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Abstract
We investigate computational aspects of popular solution concepts for different models
of network games. In chapter 3 we study balanced solutions for network bargaining games
with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number
of contracts. We fully characterize the existence of balanced solutions and provide the
first polynomial time algorithm for their computation. Our methods use a new idea of
reducing an instance with general capacities to an instance with unit capacities defined on
an auxiliary graph. This chapter is an extended version of the conference paper [32].
In chapter 4 we propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In
our model the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary bi-
nary relations, that need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization is practically
well-motivated, and as we show, encompasses the well studied hard variant of stable mar-
riage where preferences are allowed to have ties and to be incomplete. Our main result
shows that deciding the existence of a stable matching in our model is NP-complete. We
then use our model to study a long standing open problem about cyclic 3D stable match-
ings. In particular, we prove that deciding whether a fixed 2D perfect matching can be
extended to a 3D stable matching is NP-complete. This chapter is an extended version of
the conference paper [33].
In chapter 5 we study a long standing open problem of whether the nucleolus of match-
ing games can be computed efficiently. Our approach follows previous techniques that rely
on obtaining a polynomial sized characterization of the least core as both the initial and
crucial step in establishing an efficient algorithm. As a preliminary result, we introduce a
generalisation of the least core and show that for node-weighted matching games existing
polynomial sized characterizations of the least core can be extended to this generalised ver-
sion. We then use this result to show that for a certain class games with general weights
one can identify a node-weighted subgraph such that the least core of the original matching
game is equal to the generalised least core of this subgraph. This allows us to obtain a
polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for this class of matching games
with general weights.
iii
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my
advisor Jochen Ko¨nemann. I am grateful for his constant confidence in my abilities and for
allowing me to work on problems that I found both exciting and challenging. His optimism
and enthusiasm for research have been contagious over the years. I am also indebted to
Costis Georgiou, Umang Bhaskar, Bernhard von Stengel, Laura Sanita`, Chaitanya Swamy
and Kate Larson. Their input has been invaluable to the success of this thesis.
Throughout my studies I was fortunate to encounter several people whose support I
have tremendously benefited from. I am grateful to Navin Kashyap for introducing to
research and encouraging me to pursue graduate studies. I would also like to thank Luc
Devroye for all his guidance during my masters studies that has greatly contributed to my
development as a researcher.
My time in Waterloo has been enriched by the wonderful friendships that I have formed
here. I am forever thankful to all my friends that have shared this journey with me, and
have made the last four years truly memorable. I would also like to thank the wonderful
C&O staff for all their help along the way.
This research has been supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council (NSERC) of Canada.
iv
To my parents Gina and Lajos
v
Table of Contents
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Network bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Matching games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Outline of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Background 23
2.1 Matching theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Cooperative games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Matching games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Network bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Network bargaining 50
3.1 Connection to cooperative games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Reduction to unit capacity games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
vi
4 Stable matchings 71
4.1 Hardness results for SMG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Algorithmic results for SMG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Hardness results for SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5 The nucleolus of matching games with empty core 86
5.1 The least core: a special case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 A generalisation of the node-weighted result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3 The least core: a stronger result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4 Choice of optimal dual solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 Computing the nucleolus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6 Conclusion 133
References 135
vii
List of Tables
1.1 Mysterious division of a man’s estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 The preferences for the instance J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Splitting a contract with no outside options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Splitting a contract with existing outside options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 A stable but not balanced solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 A stable and balanced solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 An SMTI instance with stable matchings of different size . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6 An SMG instance with no stable matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.7 A matching game with empty core. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.8 The nucleolus of a matching game with empty core. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 An instance of a network bargaining game with general capacities. . . . . . 51
3.2 An allocation in core(N, v)∩prekernel(N, v) with no corresponding balanced
solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 A balanced solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 The two types of gadgets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Outside option is in the same component and is not saturated . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Outside option is in the same component and is saturated . . . . . . . . . 60
3.7 Outside option is not in the same component and is not saturated . . . . . 61
3.8 Outside option is not in the same component and is saturated . . . . . . . 62
ix
3.9 An instance with general capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.10 The corresponding instance with unit capacities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1 A matching game that is not node-weighted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 A least core allocation with negative excess on both triangles. . . . . . . . 89
5.3 A least core allocation with negative excess only on the left triangle. . . . . 90
5.4 Optimal dual solution and equality subgraph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.5 An matching game where ν(G=, y) < ν(G,w) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.6 Optimal dual solution and equality subgraph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.7 A least core allocation with negative excess on both triangles. . . . . . . . 100
5.8 A least core allocation with negative excess only on the left triangle. . . . . 100
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies the computational complexity of some central solution concepts in net-
work games. Networks are prevalent in every aspect of our lives. For example, in the last
decades social networks have proven to be essential to understanding human behaviour.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a vast majority of decisions that people make from which prod-
ucts to buy, to which political candidate to support, are closely tied to the choices of their
friends. As a result, social interactions and the spread of information have fundamental
effects on the outcomes of these decisions. In turn, these interactions are often governed
by the underlying structure of a network, a system of bilateral relationships between par-
ticipants. The study of such systems is therefore a crucial step in better understanding the
outcomes of human interactions.
In the game theoretic approach to networks, the inputs to the problem are assumed
to be controlled by rational, self-interested agents. This gives rise to what we refer to as
network games: situations where agents who are connected via a network interact with one
another to achieve an outcome of mutual benefit. In its simplest form, a network game is
described by a graph, where the vertices of the graph represent the agents and the edges are
the bilateral links among them. These links capture the way that the agents can interact
to derive some mutual benefit. As one would expect, the benefit derived by a given agent is
heavily dependent on those of his or her neighbours in the network. Hence, the underlying
graph-theoretical properties of the network become instrumental in determining exactly
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what type of outcomes one can expect.
Network games can also be viewed as a special case of cooperative games. Cooperative
game theory studies situations where agents can cooperate with one another by entering
in some binding agreements with each other to derive mutual benefit. In this thesis we
are particularly interested in transferable utility (TU) games, a type of cooperative games
where the value derived from cooperation can be transferred among the agents without the
use of a third entity. The main goals of such games is to determine exactly which groups,
or coalitions, of agents decide to cooperate and how they divide the total value achieved
by cooperation. In particular, a fundamental question is to determine how the agents will
divide the value fairly. In order to answer these questions, game theorists have devised
several solution concepts. A solution concept identifies a subset of rational outcomes which
are most likely to occur. One of the most widely accepted solution concepts for cooperative
games is that of stability. An outcome is said to be stable if no member of the forming
coalition has an incentive to deviate from it.
In addition to capturing rational outcomes, it is essential for solution concepts to
also have desirable computational properties. In particular, it is important to determine
whether a certain game always possesses a rational outcome according to a given solution
concept, and whether such an outcome can always be computed efficiently. This thesis is
concerned with answering exactly these type of questions. In the remainder of this chapter
we present the three main type of network games considered in this thesis together with
an overview of our main contributions for each game. We conclude with an outline of the
remaining chapters of the thesis.
1.1 Network bargaining
Exchanges in networks have been studied for a long time in both sociology and economics.
In sociology, they appear under the name of network exchange theory, a field which studies
the behaviour of agents who interact across a network to form bilateral relationships of
mutual benefit. The goal is to determine how an agent’s location in the network influences
its ability to negotiate for resources [15]. In economics, they are known as cooperative
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games [69] and have been used for studying the distribution of resources across a network,
for example in the case of two-sided markets [75] [71].
From a theoretical perspective the most commonly used framework for studying such
exchanges is that of network bargaining games. As a simple example consider the case of
two agents A and B who can choose to form a contract of value w dollars. Given no other
information about the agents,and assuming equal utilities, we would expect them to form
the contract and divide its value equally among themselves so that each agents receives
w/2 dollars as depicted in Figure 1.1.
A B
w
w
2
w
2
Figure 1.1: Splitting a contract with no outside options.
But now suppose that we are told the agents have the following backup options: if
they decide not to form the contract, then agent A can receive a total value of αA dollars
while agent B can receive a total value of αB dollars. How will this effect the negotiations
between the two agents? John Nash first proposed a solution to this scenario in his paper
[67] that became the foundation of modern bargaining theory. His idea, referred to as the
Nash bargaining solution, states that the contract is formed if and only if its value is at
least as much as αA+αB, the sum of the backup options of the two agents. Furthermore, if
the contract is formed then its value is divided according to the following rule: each agent
receives an amount equal to its backup option, and any leftover amount is split equally
between the two agents. The resulting split is depicted in Figure 1.2.
The idea of this two person Nash bargaining solution can be generalized to any number
of agents, where each agent can engage in a fixed number of contracts specified by its
capacity. This general model is described in terms of an undirected graph G = (V,E)
with edge weights w : E(G) → R+ and vertex capacities c : V (G) → Z+. The vertices
represent the agents, and the edges represent pairwise contracts that the agents can form.
3
A B
w
↵A +
w   (↵A + ↵B)
2
↵B +
w   (↵A + ↵B)
2
Figure 1.2: Splitting a contract with existing outside options.
The weight of each edge represents the value of the corresponding contract. As in the two
person scenario, if a contract is formed between two agents, its value is divided between
them, whereas if the contract is not formed neither agent receives any profit from this
specific contract. The capacity of each agent limits the number of contracts it can form.
This constraint, together with an agent’s position in the network determine its bargaining
power. The main questions that network bargaining tries to answer is which contracts are
formed and how their value is divided among agents forming the contract.
A solution for the network bargaining model specifies the set of contracts which are
formed, and how each contract is divided. Specifically, a solution consists of a pair (M, z),
where M is a c-matching of the underlying graph G, and z is a vector which assigns each
edge (u, v) two values zuv, zvu ≥ 0 corresponding to the profit that agent u, respectively
agent v, earn from the contract (u, v). To be a valid solution, the two values zuv and zvu
must add up to the value of the contract whenever the edge (u, v) belongs to the c-matching
M , and must be zero otherwise.
Solutions to network bargaining games are classified according to two main concepts:
stability and balance. A solution is stable if the profit an agent earns from any formed
contract is at least as much as its outside option: an agent’s outside option, in this context,
refers to the maximum profit that the agent can rationally receive by forming a new
contract with one of its neighbours, under the condition that the newly formed contract
would benefit both parties. The notion of balance, first introduced in [14], [71], is a
generalization of the Nash bargaining solution to the network setting. Specifically, in a
balanced solution the value of each contract is split according to the following rule: both
endpoints must earn at least their outside options, and any surplus is to be divided equally
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among them. Balanced solutions have been shown to agree with experimental evidence,
even to the point of picking up on subtle differences in bargaining power among agents
[80, 11]. This is an affirmation of the fact that these solutions are natural and represent
an important area of study.
As an example, consider the graph shown in Figure 1.3. There are five agents in the
graph denote by the vertices A,B,C,D and E. Each agent has capacity one and can engage
in at most one contract and the edges are all unit weight. One might immediately notice
that in order to maximize their total profit, the agents should choose to form contracts
corresponding to a maximum weight matching, that is either {AB,DE} or {BC,DE}.
This intuition turns out to be true, as any stable solution in a network bargaining game
must always occur on a maximum weight matching. The solution shown in Figure 1.3
A
B
C
D E1
0
0
1 0
Figure 1.3: A stable but not balanced solution.
awards the entire weight of the contract AB to the vertex B, and the entire weight of
the contract DE to the vertex D. This turns out to a stable solution since all vertices
that receive a value of 0 always have an outside option of 0, so no stability conditions are
violated. However, this solution is not balanced, since both vertices D and E have an
outside option of 0, and the Nash bargaining solution would dictate that they split the
value of their contract equally among them. The unique balanced solution to this game is
shown in Figure 1.4. Intuitively, vertex B receives the full value of its contract with A due
to its central location in the network. As for the contract between D and E, even though
E is an endpoint vertex and has no bargaining power, D’s only other connection is with a
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very powerful vertex and thus its bargaining power is no greater then E’s.
A
B
C
D E
1
2
1
2
1
0
0
Figure 1.4: A stable and balanced solution.
There is a close connection between network bargaining games and cooperative games.
Specifically given a solution (M, z) to the network bargaining game (G,w, c) we can define
a corresponding payoff vector x, where xu is just the total profit earned by vertex u from
all its contracts in the solution (M, z). Then this vector x can be seen as a solution to a
corresponding cooperative game (N, v) defined as follows: we let N = V (G) denote the set
of players, and for every subset S ⊆ N of players, we define its value v(S) as the weight
of the maximum weight c-matching of G[S]. This game is also known as the matching
game of Shapley and Shubik [75]. The subsets S ⊆ N are referred to as coalitions, and
the value v(S) of each coalition is interpreted as the collective payoff that the players in
S would receive if they decide to cooperate. The players are assumed to be able choose
which coalitions to form, and their objective is to maximize their pay-offs.
Cooperative games are often assumed to be super-additive, meaning that the value of
a union of disjoint coalitions is no less than the sum of the coalitions’ separate values.
The underlying assumption in such games is that the grand coalition N will form, and
the question becomes how to distribute the payoff v(N) among the players. A vector x
describing such a distribution is referred to as an allocation. Given an allocation x, the
excess of a coalition S is defined as v(S)− x(S). The power of player u over player v with
respect to the allocation x is the maximum excess achieved by a coalition that includes u
but excludes v. Two important concepts from cooperative games are those of the core and
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prekernel. The core consists of allocations for which no coalition has a negative excess,
whereas the prekernel consists of all allocations with symmetric powers.
1.1.1 Contributions
Our main result is providing the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced
solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities and fully characterizing the
existence of balanced solutions for these games. Specifically we show the following results.
Result 1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm which, given an instance of a network
bargaining game with general capacities and a maximum weight c-matching M , computes
a balanced solution (M, z) whenever one exists.
Result 2. A network bargaining game with general capacities has a balanced solution if
and only if it has a stable one.
Our method relies on a new approach of reducing a general capacity instance to a
network bargaining game with unit capacities defined on an auxiliary graph. This allows
us to use existing algorithms for obtaining balanced solutions for unit capacities games,
which we can then transform to balanced solutions of our original instance. This represents
a departure from previous approaches of Bateni et al. [6] who were trying to establish an
equivalence between the set of balance solutions and allocations in the intersection of the
core and prekernel of the corresponding matching game. We show that such an approach
cannot work in general, since this equivalence does not extend to all instances of general
capacity games:
Result 3. There exists an instance of a network bargaining game with general capacities
for which we can find an allocation in the intersection of the core and prekernel such that
there is no corresponding balanced solution for this allocation.
Despite this result, we provide two necessary conditions which ensure that the corre-
spondence between the set of balanced solutions and allocations in the intersection of the
core and prekernel is maintained. Using the definition of gadgets we have the following
result:
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Result 4. If the network bargaining game has no gadgets and the maximum c-matching
M is acyclic, the set of balanced solutions corresponds to the intersection of the core and
prekernel.
1.1.2 Related work
Kleinberg and Tardos [55] introduced network bargaining games to the theoretical com-
puter science community. They studied games with unit capacities and developed a polyno-
mial time algorithm for computing the entire set of balanced solutions. They also showed
that such games have a balanced solution whenever they have a stable one and that a
stable solution exists if and only if the linear programming relaxation for the maximum
weight matching of the underlying graph has an integral optimal solution. Here we are
referring to the linear program containing only the degree constraints and not the odd set
constraints.
Bateni et al. [6] were the first to generalize network bargaining games to arbitrary
capacities. They characterized the existence of stable solutions by providing a parallel
result to the case of unit weights: stable solutions exist if and only if the linear programming
relaxation for the maximum weight c-matching (again without the odd set constraints) of
the underlying graph has an integral optimal solution. For balanced solutions, they focused
on a special case of bipartite graphs where one side of the partition has unit capacities but
the other side can have arbitrary capacities. They proved an equivalence between the set
of balanced solutions of this special class of graphs and the intersection of the core and
prekernel of the corresponding matching game. This equivalence implies that balanced
solutions can be computed using an existing polynomial time algorithm of Faigle [31] for
finding allocations in the prekernel.
Network bargaining games with general capacities have also been studied by Kanoria
et al. [51] who focused on the existence of a natural local dynamics for this game. They
also provided a partial characterization of the existence of balanced solutions by proving
that if the associated linear programming relaxation has a unique optimum solution that
is integral, then a balanced solution is guaranteed to exist. They provide an algorithm for
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computing balanced solutions in this case which uses local dynamics but whose running
time is exponential.
Local dynamics in network bargaining games with unit capacities are also studied by
Azar et al. [3] who focus on a different local dynamics that assumes the maximum weight
matching M is fixed and proceeds by iteratively fixing edges that do not satisfy the Nash
bargaining solution. They show that this edge balancing dynamics converges to a balanced
outcome whenever one exists. However the rate of convergence might be exponential. In
[10] the authors analyse the same local dynamics using a new technique that relies on a
connection to random turn games. They are able to improve the previous exponential
bound on convergence to a polynomial one for the case of network bargaining games with
unit weights. Independently from these works, Draief et al. [21] showed quadratic conver-
gence of the edge balancing dynamics for the following graphs: a path, a cycle, a blossom
and a bicycle.
For general cooperative games, Maschler proposed a simple transfer scheme to approxi-
mate points in the prekernel. Stearns [78] was the first to prove convergence of this scheme,
and a simpler proof was provided by Faigle et al. [31]. In the same paper, Faigle et al.
provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding a point in the intersection of the least core
and prekernel that uses two components: a transfer scheme similar to Maschler’s and a
linear programming based update that guarantees the polynomial running time.
1.2 Stable matchings
The Stable Marriage (SM) problem is a classical bipartite matching problem first intro-
duced by Gale and Shapley [36]. An instance of the problem consists of a set n of men,
and a set of n women. Each man (woman) has a preference list that is a total order over
the entire set of women (men). The goal is to find a stable matching between the men and
women, meaning that there is no (man, woman) pair so that both prefer each other to their
current partners in the matching. Since its introduction, the stable marriage problem has
become one of the most popular combinatorial problems with several books being dedicated
to its study [42, 56, 72] and more recently [61]. The popularity of this model arises not
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only from its nice theoretical properties but also from its many applications. In particular,
a wide array of allocation problems from many diverse fields can be analysed within its
context. Some well known examples include the labour market for medical interns, auction
markets, the college admissions market, the organ donor-recipient pair market, and many
more [72].
In their seminal work Gale and Shapley showed that every instance of SM admits a
solution and such a solution can be computed efficiently using the so-called Gale-Shapley
(or man-proposing) algorithm. Among the many new variants of this classical problem, two
extensions have received most of the attention: incomplete preference lists and ties in the
preferences. Introducing either one of these extensions on its own does not pose any new
challenges, meaning that solutions are still guaranteed to exist, all solutions have the same
size, and they can be computed efficiently using a modification of the original Gale-Shapley
algorithm [37, 42]. However, the same cannot be said about the Stable Marriage problem
with Ties and Incomplete Lists (SMTI) that incorporates both extensions. In this variant,
stable matchings no longer need to be of the same size, even though they are still guaranteed
to exist. To see this consider the example depicted in Figure 1.5. The edges in the graph
denote all acceptable pairs and the numbers on the edges near a vertex denote the ranking
of each partner with respect to that vertex. Man b1 and woman c2 only have one acceptable
partner, whose ranking is by default 1. Woman c1 finds both b1 and b2 acceptable and she
is indifferent between them, since they both have rank 1. Man b2 finds both women c1 and
c2 acceptable but prefers woman c1 over woman c2. In the figure on the left the red edges
b1c1 and b2c2 denote a stable matching of size two, while in the figure on the right the red
edge b2c1 denotes a stable matching of size one.
Since SMTI instances poses solutions of different sizes, the natural question to ask is
whether one can efficiently compute a stable matching of maximum size. The answer to this
question is no, since deciding whether a given instance admits a stable matching of a given
size is NP-hard [62], even in the case where ties occur only on one side of the partition.
When ties occur in both the preferences of the men and women the problem is NP-hard to
approximate to within 33/29(> 1.1379) and UGC-hard to approximate to within 4/3 [?].
The current best approximation ratio is 3/2 [54]. When ties occur only in the preference
lists of the women, the problem is NP-hard to approximate to within 21/19(> 1.1052)
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b2
b1
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1
1
1
1
c1
b2
b1
c2
1
2
1
1
1
1
Figure 1.5: An SMTI instance with stable matchings of different size
and UGC-hard to approximate to within 5/4 [48]. The current best approximation ratio
is 25/17 [49]. We refer the reading to [61] for an excellent account of recent work on the
approximation version of this problem.
A central assumption in most variants of SM is that agents’ preferences are transitive
(i.e., if x is preferred to y, and y is preferred to z then x is also preferred to z). However,
there are several studies [7, 35, 50, 64] that suggest that non-transitive, and even cyclic
preferences arise naturally. Cyclic preferences, for example, may be introduced in the
context of multi-attribute comparisons [34]; e.g., consider the following study from [64]
where 62 college students were asked to make binary comparisons between three potential
marriage partners x,y and z according to the following three criteria: intelligence, looks
and wealth. The candidates had the following attributes: candidate x was very intelligent,
plain, and well off; candidate y was intelligent, very good looking, and poor; and candidate
z was fairly intelligent, good looking, and rich. From the 62 participants, 17 displayed the
following cyclic preference: x was preferred to y, y was preferred to z, and z was preferred
to x. In order to better capture such situations there is a need for a model that allows for
more general preferences.
Addressing this need we propose the Stable Marriage with General Preferences (SMG)
problem. As in SM, in an instance of SMG we are given n men, and n women, and the
preferences of men are complete total orders over the set of women. The preferences of
women, on the other hand, are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations over the men.
Each of these binary relations will be represented by a set R containing ordered pairs of
men. We allow the set R to be empty. We say that a woman prefers man x at least as
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much as man y if the ordered pair (x, y) is part of her preference set. A matching is then
stable as long as for every unmatched (man, woman) pair at least one member prefers her
mate in the matching at least as much as the other member of the pair.
It is easy to see that any stable matching for an SMG instance must be a perfect match-
ing. This contrasts the case of SMTI where a given instance can have stable matchings of
different size. A second difference is that unlike in SMTI, not all instances of SMG admit
a stable matching. As a simple example consider the instance of SMG depicted in Figure
1.6. This instance consists of two men b1, b2 and two women c1, c2. Both men prefer woman
c1 to woman c2. However the set of ordered pairs representing woman c1’s preferences is
empty, meaning that she does not prefer b1 at least as much as b2, nor does she prefer b2
at least as much as b1. Then given any perfect matching, woman c1 will always form a
blocking pair with the man that she is not matched to. Hence this instance does not admit
a stable matching.
c1
b2
b1
c2
1
2
1
2
Rc1 = ;
Rc2 = {(b1, b2)}
Figure 1.6: An SMG instance with no stable matching
Our SMGmodel can also be used to study a three-dimensional stable matching problem
first proposed by Knuth [56]. In particular we consider the Cyclic 3-Dimensional Stable
Matching problem (c3DSM), where we are given a set of n men, a set of n women and
in addition a set of n dogs. The preferences of the men are complete total orders over
the set of women. Similarly the women have preferences over the dogs, and the dogs have
preferences over the men. A 3D matching is said to be stable if there is no (man, woman,
dog) triple such that each member of the triple prefers this triple over the one assigned to
them in the matching. A prominent open question is whether every instance of c3DSM
admits a stable matching, and whether such a matching can be computed efficiently.
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A natural avenue for attacking c3DSM is to solve the following problem which we
refer to as Stable Extension (SE): suppose we fix a perfect matching M on the sets of dogs
and men, can we efficiently determine whether M is extendible to a 3D stable matching?
More specifically, we say that M is extendible to a 3D stable matching if there is a way
of assigning to each man-dog pair in M a woman such that the resulting 3D matching
is stable. Recall that women have preferences over dogs only, but note that the given
matching M induces preferences over their male owners as well. In essence, this allows us
to state the SE problem as a special case of the SMG model.
1.2.1 Contributions
Introducing non-transitive preferences, even when restricted to just one side of the parti-
tion, changes the properties of the model drastically. Like in SM any solution must be
a perfect matching. However, solutions are no longer guaranteed to exist. We show that
non-transitive preferences generalize both incomplete lists and ties by reducing the SMTI
to SMG. In doing so, we prove that the SMG problem is also NP-hard.
Result 5. The decision problem of whether an instance of SMG admits a solution is
NP-complete.
We then identify a significant class of instances that are solvable in polynomial time:
those where the preferences are asymmetric, meaning that for every pair of men x, y, each
woman prefers at most one to the other. We then prove the following result.
Result 6. For instances of SMG with asymmetric preferences, there exists a polynomial
time algorithm that finds a solution if and only if one exists.
We provide two different proofs. The first employs an adaptation of the classical Gale-
Shapley man-proposing algorithm. The second relies on a polyhedral characterization: we
define a polytope that is non-empty if and only if the instance admits a stable matching.
We also develop an efficient rounding algorithm for its fractional points.
Despite displaying stronger structural properties than SMG, we show that SE remains
hard to solve.
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Result 7. The decision problem of whether an instance of SE admits a solution is NP-
complete
At a high level, the strategy for proving result 7 resembles that of the proof of result
5. The details are however significantly more intricate, mainly due to the fact that SE
instances correspond to SMG instances in which preferences are induced by a given 3D
matching instance. As an interesting consequence for the c3DSM, result 7 rules out the
natural algorithmic strategy of fixing and extending a 2D perfect matching on two of the
input sets. In addition our results for SMG instances with complete preferences provide a
sufficient condition for when a perfect matching is extendable to a stable three dimensional
matching.
1.2.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the stable marriage problem with preferences given in terms
of arbitrary binary relations has not been studied before. In [1] the authors do consider a
version of SM with non-transitive preferences, however unlike in our model, the preference
relations are required to be acyclic. The authors do not study this problem directly but
instead use it as a tool for developing a reduction between the stable room-mates problem
and the stable marriage problem.
There is a rich literature about SM and its variants. In particular, there has been
significant work concerning the approximation variant of the SMTI problem, where the
goal is to find a maximum size stable matching. When ties are allowed on both sides, the
problem is NP-hard to approximate within 33/29 [?] and the currently best known ration
is 3/2 [65]. When ties are only allowed on the side of the women the problem is NP-hard
to approximate within 21/19 [43] and the currently best known ratio is 25/17 [49].
A related model, known as Stable Marriage with Indifference [45, 60], allows for pref-
erences to be given in the form of partial orders that are not necessarily expressible as a
single list involving ties. That is, the indifference relation need not be transitive. This
model allows for several definitions of stability, and depending on which definition is used,
solutions might not always exist. In particular, under strong stability, stable matchings
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might not always exists and it is show in [46] that the problem of deciding whether a
strongly stable matching exists, given an instance of the stable marriage problem with
partially ordered preferences, is NP-complete.
For c3DSM, it is known that every instance admits a stable matching for n ≤ 4 [27].
The authors conjectured that this result can be extended to general instances. In [8] it was
shown that if we allow unacceptable partners, the existence of a stable matching becomes
NP-complete. In the same paper, and also independently in [44], it was shown that the
c3DSM problem under a different notion of stability known as strong stability is also
NP-complete.
1.3 Matching games
While the core is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, unfortunately
many games have an empty core. This is particularly true for matching games, where the
core is empty whenever the weight of the maximum weight fractional matching is strictly
greater than the weight of the maximum weight integral matching. As an example consider
the matching game displayed in Figure 1.7.
A
C
B
D
6
1
55
Figure 1.7: A matching game with empty core.
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The red edges indicate the unique maximum weight matching with total weight 7.
However, the maximum weight fractional matching achieves a total weight of 8 by assigning
a value of 1/2 to each edge of the triangle. It can be easily checked that there is no way to
divide the 7 units among the five vertices while ensuring that the endpoints of each edge
receive a total value equal to at least the weight of the edge. Indeed, any allocation x that
satisfies x(e) ≥ w(e) for every edge e of our graph would need to have xA + xB + xC ≥ 8.
Hence the core of this matching game is empty.
Even if the core is non-empty, it might be a very large set, meaning that the question
of which outcome is the most fair remains largely unanswered. To address these issues
Schmeidler [73] introduced the concept of the nucleolus as a single point solution concept
for cooperative games. The idea behind the nucleolus is that it recursively maximizes the
pay-off of the least satisfied coalition. For a more formal definition, we need the notion
of excess. Given a coalition S, and an allocation x : 2N → R, the excess of S with
respect to x is defined as x(S)− v(S). This difference captures the incentive of a coalition
to deviate: if the excess is positive, then the coalition is fairly satisfied and would have
no incentive to deviate; while if the excess is negative then the coalition would have an
incentive to deviate since its agents can derive more value by leaving the grand coalition
and cooperating among themselves. The nucleolus can then be defined as the allocation
that lexicographically maximizes the vector of non-decreasingly ordered excesses over the
set of all allocations.
Figure 1.8 displays the nucleolus for the same matching game that we considered in
Figure 1.7. Since the core is empty as we observed, there have to be some coalitions that
receive negative excess. These are exactly the coalitions corresponding to the triangle
edges, and each one of them has an excess of −2/3.
While its definition might seem hard to digest, the nucleolus turns out to have several
very nice properties. For instance, it always exists and it is part of the core whenever
the core is non-empty. But perhaps most importantly, the nucleolus is always unique,
meaning that it specifies a unique way to divide the value of the grand coalition among
all the agents. Due to these properties, applications of the nucleolus have arisen in many
fields such as cost allocations problems, surplus sharing problems, and in insurance and
bankruptcy policies [58].
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AC
B
D
6
1
0
55
5
3
8
3
8
3
Figure 1.8: The nucleolus of a matching game with empty core.
The nucleolus has also been used to explain a rather curious division problem from
the Babylonian Talmud, whose solution has puzzled academics for thousands of years [2].
The problem concerns a man that dies with outstanding debts to three creditors. Creditor
1 is owed 100, creditor 2 is owed 200, and creditor 3 is owed 300. It is decided that in
order to make up for his debts, the man’s estate will be divided among the three creditors.
The question is, what proportion of the estate should each creditor get? The Talmud
offers answers for three different scenarios: when the estate size is 100, 200, and 300. The
answers are portrayed in Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1: Mysterious division of a man’s estate
Estate size Creditor 1 Creditor 2 Creditor 3
100 100/3 100/3 100/3
200 50 75 75
300 50 100 150
When the size of the estate is 100, the suggested division gives equal amounts to each
creditor, while when the size of the estate is 300 the amounts are proportional to the
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amount of money owed. Perhaps even more puzzling is the suggested division for the 200
case, where the second and third creditor receive equal amounts, while the first receives a
smaller amount. Not being able to explain the pattern behind this decisions, many scholars
have suggested that 200 case an error introduced during transcription. However, Aumann
and Maschler [2] showed that the divisions given in the Talmud correspond to the nucleolus
of a properly defined cooperative game. Intuitively, any subset of creditors S ⊆ {1, 2, 3} can
guarantee themselves an amount equal to the maximum between zero and the remainder of
the estate after every creditor outside S has been paid in full. This characteristic function
defines a cooperative game whose nucleolus coincides with the value given in the table.
For example for the case where the estate size is 200, each coalition S ⊆ {1, 2, 3} \ {2, 3}
has value v(S) = 0 while v(S) = 100 for S = {2, 3}. The excess vector corresponding
corresponding to the suggested division of (50, 75, 75) is (50, 50, 75, 75, 125, 125) and this
is indeed the unique lexicographically maximum over the set of all allocations.
Due to its many applications and useful properties, the question of whether the nu-
cleolus can be computed efficiently is a major problem in cooperative games. This is
particularly true for matching games. For the case of matching games with non-empty
core, and matching games with unit weights, polynomial time algorithms for computing
the nucleolus have been known to exist for a while. However, for matching games with
empty core and general weights, the question remains to be answered and it is considered
one of the major open problems in the area.
1.3.1 Contributions
We study the open question of whether the nucleolus can be computed efficiently for
matching games with an empty core and general weights. We follow previous techniques
that compute the nucleolus using a sequence of linear programs that iteratively refine the
underlying feasible region until it consists of a single allocation that is the nucleolus of
the game. The main challenge in turning this procedure into a polynomial time algorithm
is describing each linear program using only a polynomial number of constraints. The
first linear program in this sequence defines the least core, which is the set of allocations
that maximize the minimum excess of a coalition. Thus, obtaining a polynomial sized
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characterization of the least core is the initial step in establishing an efficient algorithm.
In fact, this also turns out to be the crucial step since similar characterizations can be
obtained for all subsequent linear programs by induction.
As part of our results we require a generalisation of the least core obtained by relaxing
the requirement that the total value of an allocation equals the maximum weight of a
matching. Instead we allow a total value of ∆, where ∆ is a fixed constant that is at
least the maximum weight of a matching and strictly less than the maximum weight of
a fractional matching. Our first result shows that existing characterizations of the least
core be extended to this generalised least core for matching games that are node-weighted,
meaning that the weight of each edge can be obtained as the sum of non-negative weights
of the endpoints.
Result 8. There exists a polynomial sized characterization of the generalised least core of
any matching game that is node-weighted.
We then use this result as follows: given a weighted graph (G,w) that has an empty core
and is not node-weighted we first obtain an optimal dual solution y to the maximum weight
fractional matching problem for (G,w). We then look at the subgraph G[y] of G that is
induced by the edges of G that are tight with respect to y, and consider the generalised
least core of G[y] obtained by setting ∆ to be equal to the maximum weight of a matching
in (G,w). If this is equal to the weight of a maximum weight matching in (G[y], w), then
this is just the regular least core of G[y]. However, since this might not always be the case,
we really require the generalisation of the least core. Given this generalised least core,
we check whether it contains any extendable allocations, where extendable allocations are
defined as having the same minimum excess in both G and G[y]. The following is then our
main result.
Result 9. If the generalised least core of G[y] contains at least one extendable allocation,
then the least core of G is equal to the set of all extendable allocations. Moreover, the
nucleolus of the matching game (G,w) can be computed in polynomial time.
We conclude the chapter by showing that the existence of an extendable allocation is
independent of our original choice of optimal dual solution.
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Result 10. Let y1 and y2 be two optimal solutions to the dual of the maximum weight
fractional matching linear program of (G,w). Then the generalised least core of G[y1]
contains an extendable allocation if and only if the generalised least core of G[y2] contains
an extendable allocation.
1.3.2 Related work
This computational complexity of the nucleolus for cooperative games has been studied by
Maschler et al. [63] who devised an approach, often referred to as Maschler’s scheme, that
is based on solving a sequence of linear programs that refine the core until it becomes a
singleton set containing exactly the nucleolus. While the number of linear programs in this
scheme is no more then the number of agents in the game, each linear program contains an
exponential number of constraints, one for each coalition. In general it is unclear whether
these linear programs can be solved efficiently [18].
On the positive side, there are several polynomial time algorithms for computing the
nucleolus for certain classes of cooperative games. Solymosi and Raghavan [76] provide
a combinatorial algorithm for computing the nucleolus of matching games on bipartite
graphs, also known as assignment games. An important property of this class of games is
that the core is always non-empty. Biro et al. extend this result to non-bipartite graphs
but maintaining the assumption that the core is non-empty. Chen et al. [13] provide an
algorithm for fractional matching games, whose core is also non-empty.
Kern and Paulusma [53] were the first to study matching games with an empty core in
the case where all edges have unit weight. They provide a polynomial time algorithm for
computing the nucleolus that relies on initially obtaining a polynomial sized description of
the least core, which is the first linear program that has to be solved in Maschler’s scheme.
In Paulusma’s thesis [68] this result is extended to node-weighted games, matching games
where there exists an assignment of non-negative weights to the nodes of the graph such
that the weight of each edges is equal to the sum of the node weights of its endpoints.
Faigle et al. [29] propose a different solution concept called the nucleon, which differs
from the nucleolus by defining the excess of a coalition as x(S)/v(S) as supposed to x(S)−
v(S). They provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleon of any matching game.
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Outside of matching games, efficient algorithms for computing the nucleolus have also
been found for standard tree games [66, 40], convex games [57], flow games [19] , cyclic-
permutation games [77], airport profit games [9] and spanning connectivity games [4] among
others.
On the negative side, several hardness results also exist. For the case of minimum
cost spanning tree games Faigle et al. showed that testing core membership [28] as well
as computing the nucleolus [30] are NP-hard. A similar result is shown by Elkind et
al. [25] for weighted threshold games. In a follow up paper Elkind et al. [26] provide
a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm that computes the nucleolus for k-vector weighted
voting games.
For an excellent treatise of general computational issues arising in cooperative game
theory we refer the reader to [12].
1.4 Outline of the thesis
In chapter 2 we introduce the main terminology and background results requires for this
thesis. Section 2.1 introduces the main matching theory concepts. This includes the
maximum weight matching and maximum weight fractional matching problems and cor-
responding linear programming formulations in 2.1.1, the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
of a graph and its properties in 2.1.2, and c-matchings in 2.1.3. The major concepts of
cooperative games are all defined in the section 2.2: the core 2.2.1, the least core 2.2.2, the
nucleolus 2.2.3, and the prekernel 2.2.4. Section 2.3 introduces the special type of coop-
erative games studied in this thesis: matching games, and their generalisation c-matching
games 2.3.6. We review some famous results specific to matching games regarding the 2.3.1,
the least core 2.3.2 and a linear programming scheme for computing the nucleolus 2.3.3.
We also introduce existing results for computing the nucleolus when the core is non-empty
2.3.4, and when the graph is node-weighted 2.3.5. In section 2.4 we introduce network bar-
gaining games and review existing results regarding unit capacities 2.4.1 and connections
to cooperative games 2.4.2. In section 2.5 we introduce stable matchings including the
classical stable marriage model in 2.5.1 together with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the gen-
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eralisation known as stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists in 2.5.2 and extensions
to three dimensions in 2.5.3.
In chapter 3 we present our result on network bargaining games with general capacities.
Section 3.1 contains the results 3 and 4, while section 3.2 contains results 1 and 2. In chapter
4 we have the results for stable matchings, in particular result 5 in section 4.1, result 6 in
section 4.2 and result 7 in section 4.3. In chapter 5 we present out results on matching
games with empty core and general weights. Result 8 is presented in section 5.2, result 9
in sections 5.3 and 5.5, and result 10 in section 5.4. Finally in chapter 6 we conclude with
some directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Matching theory
In this chapter we review some fundamental results from matching theory that will be used
throughout the thesis. For a more in depth take on these topics we refer the reader to [59].
2.1.1 Maximum weight matchings
We let G denote an undirected simple graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G).
The edges of G have weights given by a vector w ∈ R|E(G)|. For the purposes of this
thesis we can assume that the weight vector is non-negative, meaning that we ≥ 0 for all
e ∈ E(G). For a given vertex v ∈ V (G) we let δ(v) denote the set of edges in E(G) that
are incident with v. Given a subset of vertices S ⊆ V (G) we denote by γ(S) the set of
edges in E(G) with both endpoints in S and let G[S] denote the subgraph of G with vertex
set S and edge set γ(S). Given a vector x defined over a finite set N and S ⊆ N we use
the standard notation x(S) to denote
∑
i∈S xi. In particular if x ∈ R|V (G)| and e is an edge
with endpoints u and v then x(e) denotes xu + xv.
We start by introducing the main underlying notion of this thesis: a matching.
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Definition 2.1.1. A matching of G is a subset of edges M ⊆ E(G) no two of which share
an endpoint. The weight of M is w(M) =
∑
e∈M we. The maximum weight of a matching
of G is denoted by ν(G) and defined as
ν(G) := max {w(M) : M is a matching } .
A matching M is said to cover a vertex v ∈ V if |M ∩ δ(v)| = 1, and otherwise M is
said to expose v. A matching M is perfect if it does not expose any vertex of the graph,
and near-perfect if it exposes exactly one vertex of the graph.
A graph G is factor critical if G has no perfect matching but for each vertex v of G
there exists a near-perfect matching of G exposing v.
Given two disjoint sets of vertices A and B we say that a matching M matches A
completely into B if each vertex of A is matched by M to a vertex of B.
We say that a matching M is a maximum weight matching if w(M) = ν(G) and a
maximum cardinality matching if |M | ≥ |N | for any other matching N . We define the
linear program
(PFM) max
∑
e∈E(G)
wexe (2.1)
x(δ(u)) ≤ 1 for all u ∈ V (G)
xe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E(G).
The dual linear program to PFM is
(DFM) min
∑
u∈V (G)
yu (2.2)
yu + yv ≥ we for all e = (u, v) ∈ E(G)
yu ≥ 0 for all u ∈ V (G).
This brings us to the definition of a fractional matching.
Definition 2.1.2. A fractional matching is a vector x that is a feasible solution to PFM .
The weight of a fractional matching x is
∑
e∈E(G) xewe, the objective value achieved by the
solution x. The optimal value of PFM is denoted by νf (G).
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We say that a fractional matching x is a maximum weight fractional matching if∑
e∈E xewe = νf (G). Since the incidence vector of any matching is a feasible solution
to PFM we immediately have ν(G) ≤ νf (G). The following is a famous result of Egerva´ry
[24].
Theorem 2.1.3. If G is bipartite then νf (G) = ν(G).
For non-bipartite graphs this is no longer true since the optimal solution to PFM might
be fractional. However the following result states that any optimal solution to PFM is
half-integral [5]
Theorem 2.1.4. Let x∗ be a basic solution to PFM . Then x∗e ∈
{
0, 1
2
, 1
}
for all e ∈ E(G)
and the edges
{
e ∈ E(G) : x∗e = 12
}
induce vertex disjoint odd cycles.
We say that a basic fractional matching x∗ is perfect if
∑
e∈δ(v) x
∗
e = 1 for all vertices
v ∈ V (G). We will require the following result from [17], also found in [70], about fractional
matching of factor critical graphs.
Theorem 2.1.5. Let G be a factor critical graph with |V (G)| > 1. For each vertex v ∈
V (G) there exists a basic perfect fractional matching x∗ of G such that
{
e ∈ E(G) : x∗e = 12
}
contains a single cycle C that passes through v.
The complementary slackness conditions imply that any maximum weight fractional
matching x∗ and optimal dual solution y∗ to DFM must satisfy
y∗u + y
∗
v = we for all e = (u, v) ∈ E(G) such that x∗e > 0 (2.3)
x∗(δ(v)) = 1 for all v ∈ V (G) such that y∗v > 0 (2.4)
Let Vodd be the set of all odd sized subsets of V of size at least 3. We define the linear
program
(PM) max
∑
e∈E(G)
wexe (2.5)
x(δ(u)) ≤ 1 for all u ∈ V (G)
x(γ(B)) ≤ (|B| − 1)/2 for all B ∈ Vodd
xe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E(G).
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The dual linear program to PM is given by
(DM) min
∑
u∈V
yu +
∑
B∈Vodd
|B| − 1
2
zB (2.6)
yu + yv +
∑
B ∈ Vodd: e ∈ γ(B)
zB ≥ we for all e = (u, v) ∈ E(G) (2.7)
yu ≥ 0 for all u ∈ V (G)
zB ≥ 0 for all B ∈ Vodd.
Note that any incidence vector of a matching is a feasible solution to PM . Hence the
optimal value of PM is clearly an upper bound on ν(G). The following classic result of
Edmonds [22] states that this bound is exact.
Theorem 2.1.6. The optimal value of PM is equal to ν(G).
Despite the exponential number of constraints of the linear program PM , a celebrated
result of Edmonds [22] provides a polynomial time combinatorial algorithm that constructs
a primal-dual optimal pair to PM and DM . This algorithm is known as Edmonds blossom
algorithm, and for a detailed description of it we refer the reader to [16]. For the purposes
of this thesis it suffices to use the fact that a maximum weight matching of G can be
computed in polynomial time.
2.1.2 Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
For our results we will need the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of a graph. In order to
describe this decomposition we first need to introduce some more notation.
Definition 2.1.7. Let A ⊆ V (G). We let C = C(A) denote the set of even sized components
of G\A and D = D(A) the set of odd sized components of G\A. The subset A is called a
Tutte set if every maximum cardinality matching M in G can be decomposed as
M = MC ∪MA,D ∪MD
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where MC is a perfect matching in the union of all even components C; MD induces a
near-perfect matching in all odd components D ∈ D; and MA,D is a matching that matches
A completely into ∪D the union of odd components.
The following theorem proven by both Gallai [38, 39] and Edmonds [23] guarantees
that we can compute such a set efficiently and lists some of its useful properties.
Theorem 2.1.8. Given a graph G, one can construct a Tutte set A ⊆ V (G) in polynomial
time such that
1. Each odd component D ∈ D is factor critical.
2. For each D ∈ D there exists a maximum cardinality matching in G that exposes a
vertex of D.
The triple (A(G),D(G), C(G)) is called the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G. The
components in D(G) are referred to as odd components, while the ones in C(G) are referred
to as even components.
2.1.3 Vertex capacities
If in addition to edge weights we also have vertex capacities we use the following generalised
definition of a matching.
Definition 2.1.9. Let G be a graph with vertex capacities cv ∈ Z+ for all v ∈ V (G). A
c-matching of G is a subset of edges M ⊆ E(G) satisfying
|M ∩ δ(v)| ≤ cv for all v ∈ V (G).
We let νc(G) denote the maximum weight of a c-matching in G.
We define the linear program
(P cFM) max
∑
e∈E
wexe (2.8)
x(δ(u)) ≤ cu for all u ∈ V (G)
0 ≤ xe ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E(G).
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We let νcf (G) denote the optimal value of P
c
FM .
2.2 Cooperative games
In this section we introduce the main concepts from cooperative game theory that are used
in this thesis.
Definition 2.2.1. A cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, · · · , n} is a finite
set and v : 2N → R+ is a function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The set N is said to represent the
agents of the game, and the function v is called the characteristic function of the game.
A subset of agents S ⊆ N is called a coalition and the set N is called the grand coalition.
The function v assigns to each coalition an outcome v(S) called the value of coalition S.
This value represents the total benefit that the players in S can derive by choosing to
cooperate and form the coalition S. However, v(S) does not specify anything about how
this value should be split among the agents in S.
Our definition of cooperative games implicitly assumes that the value v(S) can be
divided amongst the agents in S in any way that they choose. Such games are also referred
to as transferable utility games or TU -games for short.
All cooperative games considered in this thesis have the property that it is always
profitable for two different coalitions to join together. This is formally known as super
additivity.
Definition 2.2.2. A cooperative game (N, v) is super additive if it satisfies v(S ∪ T ) ≥
v(S) + v(T ) for all pairs of disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N .
In super additive games there is no benefit for the agents to form disjoint coalitions,
since they can always derive at least as much profit by joining in the grand coalition. It is
thus assumed for such games that the grand coalition will always form, and the remaining
question is to decide how the agents divide the total value v(N) amongst themselves. A
vector that specifies such a division is called an allocation.
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Definition 2.2.3. An allocation of the cooperative game (N, ν) is a vector x ∈ RN+ that
satisfies x(N) = v(S). The set of all allocations of (N, v) is denoted by I(N, v).
If in addition to being an allocation, a vector x satisfies x({i}) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N
then x is called an imputation. Intuitively this correspond to individual rationality since it
ensures that no one is worse off by cooperating. The type of cooperative games considered
in this thesis all have the property that v({i}) = 0 for any i ∈ N , therefore we do not need
to make a distinction between allocations and imputations.
2.2.1 The core
The excess of a coalition S ⊆ N with respect to an allocation x is defined as
e(S, x) := x(S)− v(S)
The core represents the set of all allocations under which no coalition has negative
excess.
Definition 2.2.4. The core of a cooperative game (N, v) is defined as
core(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) : x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}
2.2.2 The least core
While the core is a very important solution concept, it can often be empty. After all, the
requirement of satisfying every single coalition is rather strong. As an alternative, one
often works with a relaxation of the core that is guaranteed to be non-empty. To define
this relaxation, we first introduce the concept of minimum excess. Given an allocation x
we define the minimum excess of a coalition with respect to x as
emin(x) := min {e(S, x) : ∅ 6= S 6= N}
We then maximize this value over the set of allocations to obtain
1 := max
x∈I(N,v)
emin(x).
Note that 1 ≥ 0 if and only if the core is non-empty.
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Definition 2.2.5. The least core of a cooperative game (N, v) is defined as
leastcore(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) : x(S) ≥ v(S) + 1 for all S ⊆ N}
Unlike the core, the least core is always non-empty. Furthermore, the least core is a
subset of the core whenever the latter is non-empty.
2.2.3 The nucleolus
One can refine the concept of the least core by extending the idea of maximizing the
minimum excess. Given any allocation x, we define the excess vector θ(x), as the 2N−2
dimensional vector whose components are the excesses e(S, x), arranged in non-decreasing
order, of all the coalitions ∅ 6= S ⊂ N . A vector x ∈ Rm is said to be lexicographically
smaller than or equal to y ∈ Rm, denoted by x  y, if x = y or there exists an index j,
1 ≤ j < n, such that xi = yi for all i ≤ j and xj+1 < yj+1. We now arrive at the definition
of the nucleolus.
Definition 2.2.6. The nucleolus of a cooperative game (N, v) is defined as
η(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) : θ(y)  θ(x) for all y ∈ I(N, v)}
That is, the nucleolus is the set of allocations that lexicographically maximize θ(x) over
the set of allocations I(N, v). If follows immediately from definition that the nucleolus
always exists and is a subset of the least core. It is not immediately clear however that the
nucleolus defines a unique point. The result was first shown in [73].
Theorem 2.2.7. The set η(N, v) consists of exactly one point.
2.2.4 The prekernel
Another important solution concept for cooperative games is the prekernel. In order to
define it this we first need to introduce the notion of power. Let (N, v) be a cooperative
30
game, and i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. The power of i over j with respect to the allocation x is
defined as
sij(x) := max
S⊆N :i∈S,j /∈S
v(S)− x(S). (2.9)
The prekernel is a solution concept based on the idea that these powers should be equalized.
Definition 2.2.8. The prekernel of a cooperative game (N, v) is defined as
prekernel(N, v) := {x ∈ I(N, v) : sij(x) = sji(x) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}
While its definition is not very intuitive, the prekernel does have some nice connections
to other solution concepts. The prekernel is always non-empty and satisfies the following
property [31]
Theorem 2.2.9. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game. If core(N, v)∩ prekernel(N, v) consists
of a single point x∗ ∈ R|N |, then x∗ is the nucleolus of the game.
2.3 Matching games
Matching games are a special class of cooperative games derived from an underlying max-
imum matching problem.
Definition 2.3.1. Given an undirected simple graph G = (V,E) with edge weights w :
E → R+ we define the corresponding matching game on G as the cooperative game (N, v)
where N = V and
v(S) := ν(G[S]) for all S ⊆ N
where ν(G[S]) = max {w(M) : M is a matching in G[S]}
Matching games are super additive. A matching game on a bipartite graph is also
called an assignment game.
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2.3.1 The core
It turns out that for matching games, the core can be characterized using only the con-
straints corresponding to coalitions of size one and two [68].
Theorem 2.3.2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and (N, v) the
corresponding matching game on G. Then
core(N, v) = {x ∈ R+ : x(N) = v(N) and x(e) ≥ we for all e ∈ E} .
Recall our definition of the linear program PFM for the maximum weight matching
problem
(PFM) max
∑
e∈E
wexe
x(δ(u)) ≤ 1 (u ∈ V )
xe ≥ 0 (e ∈ E)
and its dual
(DFM) min
∑
u∈V
yu
yu + yv ≥ we (e = uv ∈ E)
yu ≥ 0 (u ∈ V ).
Using our new characterization of the core we can see that y is a core allocation if and
only if y is a feasible solution to DFM with objective value ν(G). We therefore have the
following useful observation, also found in [20].
Theorem 2.3.3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and (N, v) the
corresponding matching game on G. Then core(N, v) 6= ∅ if and only if νf (G) = ν(G).
Furthermore, from complementary slackness we have that for any x ∈ core(N, v)
• xi = 0 for all i ∈ V such that i is exposed by a maximum weight matching
• x(e) = we for all e ∈ E such that e belongs to a maximum weight matching
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2.3.2 The least core
In addition to the core having a nice representation for matching games, the description
of the least core can also be simplified using the following observation from [68].
Theorem 2.3.4. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and (N, v) the
corresponding matching game on G. Then core(N, v) ⊆ RN+ .
This allows us to work with the following equivalent characterization of the core. Let
M be the set of all matchings in G. Define the linear program
(P1) maximize  (2.10)
subject to x(M) ≥ w(M) +  M ∈M
x(V ) = ν(G)
x ≥ 0.
For any  let P1() be the set of vectors x so that (x, ) is a feasible solution to P1, and let
1 is the optimum value of P1. Theorem 2.3.4 implies that leastcore(N, v) = P1(1).
2.3.3 The nucleolus: Maschler’s scheme
In this subsection we review the standard procedure used for computing the nucleolus
found in [63]. This procedure applies to any cooperative game (N, v) but we assume here
that (N, v) is a matching game. We start by solving the linear program
(Q1) maximize 
s.t. x(S) ≥ v(S) +  for all S /∈ S0
x(N) = v(N).
where S0 := {∅, N}.
Let 1 be the optimum value for Q1 and for a given  define Q1() to be the set of all x
such that (x, ) is feasible for Q1. Note that under these definitions, we have core(N, v) =
Q1(0) and leastcore(N, v) = Q1(1).
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Now if Q1(1) does not consist of a single point we proceed by defining S1 to be the set
of coalitions that are fixed by Q1(1)
S1 := {S ⊆ N : x(S) = v(S) + 1 for all x ∈ Q1(1)}
And we solve the second linear program
(Q2) maximize 
s.t. x(S) = v(S) + 1 for all S ∈ S1
x(S) ≥ v(S) +  for all S /∈ S0 ∪ S1
x(N) = v(N)
defining in a similar way 2 be the optimum value for Q2 , Q2(2) to be the set of all x
such that (x, 2) is feasible to Q2 and
S2 := {S ⊆ N : x(S) = v(S) + 2 for all x ∈ Q2(2)}
We continue in this way until we reach
(Qr) maximize 
s.t. x(S) = v(S) + 1 for all S ∈ S1
x(S) = v(S) + 2 for all S ∈ S2
...
x(S) = v(S) + r−1 for all S ∈ Sr−1
x(S) ≥ v(S) +  for all S /∈ ∪r−1i=0Si
x(N) = v(N)
such that Qr(r) consists of a single point η(N, v), the nucleolus of the game.
It follows from the definition of this procedure that 1 < 2 < · · · < r and η(N, v) =
Qr(r) ⊂ Qr−1(r−1) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Q2(2) ⊂ Q1(1). Since in each iteration at least one equality
constraints is added that is independent from the previous equality constraints, it follows
that the dimension of feasible region of the above sequence of LPs decreases by at least 1
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with each iteration. Hence r ≤ |N | and the number of LP’s is polynomial in the size of
the input.
Despite the number of iterations being polynomial, there remain two main difficulties
for turning this procedure into an efficient algorithm. The first is computing the sets of
coalitions that are fixed at every step, and the second is dealing with the exponential
number of constraints. One way of circumventing the latter is via a polynomial-time
separation oracle, an algorithm that, given a candidate feasible solution, either confirms
that it is feasible or outputs a violated constraint. Given such an oracle, one could solve
each of the LP’s efficiently using the ellipsoid method [41, 74]. Our approach in this thesis
will be different. We focus instead on obtaining an equivalent characterization for each LP
that contains only a polynomial number of constraints.
2.3.4 The nucleolus when the core is non-empty
In the case of matching games with a non-empty core, Maschler’s scheme can be turned into
a polynomial time algorithm by including the constraints corresponding only to coalitions
of size one and two.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and (N, v) the corresponding
matching game on G. Suppose that core(N, v) 6= ∅ or equivalently ν(G) = νf (G). The
key observation is that if the core is non-empty then the optimal value k of each LP Qk
in Maschler’s scheme is non-negative. Hence the constraints
x(e) ≥ we + k for all e ∈ E
xi ≥ k for all e ∈ N
imply all the constraints x(S) ≥ v(S) + k for all S ⊆ N . Therefore we can replace the LP
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Qk with the equivalent program
(Q+k ) maximize 
s.t. x(e) = we + 1 for all e ∈ E1
xi = 1 for all e ∈ N1
x(e) = we + 2 for all e ∈ E2
xi = 2 for all i ∈ N2
...
x(e) = we + k−1 for all e ∈ Ek−1
xi = k−1 for all i ∈ Nk−1
x(e) ≥ we +  for all e /∈ ∪k−1j=0Ej
xi ≥  for all i /∈ ∪k−1j=0Nj
x(N) = v(N)
where Ej is the set of all edges for which x(e) = we + j for all x ∈ Q+j and Nj is the
set of all vertices i ∈ N for which xi = j for all x ∈ Q+j and Nj. Since each Q+K has a
polynomial number of constraints, each linear program in Maschler’s scheme can now be
solved efficiently, and thus we have the following result also stated in [68].
Theorem 2.3.5. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and (N, v) the
corresponding matching game on G. If core(N, v) 6= ∅ then the nucleolus of (N, v) can be
computed in polynomial time.
2.3.5 The nucleolus for node weighted matching games
The approach in the previous section that relied on replacing Qk with the equivalent
program Q+k fails whenever k < 0. Therefore a new technique is needed to reduce the
constraints of each LP to a polynomial number.
In this section we review the result of Paulusma [68] that achieves this for the case of
matching games that have an empty core, but whose weights satisfy the following property.
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Definition 2.3.6. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+. We say that
G is node-weighted if there exists a vector y ∈ RV+ such that for all e = (u, v) ∈ E we have
we = yu + yv.
The main idea behind Paulusma’s result is obtaining an equivalent characterization of
the least core, that unlike the linear program P1 2.10, contains only a polynomial number
of constraints. Once this characterization is obtained, it is not too difficult to prove by
induction that each subsequent linear program in Maschler’s scheme can also be written
with only a polynomial number of constraints.
We present here Paulusma’s characterization of the least core. LetG be a node-weighted
graph where the node weights are given by the vector y ∈ R|V |. Recall that the least core
is the set of all allocations that maximize the minimum excess. Using the representation
of the least core given by the linear program P1, this essentially means that the least core
is the set of all allocation x that maximize the minimum excess of a matching, where the
excess of a matching M is given by
x(M)− w(M) =
∑
e∈M
(x(e)− we) =
∑
e∈M
(x(e)− y(e)) .
Since we are assuming that the core is empty it follows that ν(G) < y(V ), since otherwise
y would be a core allocation. Therefore for any allocation x we must have x(V ) < y(V ).
Hence there will be at least one edge e with negative excess, meaning that x(e) < y(e).
A crucial observation of [68] is that the set of edges that receive negative excess are the
same for any least core allocation. More specifically, it is shown in [68] that there exists
a partition of the edge set E into two sets E≥0 and E≤0 such that for any allocation
x ∈ leastcore(N, v) we have
x(e)− we ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E≤0
x(e)− we ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E≥0
Note that this also implies that any matching with minimum excess will be contained in
the set E≤0. In fact, the set of matchings with minimum excess will be the same for any
allocation x ∈ leastcore(N, v).
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This partition of the edge set into edges receiving non-positive, respectively non-
negative, excess in any least core allocation is based on the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
of the graph. Let (A,D, C) be the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G, as defined in 2.1.8.
It is not too difficult to see that the emptyness of the core implies that there must exist at
least one non-trivial component D ∈ D with |D| > 1 [68]. It is these non-trivial odd sized
components that account for the negative excess in the graph. That is, the partition of E
is obtained by letting
E≤0 =
⋃
D∈D
E(D))
E≥0 = E\E≤0
where E(D) is the edge set of the component D for all D ∈ D. However, this observation
by itself is not sufficient to obtain a polynomial sized characterization of the least core. In
fact, something stronger turns out to be true: for each component D ∈ D the excess across
all edges in E(D) is equal. This implies that for any least core allocation, every maximum
cardinality matching contained in the union of the odd components must have minimum
excess. Hence it suffices to include only one constraint of the type x(M) ≥ w(M) +  for
a fixed maximum cardinality matching on the odd components.
We state Paulusma’s main result [68] below.
Theorem 2.3.7. Let G be a node-weighted graph with respect to the non-negative node
weights y ∈ R|V (G)|+ . Let D(G) denote the set of odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai
decomposition of G and fix M1 to be an arbitrary maximum cardinality matching contained
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in the union of these odd components. Define the linear program P˜ = P˜ (G, y) as
(P˜ ) maximize 
subject to x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E\
(⋃
D∈D
E(D)
)
xi ≤ yi for all i ∈
⋃
D∈D
V (D)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ V (D), D ∈ D(G)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ν(G, y)
x ≥ 0
and let ˜1 = ˜1(G, y) denote its optimum value. Then ˜1(G, y) = 1(G, y) and
leastcore(G, y) = P˜ (1).
Paulusma showed that this result leads to an efficient computation of the nucleolus by
proving by induction that equivalent polynomial sized characterization can be obtained for
each subsequent linear program in Maschler’s scheme.
2.3.6 Vertex capacities
In the case where we also have capacities on the vertices we can define a generalised
c-matching game as follows.
Definition 2.3.8. Given an undirected simple graph G = (V,E) with edge weights w :
E → R+ and vertex capacities c : V → Z+ we define the corresponding c-matching game
as the cooperative game (N, v) where N = V and
v(S) = max {w(M) : M is a c-matching in G[S]}
for all S ⊆ N .
The following result from [52] is an analogue of theorem 2.3.3 for general capacities
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Theorem 2.3.9. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with edge weights w : E → R+ and ver-
tex capacities c : V → Z+, and let (N, v) be the corresponding c-matching game. Then
core(N, v) 6= ∅ if and only if the weight of the maximum weight c-matching is equal to the
optimal value of the linear program P cFM given in section 2.1.
2.4 Network bargaining
In this section we review all the basic definition and notations regarding network bargaining
games.
Definition 2.4.1. An instance of a network bargaining game with general capacities is
a triple (G,w, c) where G is a undirected graph, w ∈ R|E|+ is a vector of edge weights, and
c ∈ Z|V |+ is a vector of vertex capacities. If we omit the capacity vector c then (G,w) defines
an instance of a network bargaining game with unit capacities.
Given a c-matching M , we let du denote the degree of vertex u in M . We say that
vertex u is saturated in M if du = cu. The following definition specifies exactly what we
mean by a solution to such a game.
Definition 2.4.2. A solution to a network bargaining game (G,w, c) is a pair (M, z)
where M is a c-matching of G and z is a vector belonging to R2|E|+ that assigns each edge
e = (u, v) ∈ E a pair of values zuv, zvu such that zuv + zvu = wuv if (u, v) ∈ M and
zuv = zvu = 0 otherwise.
The allocation associated with the solution (M, z) is the vector x ∈ R|V | where xu
represents the total payoff of vertex u in the solution (M, z)
xu =
∑
(u,v)∈δ(u)
zuv, (2.11)
An important concept for network bargaining games is that of an outside option.
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Definition 2.4.3. The outside option of vertex u with respect to a solution (M, z) is
defined as
αu(M, z) := max
(
0, max
(u,v)∈E(G)\M
(
wuv − 1[dv=cv ] min
vw∈M
zvw
))
,
where 1E is the indicator function for the event E, which takes value one whenever the
event holds, and zero otherwise. If {v : uv ∈ E(G)\M} = ∅ then we set αu(M, z) = 0. We
write αu instead of αu(M, z) whenever the context is clear.
The outside option is meant to capture the maximum payoff that a vertex could earn
by breaking one of its current contracts in M and making a new contract. The idea behind
the definition is that in order for a vertex u to make a new contract with a neighbour v,
v must not be worse off after forming the contract with u. Now if v is unsaturated in M
it can just form a new contract with u and even by earning zero profit from this contract
v cannot be worse off. Therefore in this case u is assumed to get the full value of the
contract given by wuv. On the other hand if v is saturated, then it must first give up one
of its current contracts before it can form a contract with u. Hence in order for v to not
be worse off, it must now earn from the contract with u at least as much as it was earning
from the contract that was dropped. Hence the maximum profit that u can earn in this
case is the value of the contract uv minus the minimum profit that v earns in any of its
current contracts.
We can now introduce the two main types of solutions that we are interested in: stable
and balanced.
Definition 2.4.4. A solution (M, z) is stable if for all uv ∈ M we have zuv ≥ αu(M, z),
and for all unsaturated vertices u we have αu(M, z) = 0. A solution (M, z) is balanced if
it is stable and in addition for all uv ∈M we have zuv − αu(M, z) = zvu − αv(M, z).
The following theorem of [51] characterizes the existence of stable solutions for network
bargaining games with general capacities.
Theorem 2.4.5. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of a network bargaining game with general
capacities. Then (G,w, c) admits a stable solution if and only if νcf (G) = ν
c(G).
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Recall that νcf (G) was defined as the optimal value of the linear program
(P cFM) max
∑
e∈E
wexe
x(δ(u)) ≤ cu for all u ∈ V (G)
0 ≤ xe ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E(G).
2.4.1 Unit capacities
The definitions of a network bargaining game simplify in the case where all vertices have
unit capacities. Specifically a solution to the unit capacity game (G,w) is a pair (M,x)
where M is now a matching of G and x ∈ R|V (G)|+ assigns a value to each vertex such that
for all edges uv ∈ M we have xu + xv = wuv and for all u ∈ V (G) not covered by M we
have xu = 0. Since each vertex has at most one unique contract, the vector x from the
solution (M,x) is also the allocation vector in this case.
The outside option of vertex u can now be expressed as
αu(M,x) := max
(u,v)∈E(G)\M
(wuv − xv) ,
where as before we set αu(M,x) = 0 whenever {v : uv ∈ E(G)\M} = ∅.
A solution (M,x) is stable if for all u ∈ V (G) we have xu ≥ αu(M,x) and balanced if
it is stable and in addition xu − αu(M,x) = xv − αv(M,x) for all uv ∈ M . The following
theorem of [55] characterizes the existence of stable solutions for network bargaining games
with unit capacities. This is a special case of Theorem 2.4.5 that was proven earlier.
Theorem 2.4.6. Let (G,w) be an instance of a network bargaining game. Then (G,w)
admits a stable solution if and only if νf (G) = ν(G).
More interestingly, it is shown in [55] that this condition is always sufficient to charac-
terize the existence of balanced solutions, and such solutions can be computed efficiently
whenever they exist.
Theorem 2.4.7. Let (G,w) be an instance of a network bargaining game. Then (G,w)
admits a balanced solution if and only if it admits a stable one. Furthermore, the set of all
balanced solutions can be computed in polynomial time.
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2.4.2 Connection to cooperative games
In this section we explore the close connections between the network bargaining games and
cooperative games. Given a graph G = (V,E) with edge weights w ∈ R|E(G)|+ and vertex
capacities c ∈ Z|V (G)|+ we define both an instance (G,w, c) of a network bargaining game
and a corresponding instance (N, v) of a c-matching game. The following theorem found in
[6] establishes a connection between solution concepts of the two games. Recall that given
a solution (M, z) to the network bargaining game (G,w, c) we define the the corresponding
allocation x for the c-matching game (N, v) as
xu =
∑
(u,v)∈δ(u)
zuv,
for all u ∈ V .
The following result is shown in [6].
Theorem 2.4.8. Let (M, z) be a solution to the network bargaining game (G,w, c) and x
the corresponding allocation for the c-matching game (N, v). Then
(i) (M, z) stable ⇒ x ∈ core(N, v)
(ii) (M, z) balanced ⇒ x ∈ core(N, v) ∩ prekernel(N, v)
In addition if we consider the unit capacity network bargaining game (G,w) and the
corresponding matching game (N, v) then the converse is also true [6].
Theorem 2.4.9. Let (M, z) be a solution to the network bargaining game with unit capac-
ities (G,w) and x the corresponding allocation for the matching game (N, v). Then
(i) (M, z) stable ⇔ x ∈ core(N, v)
(ii) (M, z) balanced ⇔ x ∈ core(N, v) ∩ prekernel(N, v)
Theorem 2.4.9 implies that in order to compute a balanced solution to a network
bargaining game with unit capacities, one can use the existing algorithm of Faigle et al. [31]
for computing allocations in the intersection of the core and prekernel of the corresponding
matching game. This approach offers an alternative proof of the results for unit capacity
network bargaining games found in [55].
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2.5 Stable matchings
In this thesis we study both two-dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional (3D) stable
matchings. In the 2D setting we have two sets of agents that we denote by B and C.
The set B will be referred to as the set of men and the set C as the set of women. We
assume throughout this thesis that we have the same number of men and women, usually
denoted by n.
Definition 2.5.1. A 2D matching is a set of ordered pairs from N ⊆ B × C such that
each q ∈ B ∪ C appears in at most one pair in N . If each q ∈ B ∪ C appears in exactly
one pair in N then N is said to be a perfect matching. For any b ∈ B we let N(b) denote
the woman in C that b is matched to in N , and similarly for any c ∈ C we let N(c) denote
the man in B that c is matched to in N .
In stable matching problems, each agent q has preferences over some subset of agents
S. In the 2D setting the men have preferences over the women and the women over the
men. The preferences of an agent q over a S can be expressed using a preference list P (q)
that lists the agents in S in non-increasing order of preference according to q. We say that
P (q) is a strict ordering if it does not contain any ties. Given s, s′ ∈ S we write s q s′
to denote that q strictly prefers s to s′ and s q s′ to denote that q prefers s at least as
much as s′.
2.5.1 Stable Marriage
We introduce here the classical stable marriage problem.
Definition 2.5.2. An instance I of the SM problem consists of a set B of n men and a
set C of n women. Each man b ∈ B has a preference list P (b) that is a strict ordering
over the set of women C. Similarly each woman c ∈ C has a preference list P (c) that is a
strict ordering over the set of men B. A pair (b, c) is blocking with respect to a matching
N if
c b N(b) and b c N(c).
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A matching N is stable if there are no blocking pairs with respect to N . In that case, we
also say that N is a solution to I.
For the stable marriage problem, any stable matching must be a perfect matching, since
any pair of unmatched agents (b, c) would form a blocking pair. The following is a famous
result of Gale and Shapley [37].
Theorem 2.5.3. There exists a stable matching for any instance of SM and such a match-
ing can be computed in polynomial time.
The proof of this result is via the well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm that is described
in 2.5.1.
Algorithm 1 The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem
Initially all men and all women are single
while there exists a single man who has not proposed to every woman do
choose one such man b
let c be the most preferred woman on b’s list to whom b has not proposed
b proposes to c
if c is single then
(b, c) become engaged
else
if c is engaged to b′ and she prefers b to b′ then
(b, c) become engaged
c rejects b′
b′ becomes single
else
c rejects b
b remains single
return the set of engaged pairs
The algorithm terminates since a man can propose to the same woman at most once.
It is not too hard to see that the set of pairs returned by the algorithm forms a perfect
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matching N . To see that N is indeed stable suppose by contradiction that we have a
blocking pair (b, c). This means that b prefers woman c over N(b). Since men propose to
women in order of preference, b must have proposed to c before N(b). Hence c must have
rejected b at some point in the algorithm. This would have only happened if c received a
proposal from some man c′ that she prefers to c. But since each woman ends up engaged
with the highest ranked man that ever proposed to her, c must prefer N(c) over b. Hence
(b, c) cannot be a blocking pair.
An alternative way to proof Theorem 2.5.3 is using a polyhedral approach. Vande Vate
[79] initiated the study of the stable marriage problem from the mathematical programming
perspective by introducing the following integer programming formulation.
(ISM)
∑
c
xbc = 1 for all b ∈ B∑
b
xbc = 1 for all c ∈ C
xbc +
∑
c′bc
xbc′ +
∑
b′cb
xb′c ≥ 1 for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C
xbc ∈ {0, 1} for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C.
The interpretation of the variables is that xbc = 1 if b is matched to c and xbc = 0 otherwise.
The first two constraints ensure that the result is perfect matching. The third constraint
can be interpreted as follows: whenever xbc = 0, meaning that b is not matched to c, at
least one of the two sums in the constraint has to be equal to one. Now if this is the first
sum then b is matched to someone he prefers over c, while if it is the second sum then
c is matched to someone she prefers over b. Hence the result is a stable matching. Now
consider the linear programming formulation obtained by relaxing the integer constraints.
(PSM)
∑
c
xbc = 1 for all b ∈ B∑
b
xbc = 1 for all c ∈ C
xbc +
∑
c′bc
xbc′ +
∑
b′cb
xb′c ≥ 1 for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C
xbc ≥ 0 for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C.
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Vande Vate [79] proved the following result.
Theorem 2.5.4. The polytope PSM is the convex hull of the stable marriage solutions.
This result is particularly interesting because it means that one can efficiently optimize
over the set of stable matchings.
2.5.2 Stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists
The most popular variant of the classical stable marriage problem is obtained by allowing
ties in the preference lists and unacceptable partners.
Definition 2.5.5. An instance I of SMTI consists of a set B of n men and a set C of
n women. Each man b ∈ B has a preference list P (b) that is an ordering over a subset of
C and is allowed to contain ties. Similarly each woman c ∈ C has a preference list P (c)
that is an ordering over a subset of B and is also allowed to contain ties. A pair (b, c) is
said to be acceptable if b appears in P (c) and c appears in P (b). A pair (b, c) is blocking
with respect to a matching N if (b, c) is an acceptable pair and it satisfies the usual blocking
conditions
c b N(b) and b c N(c).
A matching N is stable if every pair in N is acceptable and there are no blocking pairs with
respect to N . In that case, we also say that N is a solution to I.
We follows the usual assumption is that a woman c is acceptable to a man b if and only
if man b is acceptable to woman c. One can modify the Gale-Shapley algorithm slightly to
account for ties and incomplete lists. Specifically, all ties are broken arbitrarily and men
propose only to acceptable women. With this modification, the algorithm always produces
a stable matching [47], hence we have the following result.
Theorem 2.5.6. There exists a stable matching for any instance SMTI and such a match-
ing can be computed in polynomial time.
However, unlike the case of SMinstances, an instance of SMTIcan admit stable solu-
tions of different size. We will need the following result from [62].
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Theorem 2.5.7. Let I be an instance of SMTI where ties occur only in the preference
lists of the women. Deciding whether I admits a perfect stable matching is NP-hard.
2.5.3 Three-dimensional stable matchings
In the 3D setting, we have an additional set of n agents that we denote by A, usually
referred to as dogs.
Definition 2.5.8. A 3D matching M is a set of ordered triples from A×B×C such that
each q ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C appears in at most one triple in M. If each q ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C appears
in exactly one triple then M is said to be a perfect matching. For every dog a ∈ A we
denote by M(a) the man that a is matched to in M. Similarly for every man b ∈ B, M(b)
denotes the woman that b is matched to in M, and for every woman c ∈ C, M(c) denotes
the dog that c is matched to in M
A 3D perfect matching M can be induced by fixing two perfect matchings on any of
the following sets A×B, B × C or C × A.
Definition 2.5.9. Let M be a perfect matching on A × B and N a perfect matching on
B × C. Then M ◦ N is the 3D matching defined as: (a, b, c) ∈ M ◦ N if and only if
(a, b) ∈M and (b, c) ∈ N . For each q ∈ A ∪ B we denote by M(q) the partner of q in M ,
and similarly for each q ∈ B ∪ C we denote by N(q) the partner of q in N .
We can now introduce the 3D stable matching problem that we focus on in this thesis.
Definition 2.5.10. An instance of the Three-Dimensional Stable Matching with Cyclic
Preferences problem (Cyclic 3DSM) consists of three mutually disjoint sets A,B,C of n
elements each. Each a ∈ A has preferences over the set B, each b ∈ B has preferences over
the set C, and each c ∈ C has preferences over the set A. Preferences are expressed in
terms of a strict total order over all the elements of the corresponding set. A triple (a, b, c)
is said to be blocking with respect to a matching M if (a, b, c) /∈ M and a prefers b to
M(a), b prefers c to M(b) and c prefers a to M(c). A matching which has no blocking
triples is said to be stable.
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We point out that our definition of a blocking triple implies that in order for (a, b, c) to
be blocking with respect to a matchingM, no two agents from this triple can be matched
together inM. Our definition of stability is also referred to as weak stability. If instead we
defined a triple to be blocking by requiring that each member of the triple prefers this triple
at least as much as the one assigned to them in the matching and at least one member
prefers it strictly, this would give rise to a notion of stability known as strong stability. The
following result appears both in [8] and [44].
Theorem 2.5.11. Deciding whether an instance of c3DSM admits a strongly stable
matching is NP-complete.
The question of whether every instance of c3DSM admits a weakly stable matching is
still open. Since in this thesis we only consider weakly stable matchings, we refer to them
from now as stable matchings.
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Chapter 3
Network bargaining
Let (G,w, c) be an instance of a network bargaining game with general capacities defined
in section 2.4. We denote by (N, v) the corresponding c-matching game defined in section
2.3.6. In this chapter we study two problems regarding balanced solutions for (G,w, c).
First, we want to characterize when an instance admits a balanced solution, and second
we want to develop an efficient algorithm for computing such a solution.
3.1 Connection to cooperative games
Our first attempt relies on exploring a connection between the solution concepts of network
bargaining games and cooperative games. For the special class of unit capacity and con-
strained bipartite games, Bateni et al. show that the set of stable solutions corresponds to
the core, and the set of balanced solutions corresponds to the intersection of the core and
prekernel of the associated matching game. This implies that efficient algorithms, such as
the one of [31], can be used to compute points in the intersection of the core and prekernel
from which a balanced solution can be uniquely obtained. Hence, a natural question to
answer is whether such a connection can be established in general. For general capacities
we already know from Theorem 2.4.8 that one direction of the equivalence still holds: every
balanced solution gives rise to an allocation in the intersection of the core and prekernel.
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Hence, the remaining question is whether the converse is also true: can every allocation
in the intersection of the core and prekernel be obtained from a balanced solution? The
following lemma proves that this is not always the case.
Lemma 3.1.1. There exists an instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game and a
vector x ∈ core(N, v) ∩ prekernel(N, v) such that there exists no balanced solution (M, z)
satisfying
xu =
∑
v:(u,v)∈E
zuv
for all v ∈ V .
Proof. Consider the graph shown in Figure 3.1 where every vertex has capacity 2 and
the edge weights are given above each edge. The red edges denote the unique optimal
2-matching of weight 120.
A
C
B
DE
F
10
10
20
20 30
30
10
Figure 3.1: An instance of a network bargaining game with general capacities.
Let x be the allocation that assigns a value of 20 to each vertex in the graph. This
is a valid allocation since the total value assigned to all the vertices is equal to 120, the
weight of the maximum weight 2-matching of the graph. We now show that the vector x
is in the intersection of the core and prekernel but there exists no balanced solution (M, z)
corresponding to x. We start by showing that x is in the core. To do this, we must check
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that x(S) ≥ v(S) for every subset of vertices S, where v(S) is the weight of the maximum
weight 2-matching in G[S]. Note that for any subset S of vertices we have x(S) = 20|S|.
On the other hand it can easily checked that for any subset of vertices S the weight of the
maximum weight 2-matching in G[S] is at most 20|S|. Hence x ∈ core(N, v).
Next we show that x ∈ prekernel(N, v). To do this we must compute the powers
suv(x) = max
T :u∈T,v /∈T
v(T )− x(T )
for all pairs of vertices u, v ∈ V (G). Let C1 denote the outer cycle on verticesA,B,C,D,E, F
and let C2 and C3 denote the inner cycles on vertices B,C,D,E and E,F,A,B respectively.
For the pair A,B we have:
sAB = v ({A,F})− x ({A,F}) = 30− 40 = −10
sBA = v ({C2})− x ({C2}) = 70− 80 = −10
Similarly for the pair B,C we have:
sBC = v ({C3})− x ({C3}) = 70− 80 = −10
sCB = v ({C,D})− x ({C,D}) = 30− 40 = −10.
And for the pair C,D:
sCD = v ({C})− x ({C}) = −20
sDC = v ({D})− x ({D}) = −20.
Hence the pairs (A,B), (B,C) and (C,D) satisfy the prekernel condition. By symmetry
so do (D,E), (E,F ) and (F,A). Now for any pair u, v of non-adjacent vertices, one of the
two cycles C2 or C3 will contain u but not v, and vice versa. Therefore suv = svu = −10
for all non-adjacent pairs u, v. This proves that x is in the prekernel.
We now show that there is no vector z such that (M, z) is a balanced solution corre-
sponding to the vector x. Since any stable, and therefore balanced, solution must occur
on a maximum weight 2-matching [6] of the graph, any balanced solution (M, z) will have
M = E(C1). First note that vertices A,F,C and D have an outside option of zero in any
52
solution, since there are no edges in E\M incident with these vertices. Hence the contracts
(C,D) and (A,F ) have to be split evenly in any balanced solution. Since each vertex must
have a total profit of 20 from its two contracts in M in order for (M, z) to correspond to
x, this uniquely determines all values of the vector z, as are shown in Figure 3.2.
A
C
B
DE
F
5 5
5 5
5
5
15
15
1515
15
15
Figure 3.2: An allocation in core(N, v) ∩ prekernel(N, v) with no corresponding balanced
solution.
The minimum contract of both B and E is 5 and therefore αB = αE = 10 − 5 = 5.
However, the edge (B,C) (and also the edge (E,F ) by symmetry) violates the balance
condition since zBC − αB = 15 − 5 = 10 while zCB − αC = 5 − 0 = 5. This proves that
there is no balanced solution corresponding to the allocation x.
We remark that the example used in the above lemma does possess a balanced solution,
as shown in Figure 3.3. Here the outside option of both B and E is 10/3 and all edges in
the matching satisfy the balance condition. The allocation corresponding to this balanced
solution is
x′u =
553 u ∈ {A,B,D,E}70
3
u ∈ {C,F}
Theorem 2.4.8 implies that x′ should be in core(N, v) ∩ prekernel(N, v) and this is indeed
the case.
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DE
F
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3
20
3
20
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35
3
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25
3
25
3 15
15
15
15
Figure 3.3: A balanced solution.
In view of lemma 3.1.1, we cannot hope to extend the correspondence between balanced
solutions and allocations in the intersection of the core and prekernel to all network bar-
gaining games. However we can generalize the results of [6] by characterizing a larger class
of network bargaining games, including unit capacity and constrained bipartite games, for
which this correspondence holds. We achieve this by defining a certain gadget whose ab-
sence, together with the fact that the c-matching M is acyclic, will be sufficient for the
correspondence to hold.
3.1.1 Acyclic c-matchings and gadgets
In this section we characterize some sufficient conditions under which every allocation in
the intersection of the core and prekernel corresponds to a balanced outcome. Our first
condition requires that the maximum weight c-matching M is acyclic.
We can now introduce the definition of a gadget.
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Definition 3.1.2. Let (M, z) be a solution and let u be a vertex covered by M such that
αu > 0. Let v be a neighbour of u in M and let v
′ be the vertex corresponding to u’s best
outside option. If v′ is saturated in M , let u′ be its weakest contract. A gadget is set of
edges P ⊆M satisfying one of the following two conditions:
(i) P is a path from v to v′ that does pass through u
(ii) P is a path from u to u′ that does not pass through v′.
. If there exists such a gadget with respect to vertex u in the solution (M, z) we say that u
is a bad vertex this solution.
Figure 3.4 shows the two possible types of gadgets. The red edges denote edges in M
and the black edges denote edges in E\M .
uv
v0
uv
v0 u0
PP
Figure 3.4: The two types of gadgets.
We can now state our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.1.3. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and (N, v)
the corresponding c-matching game. Let x ∈ core(N, v) be a core allocation and (M, z) be
a corresponding stable solution so that
xu =
∑
v:(u,v)∈E
zuv
for all u ∈ V (G). If the following two conditions are satisfied
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1. M is acyclic,
2. there are no bad vertices in the solution (M, z),
then (M, z) is a balanced solution if and only if x ∈ prekernel(N, v).
Proof. Fix an edge (u, v) ∈ M . Note that it suffices to show suv = −zuv + αu, since this
would imply that suv = svu if and only if zuv−αu = zvu−αv. Our strategy is to first show
that suv is upper bounded by −zuv + αu, after which it will be sufficient to find a set T so
that v(T )− x(T ) achieves this upper bound. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.4. suv ≤ −zuv + αu.
Proof. Let T ⊂ N such that u ∈ T and v /∈ T . Let M ′ be a maximum weight c-matching
in G[T ]. Then
v(T )− x(T ) = w(M ′)−
∑
a∈T
xa
= w(M ′)−
∑
a∈T,ab∈M
zab
=
(
w(M ′ ∩M)−
∑
a∈T, ab∈M∩M ′
zab
)
+
w(M ′\M)− ∑
a∈T, ab∈M\M ′
zab

= w(M ′\M)−
∑
a∈T, ab∈M\M ′
zab.
Define the set of ordered pairs
S := {(a, b) : a ∈ T, b ∈ V (G), ab ∈M\M ′} ,
so that
v(T )− x(T ) = w(M ′\M)−
∑
(a,b)∈S
zab. (3.1)
Since (M, z) is a stable solution it follows that M is a c-matching of maximum weight.
Hence any edge in M ′\M must have at least one saturated endpoint. Let {a1, · · · , a`} be
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the set of vertices in T that are saturated in M . For each i ∈ [`] define the sets of ordered
pairs
Ei := {(ai, b) : aib ∈M ′\M}
Fi := {(ai, c) : aic ∈M\M ′} .
Note that all these sets are pairwise disjoint, and Fi ⊂ S for all i ∈ [`]. Now since each ai
is saturated in M it follows that |Ei| ≤ |Fi|. Therefore we can fix an arbitrary mapping
φi : Ei → Fi
so that each element of Ei is mapped to a distinct element of Fi.
We now assign to each edge e ∈M ′\M a set of ordered elements Se ⊂ S. As previously
observed, each such edge e must have at least one saturated endpoint. Hence let e = (ai, y)
and define:
Se =
{φi(ai, aj), φj (aj, ai)} if y = aj for some j ∈ [`]\ {i},{φi (ai, y)} otherwise.
It follows from the definition of the sets Ei and the choice of the mapping φi that the sets
Se are well defined, are pairwise disjoint, and are all subsets of S. Let
S ′ := S\ (∪e∈M ′\MSe) ,
Then from equation (3.1) and the fact that each ordered pair of S belongs to exactly one
Se set we obtain
v(T )− x(T ) =
∑
e∈M ′\M
we − ∑
(a,b)∈Se
zab
− ∑
(a,b)∈S′
zab. (3.2)
Now it follows from stability that for all e ∈M ′\M we have
we ≤
∑
(a,b)∈Se
zab. (3.3)
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To see this, consider e = (ai, y) ∈ M ′\M . If y = aj for some j ∈ [`]\ {i} then Se :=
{φi(ai, aj), φj(aj, ai)}. Now φi(ai, aj) represents the profit that ai gets from one of his
contracts in M , and similarly φj (aj, ai) represents the profit that aj earns from one of his
contracts in M . Since the edge (ai, aj) is not in M , by stability we must have φi(ai, aj) +
φj(aj, ai) ≥ waiy. In the other case where y is not a saturated vertex in T , we have
Se = {φi ((ai, y))}. Since y is an outside option for ai and φi (ai, y) represents the profit that
ai gets from one of his contracts in M , stability for vertex ai implies that φi (ai, y) ≥ waiy
as required.
Now suppose that (u, v) /∈ ∪e∈M ′\MSe. Then from (3.2) and (3.3) we have
v(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv.
Since αu ≥ 0, this proves the lemma in this case. If on the other hand, there exists a set
Se∗ such that (u, v) ∈ Se∗ . Then using (3.2) and (3.3) again we have
v(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv + we∗ −
∑
(a,b)∈Se∗\{(u,v)}
zuv,
Now (u, v) ∈ Se∗ implies that e∗ must be an edge in M ′\M that is incident to vertex u.
Hence e∗ = (u,w) where w is an outside option for vertex u. If w is not saturated then the
set Se∗\ {(uv)} is empty. Otherwise if w is saturated, this set contains a unique ordered
pair (w, k) such that (w, k) ∈M\M ′. Therefore it follows from the definition of αu that
v(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv + αu,
as desired.
Now that we have established this upper bound, it suffices to find a set T that achieves
this bound with equality. That is, we want to find a set T ⊆ V (G) such that u ∈ T , v /∈ T
and show that v(T )− x(T ) ≥ −zuv + αu. Given a set of vertices S we let MS denote the
edges of M that have both endpoints in S. Note that for any set of vertices S we have
w(MS)− x(S) = −
∑
ab∈M :a∈S,b/∈S
zab. (3.4)
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We define C to be the set of components of G induced by the edges in M . Since u and
v are neighbours in M they will be in the same component, call it C. Now suppose we
remove the edge (u, v) from C. Since M is acyclic, this disconnects C into two components
Cu and Cv, containing vertices u and v respectively. Now MCu is a valid c-matching of Cu
hence applying equation (3.4) to the vertex set of the component Cu we obtain
v(Cu)− x(Cu) ≥ w(MCu)− x(Cu) = −zuv.
uv
v0
Cu
Figure 3.5: Outside option is in the same component and is not saturated
If αu = 0 then setting T to be the vertex set of component Cu completes the proof for
this case. Hence it remains to consider the case where αu > 0. Then by stability of the
solution (M, z) vertex u must be saturated in M . Let v′ be vertex u’s best outside option.
Case 1: v′ ∈ Cu and v′ is not saturated in M (see Figure 3.5). Since uv /∈ Cu and
v′ is not saturated in M the set of edges MCu ∪ {(u, v′)} is a valid c-matching of Cu and
therefore
v(Cu)− x(Cu) ≥ w(MCu ∪ {(u, v′)})− x(Cu)
= w(MCu)− x(Cu) + wuv′
= −zuv + wuv′ applying (3.4) to Cu.
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Case 2: v′ ∈ Cu and v′ is saturated in M (see Figure 3.6). Let u′ be the weakest contract
uv
v0
CuDu
u0
Figure 3.6: Outside option is in the same component and is saturated
of v′ and suppose we remove the edge (v′, u′) from Cu. Since M is acyclic, this disconnects
Cu into two components. From condition (2) we know that u
′ is not on the u− v′ path in
M . Hence u and v′ are in the same component of Cu\ {(v′, u′)}. Denote this component
by Du. Now MDu ∪ {(u, v′)} is a c-matching of Du and thus
v(Du)− x(Du) ≥ w (MDu ∪ {(u, v′)})− x(Du)
= w(MDu)− x(Du) + +wuv′
= −zuv − zv′u′′ ++wuv′ applying (3.4) to Du
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′ and u′.
Case 3: v′ /∈ Cu and v′ is not saturated in M (see Figure 3.7). Condition (2) implies
that there is no v− v′ path in M , hence the fact that v′ /∈ Cu implies that v′ /∈ C. Let Cv′
be the component in C that contains vertex v′. Now MCu ∪MCv′ ∪{(u, v′)} is a c-matching
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u
v
v0
Cu
Cv0
Figure 3.7: Outside option is not in the same component and is not saturated
of Cu ∪ Cv′ and therefore
v(Cu ∪ Cj′)− x(Cu ∪ Cv′) ≥ w(MCu ∪MCv′ ∪ {(u, v′)})− x(Cu ∪ Cv′)
= (w(MCu)− x(Cu)) +
(
w(MCv′ )− x(Cv′)
)
+ wuv′
= −zuv + wuv′ applying (3.4) to Cu, Cv′
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′.
Case 4: v′ /∈ Cu and v′ is saturated inM (see Figure 3.8). As in Case 3 we let Cv′ be the
component in C that contains vertex v′. Let u′ be the weakest contract of v′ and suppose
we remove the edge (v′, u′) from Cv′ . Since M is acyclic, this disconnects Cv′ into two
components and we let Dv′ be the one that contains vertex v
′. Now MCu ∪MDv′ ∪{(u, v′)}
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v
v0
Cu
Cv0
Dv0
u0
Figure 3.8: Outside option is not in the same component and is saturated
is a c-matching of Cu ∪ Cv′ thus
v(Cu ∪Dv′)− x(Cu ∪Dv′) ≥ w
(
MCu ∪MDv′ ∪ {(u, v′)}
)− x (Cu ∪ Cv′)
= (w(MCu)− x(Cu)) +
(
w(MDv′ )− x(Dv′)
)
+ wuv′
= −zuv − zv′u′ + wuv′ applying (3.4) to Cu , Dv′
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′ and u′.
Hence in all cases we have v(T )− x(T ) ≥ −zuv +αu as required. This completes the proof
of the theorem.
We note that all network bargaining games studied in [6] satisfy conditions (1) and
(2) of Theorem 3.1.3. In addition to these, Theorem 3.1.3 also covers the case of network
bargaining games where the underlying graph is a tree, but where each vertex can have an
arbitrary capacity. Hence one can use the polynomial time algorithm of [31] to compute
a point in the intersection of the core and prekernel for these games from which we can
obtain a corresponding solution (M, z) that is guaranteed to be balanced by Theorem 3.1.3.
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3.2 Reduction to unit capacity games
While we were able to generalize the class of network bargaining games for which balanced
solutions can be obtained by computing a point in the intersection of the core and prekernel,
we were not able to apply this technique to all network bargaining games. In this section
we show that balanced solutions can be obtained to any network bargaining game (G,w, c)
by a reduction to a unit capacity game defined on an auxiliary graph.
Suppose we are given an instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game together
with a c-matching M of G. Algorithm 3.2 describes how to obtain an instance (G′, w′) of
the unit capacity game together with a matching M ′ of G.
Algorithm 2 Mapping from general capacities to unit capacities.
Input: An instance (G,w, c) with general capacities and a c-matching M
Output: An instance (G′, w′) with unit capacities and a matching M ′
for u ∈ V (G) do
Fix an arbitrary labelling σu : {v : uv ∈M} → {1, · · · , d(u)}
Create cu copies u1, · · · , ucu in V (G′)
for (u, v) ∈ E(G) do
if (u, v) ∈M then
add the unique edge (uσv(u), vσu(v)) to E(G
′) ∩M ′ and set its weight to wuv
else
add all edges (ui, vj) to E(G
′) for i ∈ [cu] and j ∈ [cv], and set their weights to wuv
return (G′, w′,M ′)
Figure 3.9 illustrates an example of this construction. All edges have unit weight and
the capacities are listed next to each vertex. The red edges denote the unique maximum
cardinality c-matching M . The first step is make copies of each vertex according to its
capacity. Hence we make four copies of u , two copies of x and y, and one copy of every
other node. This defines the vertex set of G′. We then map each edge in M to a unique
copy of itself in M ′. The edge (u, x) is mapped to (u1, x1), the edge (x, y) to (x2, y1), the
edge (u, y) to (u2, y2) and finally the edge (u, z) to (u3, z1). Note that M
′ has exactly the
same number of edges as M and each edge in M ′ has weight equal to its corresponding
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xu
y
v
w
zcu = 4
cx = 2
cy = 2
cz = 1
cv = 1
cw = 1
Figure 3.9: An instance with general capacities
edge in M . It remains to consider the edges (u, v) and(u,w) that are part of the original
graph G but were not in the c-matching M . For these edges we create all the possible
copies connecting their corresponding endpoints but do not include them in the matching
M . Hence (u, v) maps to cucv copies of itself, and (u,w) to cucw copies of itself. Finally,
each edge in G′ has weight equal to its corresponding edge in G. The resulting graph is
shown in Figure 3.10.
The important idea behind our reduction is the fact that we create only one copy of
each edge that belongs to the original c-matching M and the resulting set of edges M ′
form a matching in the new graph. This is exactly what distinguishes our reduction from
the standard reduction of a c-matching to a matching where cucv copies of each edge are
created.
3.2.1 Mapping between the two solution sets
Suppose we are given an instance of the network bargaining game (G,w, c) with a c-matching
M . Let [(G′, w′),M ′] be obtained using the construction described in algorithm 3.2. Note
that M and M ′ have the same number of edges and each edge (u, v) ∈ M is mapped to
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u1
u2
u3
u4
x1 x2
y1
y2
z1
v1
w1
Figure 3.10: The corresponding instance with unit capacities.
the unique edge (ui, vj) ∈ M ′ where i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). This allows us to go back
and forth between solutions on M and M ′ by dividing the weight of each edge in the same
way as its corresponding pair.
We define the two solution sets:
X :=
{
x ∈ R|V (G′)| : (M ′, x) is a solution to (G′, w′)
}
Z := {z ∈ R2|E(G)| : (M, z) is a solution to (G,w, c)} .
And the two mappings:
1. φ : X → Z
For all (u, v) ∈ E define
(φ(x)uv, φ(x)vu) :=

(
xuσv(u) , xvσu(v)
)
if uv ∈M ,
(0, 0) otherwise.
(3.5)
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2. φ−1 : Z → X .
For all ui ∈ V (G′) define
φ−1(z)ui :=
zuv if i = σu(v),0 otherwise. (3.6)
Note that z = φ(x) if and only if x = φ−1(z). The following lemma implies that the
mapping given by the function φ and its inverse φ−1 defines a bijection.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let φ and φ−1 be defined as in 3.5 and 3.6. Then the following are true.
1. If x ∈ X and z = φ(x), then z ∈ Z.
2. If z ∈ Z and x = φ−1(z) then x ∈ X .
Proof. Let x ∈ X and z = φ(x). We show that z ∈ Z. Take (u, v) ∈ E(G) ∩ M .
Suppose i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). Then from the construction of G
′ and M ′ it follows that
uivj ∈M ′. We have
zuv + zvu = xui + xvj from the definition of φ(x)
= wuiuj since (M
′, x) is a solution
= wuv from the construction of (G
′, w′).
Furthermore if (u, v) ∈ E(G)\M then from the definition of φ(x) we have zuv = zvu = 0.
Now let z ∈ Z and x = φ−1(z). We show that x ∈ X . Take uivj ∈ E(G′) ∩ M ′.
From the construction of G′ and M ′ there must exist an edge (u, v) ∈ E(G)∩M such that
i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). We have
xui + xvj = zuv + zvu from the definition of φ
−1(z)
= wuv since (M, z) is a solution
= wuivj from the construction of (G
′, w′).
Furthermore if ui is uncovered in M
′ then xui = 0 by definition.
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From now on we write (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x) whenever z = φ(x) or equivalently x = φ−1(z).
The next lemma is the key step in showing that certain properties of a solution are preserved
under our mapping.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and M a
c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching M ′ were ob-
tained using the construction given in algorithm 3.2. Let (M, z) be a solution to (G,w, c)
and (M ′, x′) a solution to (G′, w′) such that (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x). Then for any u ∈ V (G) and
any i ∈ [du] we have
αu(M, z) = αui (M
′, x) .
Proof. We first show that αu(M, z) ≤ αui (M ′, x). We may assume that αu(M, z) > 0 since
otherwise there is nothing to show. Let v be vertex u’s best outside option in (M, z). That
is (u, v) ∈ E(G)\M and
αu(M, z) = wuv − 1[dv=cv ] min
vw∈M
zvw.
Since (u, v) ∈ E(G)\M we have uivj ∈ E(G′)\M ′ for all j ∈ [cv]. We have two cases:
1. v is not saturated in M . Then the vertex vdv+1 is in V (G
′) and it is not covered by
M ′. Since (ui, vdv+1) ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we have
αui (M
′, x) ≥ wuivdv+1 − xvdv+1
= wuivdv+1 vdv+1 is not covered by M
′ so xvdv+1 = 0
= wuv from the definition of (G
′, w′)
= αu(M, z) by choice of v.
2. v is saturated in M . Let w = argminvw∈M zvw. Suppose that j = σw(v). Then vj is
covered in M ′ and xvj = zvw. Since (ui, vj) ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we have
αui (M
′, x) ≥ wuivj − xvj
= wuv − zvw from the definition of (G′, w′)
= αu(M, z) by choice of v.
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We now show that αu(M, z) ≥ αui (M ′, x). We may assume that αui (M ′, x) > 0. Let
vj be vertex ui’s best outside option in (M
′, x). That is, vj ∈ V (G′) such that (ui, vj) ∈
E(G′)\M ′ and
αui(M
′, x) = wuivj − xvj .
Since (ui, vj) ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we must have (u, v) ∈ E(G)\M . Again, we have two cases:
1. vj is not covered in M
′. Then the vertex v is not saturated in M and
αu(M, z) ≥ wuv
= wuivj from the definition of (G
′, w′)
= wujvj − xvj vj is not covered in M ′ so xvj = 0
= αui (M
′, x) by choice of vj.
2. vj is covered in M . Then there exists w ∈ V (G) such that (v, w) ∈ E(G) ∩M and
j = σw(v) . We have
αu(M, z) ≥ wuv − zvw
= wuivj − xvj from the definition of (G′, w′)
= αui (M
′, x) by choice of vj.
Lemma 3.2.2 shows that our mapping preserves outside options. This crucial property
allows us to prove that stability and balance are also preserved. The following theorem is
our main result.
Theorem 3.2.3. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and M
a c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching M ′ were
obtained using the construction given in algorithm 3.2. Let (M, z) be a solution to (G,w, c)
and (M ′, x′) a solution to (G′, w′) such that (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x). Then:
1. (M, z) is stable if and only if (M ′, x) is stable.
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2. (M, z) is balanced if and only if (M ′, x) is balanced.
Proof. Let (u, v) ∈M . Suppose that i = σv(u). Then zuv = xui and using lemma 3.2.2 we
have
zuv ≥ αu(M, z) if and only if xui ≥ αuσv(u) (M ′, x) .
It remains to show that if (M ′, x) is stable then αu(M, z) = 0 for any unsaturated vertices u
of G. Suppose u is such a vertex. Then the vertex udu+1 is not covered in M
′ and therefore
x′du+1 = 0. If (M
′, x) is stable then αudu+1 = 0 and by lemma 3.2.2 we have αu(M, z) = 0
as desired. This completes the proof of the first statement.
To prove the second statement let (u, v) ∈M and suppose that i = σv(u) and j = σu(v).
Then zuv = xui , zvu = xvj and by lemma 3.2.2 we have:
zuv − αu(M, z) = zvu − αv(M, z) ⇔ xui − αui (M ′, x) = xvj − αvj (M ′, x) .
This completes the proof.
Using Theorem 3.2.3 we have the following algorithm for finding a balanced solution
to the network bargaining game (G,w, c):
Algorithm 3 Computing balanced solutions for general capacities.
1: Find a maximum c-matching M in G
2: Obtain the unit capacity instance (G′, w′) with matching M ′ using algorithm 3.2
3: Find a balanced solution x on the matching M ′ in G′
4: Set z = φ(x).
5: return (M, z)
We note that step 3 of the algorithm can be implementing using the existing polynomial
time algorithm of Kleinberg and Tardos [55]. Given any instance of a network bargaining
game with unit capacities together with a maximum weight matching, their algorithm
returns a balanced solution on the given matching, whenever one exists.
Theorem 3.2.3 also helps us characterize the existence of balanced solutions. Since any
stable solution must occur on a c-matching, respectively matching, of maximum weight we
have the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.2.4. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and M
a c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching M ′ were
obtained using the given construction. Then
1. M is a maximum weight c-matching for (G,w, c) if and only if M ′ is a maximum
weight matching for (G′, w′).
2. There exists a balanced solution for (G,w, c) on the c-matching M if and only if there
exists a balanced solution for (G′, w′) on the matching M ′.
This leads us to the following full characterization of the existence of balanced solutions
for network bargaining games with general capacities.
Theorem 3.2.5. An instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game has a balanced
solution if and only if it has a stable one.
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Chapter 4
Stable matchings
We start by introducing our model of stable marriage with general preferences.
Definition 4.0.6. An instance I of SMG consists of a set B of n men and a set C of
n women. Each man b ∈ B has a preference list P (b) that is complete total order over
C. Each woman c ∈ C has a preference relation given in terms of a set of ordered pairs
Rc ⊆ B×B. A pair (b, c) is blocking with respect to a matching N if (b, c) /∈ N , c b N(b)
and (N(c), b) /∈ Rc. A matching N is stable if it has no blocking pairs.
Given two men b, b′ ∈ B and woman c ∈ C we interpret (b, b′) ∈ Rc as woman c
preferring man b at least as much as man b′. Note that whether (b, b′) is in Rc is completely
independent of whether (b′, b) ∈ Rc. The definition of a blocking pair can be interpreted
as saying that a pair (b, c) is blocking with respect to a matching N if neither agent of the
pair prefers their current partner in N at least as much as the partner in the pair.
We use SMG to refer to the decision problem of whether a given instance admits a
stable matching (which we also call a solution). The following definition introduces a
special class of instances.
Definition 4.0.7. An instance I of SMG is said to have asymmetric preferences if for
every b1, b2 ∈ B and c ∈ C at most one of the following two conditions holds: (b1, b2) ∈ Rc
or (b2, b1) ∈ Rc.
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Note that we could have obtained an alternate definition of stability by saying that
a pair (b, c) is blocking if (b, c) /∈ N , c b N(b) and (b,N(c)) ∈ Rc. Note that then we
would also have to chance the definition of asymmetric preferences accordingly. However,
the two models are equivalent via the following correspondence: create a new instance I ′
with sets R′c where (b, b′) ∈ R′c if and only if (b′, b) /∈ Rc. Then the solutions that are
stable for I under our definition of stability, are exactly those that are stable for I ′ using
the alternate definition of stability. Hence, we can use our definition of stability without
loss of generality.
It is easy to see that any stable matching for an SMG instance must be a perfect match-
ing. This contrasts the case of SMTI where a given instance can have stable matchings of
different size. A second difference is that unlike in SMTI, not all instances of SMG admit
a stable matching as demonstrated by the example consider in chapter 1 Figure 1.6. We
now introduce our second model of stable matching: the stable extension problem.
Definition 4.0.8. An instance I of SE consists of a set of n dogs A, a set of n men
B, and a set of n women C, together with a fixed perfect matching M on A × B. The
preferences are defined cyclically (A over B, B over C, and C over A) and are complete
total orders over the corresponding sets. A triple (a, b, c) is blocking with respect to a 3D
matching M if (a, b, c) /∈ M, b a M(a), c b M(b) and a c M(c). A 3D matching M
is stable if it has no blocking pairs.
We note that if (a, b, c) is a blocking triple then a, b and c must be part of three disjoint
triples inM. It follows from this definition that any stable 3D matching must be a perfect
matching. We say that a perfect matching N on B ×C is a stable extension, or a solution
to I, if M ◦N is a 3D stable matching, and we use SE to refer to the decision problem of
whether a given instance admits a stable extension.
Our first result demonstrates demonstrate how an instance I of SE can be reduced to
an SMG instance. Let I be an instances of SE. We describe how to obtain a corresponding
instance of SMG. First, for each man b ∈ B we define Ab to be the set of dogs in A that
prefer b to the man assigned to them in the fixed perfect matching M . That is
Ab = {a ∈ A : b a M(a)} (4.1)
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The set Ab contains exactly those dogs in A with whom man b can potentially be in a
blocking triple when extending M to a 3D matching. It follows that if Ab = ∅ then man
b cannot be in a blocking triple in any extension of M to a 3D matching. Now, for each
pair (b, c) where Ab 6= ∅ we define α(b, c) to be the dog in the set Ab that woman c prefers
the most. That is
α(b, c) = {a ∈ Ab : a c a′ for all a′ ∈ Ab, a′ 6= a} (4.2)
Since the preference list of c does not contain any ties, α(b, c) is well-defined. If Ab = ∅
then we let α(b, c) be the dog in the last position in woman c’s preference list. We now
define preferences for each woman c ∈ C
Rc := {(b, b′) | b, b′ ∈ B, b 6= b′, M(b) c α(b′, c)} . (4.3)
Note that if (N(c), b) ∈ Rc then in the 3D matching M ◦N the woman c will be matched
to a dog that she prefers at least as much as any dog in Ab, therefore guaranteeing that
the man b and woman c will never be part of the same blocking triple. Hence, in order for
M ◦N to be a 3D stable matching it suffices to ensure that for all (b, c) /∈ N we either have
b matched to someone better than c, meaning N(b) b c, or we have c matched to some
N(c) such that (N(c), b) ∈ Rc. But this is exactly the definition of a stable matching for
an instance of SMG. Hence we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.0.9. SE can be reduced in polynomial time to SMG.
4.1 Hardness results for SMG
We note that Theorem 4.0.9, together with Theorem 4.3.1 imply NP-hardness of SMG,
and hence prove Theorem 4.1.1 (modulo containment in NP which is straightforward).
Nevertheless, we choose to present first the proof of Theorem 4.1.1 as a warm-up, as it
shares many similarities with the more complex version of Theorem 4.3.1.
Theorem 4.1.1. SMG is NP-complete.
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Proof. Containment in NP is straightforward, and is based on the observation that deciding
whether an edge not in a perfect matching of an instance of SMG is blocking or not can
be done in polynomial time in n. The rest of our argument focuses on hardness. Our proof
uses a polynomial time reduction from SMTI where ties occur only in the preference lists
of the women. This problem is known to be NP-complete [62]. Let I be an instance of
SMTI where ties occur only on the side of the women. We let B = {b1, · · · , bn} denote
the set of men and C = {c1, · · · , cn} denote the set of women for the instance I. For each
person q ∈ B ∪ C we let P (q) denote their preference list.
We now describe how to construct an instance J of SMG. The set of men for our
instance will be given by B′ = B ∪ {bn+1} and the set of women by C ′ = C ∪ {cn+1}.
The preferences of the men are defined as follows: each original man b ∈ B ranks the
women in P (b) first, in the same order as in P (b), followed by the woman cn+1, and the
remaining women of C ′ ranked arbitrarily; the man bn+1 ranks the woman cn+1 first, and
the remaining women of C ′ arbitrarily. Now, for each original woman c ∈ C we define the
binary relation Rc ⊆ B × B as follows Rc := {(b, b′) | b, b′ ∈ P (c), b c b′}. That is, Rc
contains the ordered pair (b, b′) when both b and b′ are acceptable to c under the instance
I and c prefers b at least as much as b′. Finally, for the woman cn+1 we set Rcn+1 := ∅.
This completes the definition of the instance J .
We use the introduction of the new agents to establish the following property
Lemma 4.1.2. In any solution N to J every men b ∈ B is matched to a woman from the
set P (b).
Proof. Let N be a solution to J . We first show that bn+1 is matched to cn+1 in N . Suppose
by contradiction that N(bn+1) 6= cn+1. Then from the way we defined the preferences of
bn+1 in J we can conclude that bn+1 prefers cn+1 to its partner in N . Hence, in order
for the pair (bn+1, cn+1) to not be blocking with respect to the solution N we must have
(N(cn+1), bn+1) ∈ Rcn+1 , which gives us a contradiction since we defined Rcn+1 = ∅. Hence
N(bn+1) = cn+1.
We can now prove the lemma. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a man b ∈ B
such that N(b) /∈ P (b). Then b cannot be matched to cn+1, since we showed that cn+1
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is always matched to bn+1. From the way we defined the preferences of b in J we can
conclude that b prefers cn+1 to its partner in N . Hence, in order for the pair (b, cn+1) to
not be blocking with respect to the solution N we must have (N(cn+1), b) ∈ Rcn+1 , which
gives us a contradiction since we defined Rcn+1 = ∅.
The following lemma completes our proof.
Lemma 4.1.3. I admits a perfect stable matching if and only if J admits a stable match-
ing.
Proof. Suppose that N is a perfect stable matching for I. Then complete N to a perfect
matching on B′ ∪ C ′ by matching bn+1 to cn+1. To see that this is a stable matching for
J , note that bn+1 is matched to its most preferred woman in C ′, hence it cannot be part
of any blocking pairs. It remains to show that no man in B can be part of a blocking
pair. Consider a man b ∈ B, and suppose that c is a woman that b strictly prefers to
N(b) according to the preferences in J . Then it must be the case that c ∈ P (b) and b also
strictly prefers c to N(b) in I. Since N is a solution to I, woman c prefers N(c) at least
as much as b in I. Hence from the way we defined the set Rc we have (N(c), b) ∈ Rc,
implying that (b, c) is not blocking in J either.
To see the other direction suppose that J admits a stable matching, and let N be the
part of this stable matching obtained by restricting it to the sets B ∪ C. It follows from
lemma 4.1.2 that N is a perfect matching and every man is matched to an acceptable
woman. To see that there are no blocking pairs, consider any pair (b, c) /∈ N such that
(b, c) is an acceptable pair, that is b ∈ P (c) and c ∈ P (b). Assume now that in I man b
strictly prefers c to N(b). Since c ∈ P (b) it follows that b also strictly prefers c to N(b)
in J . Hence, since N is a stable matching for J , we must have (N(c), b) ∈ Rc. From the
way we defined Rc this implies that N(c) is acceptable to c, and c prefers N(c) at least as
much as b in I. Therefore N does not have any blocking pairs, and is a stable matching
in I.
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4.2 Algorithmic results for SMG
In this section we introduce a variant of the Gale-Shapley man-proposing algorithm for
instances of SMG that have asymmetric preferences. Let I be an instance of SMG. Like
in the classical algorithm, each man in B is originally declared single and is given a list
containing all the women of C in order of preference. In each round, every man b that is
still single proposes to its most preferred woman in C that is still in his list. If a woman c
accepts a proposal from a man b then they become engaged, and b’s status changes from
single to engaged. On the other hand, if c rejects b’s proposal then b removes woman c from
his list and remains single. The difference from the original Gale-Shapley algorithm from
section 2.5.1 is in the way that the women decide to accept or reject incoming proposals.
A woman c accepts a proposal from a man b if and only if (b, b′) ∈ Rc for all other men b′
that have proposed to c up to that point in the algorithm. This will ensure that whenever
a woman c rejects a proposal from a man b, c is guaranteed to be matched at the end of
the algorithm to some b′ such that (b′, b) ∈ Rc therefore ensuring that (b, c) will not be a
blocking pair. The description of the algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 4 A deferred acceptance algorithm for SMG
1: while there a single man in B with a non-empty list do
2: for all b single with a non-empty list do
3: b proposes to the top c in its list
4: for all b, c such that b proposed to c do
5: if (b, b′) ∈ Rc for all b′ 6= b that proposed to c then
6: c accepts b ( (b, c) become an engaged pair)
7: else
8: c rejects b
9: If the set of engaged pairs forms a perfect matching return this solution, else conclude
that I does not admit a stable matching.
It is easy to see that algorithm 4 terminates and runs in polynomial time since each
man in B proposes to every woman in C at most once. The following lemma is also easy
to establish.
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Lemma 4.2.1. Any solution returned by algorithm 4 is a stable matching.
Proof. Let N be a solution returned by algorithm 4. It then follows that N is a perfect
matching. Suppose there is a blocking pair (b, c). Then b must have proposed to c, and c
rejected b’s proposal. But, every time a woman c rejects a proposal from b, algorithm 4
ensures that c will only become engaged to some man b′ such that (b′, b) ∈ Rc. Therefore
we cannot have any blocking pairs.
We now present our main result of this section.
Theorem 4.2.2. For instances of SMG with asymmetric preferences, there exists a poly-
nomial time algorithm that finds a solution if and only if one exists.
Proof. Using lemma 4.2.1 it suffices to show that if algorithm 4 does not find a solution
then the given instance does not admit a stable matching. Suppose by contradiction that
there exists a stable matching N but algorithm 4 does not find a solution. First note that
since the preferences are asymmetric, no woman c ∈ C accepts more then one proposal at
any point in the algorithm. Hence every woman is engaged to at most one man. Now since
Algorithm 1 does not find a solution there is a man b that is rejected by every woman in
C. In particular, b is rejected by N(b). Among all pairs (b, c) ∈ N such that b proposed
to c and c rejected b, let (b0, c0) be the one that corresponds to the earliest rejection. As
observed earlier, no man is rejected because of an arbitrary choice. Therefore, if b0 was
rejected at c0 then there must be some man b1 that also proposed to c0 and (b0, b1) /∈ Rc0 .
Let c1 be the partner of b1 in N . We must have c1 b1 c0, since otherwise (b1, c0) would
be a blocking pair for the stable matching N . Thus b1 proposed to c1 before proposing to
c0 and c1 rejected b1 before c0 rejected b0. But this contradicts our choice of (b0, c0). This
concludes the proof of the theorem.
We now provide a polyhedral description for SMG, that is an analogue of the well
studied stable marriage polytope, first introduced in [79]. It is well known that the latter
polytope is integral, meaning that the optimization version of SM can be solved in poly-
nomial time. For our setting, we show that our polytope can be used to efficiently decide
the feasibility of an SMG instance with asymmetric preferences, thus giving an alternative
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proof of Theorem 4.2.2. We remark however that our polytope is not integral for this class
of instances. Indeed, one can easily find instances with asymmetric preferences for which
our polytope has fractional extreme points.
Given an instance I of SMG we associated with each pair (b, c) ∈ B×C a variable xbc,
with the intended meaning that xbc = 1 if b and c are matched to each other and xbc = 0
otherwise. We then consider the following relaxation of the problem and let P (I) denote
the set of all vectors satisfying the constraints below∑
c
xbc = 1 for all b ∈ B (4.4)∑
b
xbc = 1 for all c ∈ C (4.5)
xbc +
∑
c′bc
xbc′ +
∑
(b′,b)∈Rc
xb′c ≥ 1 for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C (4.6)
xbc ≥ 0 for all b ∈ B, c ∈ C (4.7)
It is easy to check that x is the incidence vector of a stable matching for I if and only if x
is an integer vector in P (I). Our main result is the following.
Theorem 4.2.3. Let I be an instance of SMG with asymmetric preferences. Then P (I) 6=
∅ if and only if I admits a stable matching. Furthermore any fractional point x ∈ P (I)
can be efficiently rounded to a stable matching solution for I.
Proof. The first direction is trivial since if I admits a stable matching then the incidence
vector corresponding to this stable matching is clearly in P . Now assume P 6= ∅ and let
x be any point in P . We will show how to efficiently round x to a stable matching, thus
completing the proof of the theorem. For each b ∈ B let f(b) be b’s most preferred woman
in the set {c ∈ C : xbc > 0}. Define N = {(b, f(b)) : b ∈ B}. We first show that N is a
perfect matching. Since each man selects exactly one woman it suffices to show that no
two men select the same woman. Suppose by contradiction that f(b1) = f(b2) = c for
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some b1 6= b2. Note that
f(b) = c ⇒
∑
c′bc
xbc′ = 0 from the definition of f(b)
⇒ xbc +
∑
(b′,b)∈Rc
xb′c ≥ 1 from the stability constraint for (b, c)
⇒ xbc +
∑
(b′,b)∈Rc
xb′c = 1 from the matching constraint for c
⇒
∑
(b′,b)/∈Rc
xb′c = 0.
Therefore f(b1) = f(b2) = c implies that (b1, b2) ∈ Rc and (b2, b1) ∈ Rc. But this
contradicts the assumption that the preferences are asymmetric. Hence N must be a
perfect matching. To see that N satisfies the stability constraints consider any pair (b, c).
If f(b) = c or f(b) b c then (b, c) cannot be blocking, since b will be matched in N to
someone he prefers at least as much as c. Hence it suffices to consider the case where
c b f(b). But then we must have xbc +
∑
c′bc xbc′ = 0 and since x ∈ P (I) this implies
that
∑
(b′,b)∈Rc xb′c = 1. Now, since N uses only edges in the support of x, it follows that
(N(c), b) ∈ Rc and hence (b, c) is not blocking. Therefore N is a stable matching for I.
4.3 Hardness results for SE
In this section we present a hardness result for SE similar to the one we proved for SMG. At
a high level, our proof adopts a similar strategy to the one used for SMG. In particular, we
will provide a polynomial-time reduction for SMTI to SE. However, due to the additional
structural properties of SE instances this reduction becomes significantly more intricate.
Theorem 4.3.1. SE is NP-complete.
Proof. Containment of SE in NP follows by observing that deciding whether any triple
not in a 3D matching of any instance (extending the given 2D matching) is blocking or
not, can be done in polynomial time in n. The rest of the argument focuses on hardness.
Let I be an instance of SMTI where ties occur only on the side of the women. We let
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B = {b1, · · · , bn} denote the set of men and C = {c1, · · · , cn} denote the set of women
for the instance I. For each person q ∈ B ∪ C let P (q) denote their preference list. For
a given woman ci ∈ C the preference list P (ci) might have several men tied at a certain
position. We let ti be the number of positions in ci’s preference list, so that 1 ≤ ti ≤ n.
Now for each j ∈ {1, · · · , ti} we let P (ci)j denote the men that are tied in position j in
ci’s preference list. Furthermore, for each b ∈ P (ci) we let rci(b) denote the position that
b occupies in P (ci).
We now describe how to construct an instance J of SE. Our instance will consist of
three sets A′, B′ and C ′. We will include all the elements of B in B′, and all the elements
of C in C ′. We will also define some extra elements as follows
– For all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we create the new elements an+i, bn+i and cn+i.
– For all i ∈ [n] we create ti new elements Bi = {bi,1, · · · , bi,ti}, together with the
corresponding sets Ai = {ai,1, · · · , ai,ti}, and Ci = {ci,1, · · · , ci,ti}.
– We create a set of n new elements A = {a1, · · · , an}, corresponding to the original
sets B and C.
We then set
A′ = A ∪
n⋃
i=1
Ai ∪ {an+1, an+2, an+3}
B′ = B ∪
n⋃
i=1
Bi ∪ {bn+1, bn+2, bn+3}
C ′ = C ∪
n⋃
i=1
Ci ∪ {cn+1, cn+2, cn+3}
We now fix the perfect matching M on A′ × B′ by matching each dog of A′ to its corre-
sponding man in B′. That is ai is matched to bi for all i ∈ [n], ai,j is matched to bi,j for
all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [ti], and an+i is matched to bn+i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Next, we create the preferences lists of each agent. For each q ∈ A′∪B′∪C ′ we let P ′(q)
denote the preference list of agent q for the instance J . Recall that for each a ∈ A′ the
preference list P ′(a) must be a complete and strict ordering of the set B′. Similarly for each
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P ′(ai) = bi, [· · · ]
for all i ∈ [n] P (bi), cn+1, [· · · ]
P ′(ci) = [M (P (ci)1)], ai,1, · · · , [M (P (ci)ti)], ai,ti , [· · · ]
P ′(ai,j) = [P (ci)j], bi,j, [· · · ]
for all i ∈ [n], P ′(bi,j) = ci,j, [· · · ]
for all j ∈ [ti] P ′(ci,j) = an+2, [· · · ]
P ′(an+1) = bn+1, [· · · ]
P ′(an+2) = [· · · ], bn+2
P ′(an+3) = bn+2, bn+3, [· · · ]
for all i ∈ [3] P ′(bn+i) = cn+i, [· · · ]
P ′(cn+1) = an+2, [· · · ]
P ′(cn+2) = an+3, [· · · ]
P ′(cn+1) = an+2, [· · · ]
Table 4.1: The preferences for the instance J .
b ∈ B′ the list P ′(b) will be a complete and strict ordering of the set C ′, and for each c ∈ C ′
the list P ′(c) will be a complete and strict ordering of the set A′. Table 4.1 summarizes
the preferences of each agent. When listing the preference list P ′(q) of an agent q, we use
the notation [Q] to denote that the agents of the set Q appear in consecutive positions
in P ′(q) in any arbitrary order among them. The notation [· · · ] is used to denote that
the remaining agents that have not been listed in P ′(q) appear in consecutive positions in
P ′(q) in any arbitrary order among them.
The preferences of the dogs in A′ over the set of men B′ are defined as follows
– For all i ∈ [n]: ai ranks bi first, and the remaining men of B′ arbitrarily.
– For all i ∈ [n] and for all j ∈ [ti]: ai,j ranks the men that are tied in position j of
women ci’s list (in the instance I) at the top of its list in any arbitrary order among
them, followed by the man bi,j. The remaining men of B
′ are ranked arbitrarily.
– an+1 ranks bn+1 first, an+2 ranks bn+2 last, and an+3 ranks bn+2 first followed by bn+3
second. The rest of their lists are arbitrary.
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The preferences of the men in B′ over the set of women C ′ are defined as follows
– For all i ∈ [n]: bi ranks the women in P (bi) first, in the same order as in P (bi),
followed by the woman cn+1, and the remaining women of C
′ ranked arbitrarily.
– For all i ∈ [n] and for all j ∈ [ti]: bi,j ranks ci,j first, and the remaining women of C ′
arbitrarily.
– For all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: bn+i ranks cn+i first and the remaining women of C ′ arbitrarily.
The preferences of the women in C ′ over the set of dogs A′ are defined as follows
– For all i ∈ [n]: ci ranks the dogs in the set M (P (ci)1) at the top of its list in an
arbitrary order, followed by the dog ai,1, then the dogs in the set M (P (ci)2) again
in an arbitrary order, followed by the dog ai,2, and so on until the dogs in the set
M (P (ci)ti) followed by the ai,ti . The rest of ci’s preference list is arbitrary.
– For all i ∈ [n] and for all j ∈ [ti]: ci,j ranks an+2 first, and the remaining dogs in A′
arbitrarily.
– cn+1 and cn+3 rank an+2 first, and the remaining dogs in A
′ arbitrarily, while cn+2
ranks bn+3 first and the remaining dogs in A
′ arbitrarily.
This concludes the description of the instance J . Note that since we already fixed the
perfect matching M , the sets {Ab : b ∈ B′} are now fully determined as follows
Ab =

{
ai,rci (b) : i ∈ [n], b ∈ P (ci)
} ∪ {an+2} if b ∈ B,
{an+2} if b ∈ B′\ (B ∪ {bn+2}) ,
{an+3} if b = bn+2.
(4.8)
This also fixes the sets Rc for all c ∈ C using the definition given in equation (4.3). In
particular, the sets Rc satisfy the following property.
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Lemma 4.3.2. For every c ∈ C and b, b′ ∈ B where b is an acceptable partner of c in I,
we have (b′, b) ∈ Rc if and only if b′ is also an acceptable partner of c in I and c prefers b′
at least as much as b.
Proof. Let (b, c) ∈ B × C such that (b, c) is an acceptable pair for the instance I. Then b
must appear in the preference list P (c) of woman c. Recall that rc(b) denotes the position
that b occupies in P (c). Then it follows from the description of Ab in (4.8) that the only
dog from the set {ai,1, · · · , ai,ti} that is contained in Ab is ai,rc(b). It then follows from the
way we defined the preference list P ′(ci) that α(b, ci) = ai,rc(b). The lemma then follows
form the definition of the sets Rc.
The proof of the Theorem is completed via the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.3. In any solution to J bn+2 and bn+3 are matched to cn+2 and cn+3.
Proof. Let N be a solution to J . Suppose by contradiction that this is not true. Then at
least one of the men bn+2 and bn+3 must be matched to a woman that is neither cn+2 nor
cn+3. Assume that this is bn+2. The case with bn+3 follows from a symmetric argument.
Then since cn+2 was the most preferred woman of bn+2 it follows that cn+2 must be matched
to some b′ such that (b′, bn+2) ∈ Rcn+2 , since otherwise the pair (bn+2, cn+2) would be
blocking. Now from (4.8) we have that Abn+2 = {an+3} hence α(bn+2, cn+2) = an+3 and
therefore it follows from the preference list P ′(cn+2) that (b′, bn+2) ∈ Rcn+2 if and only if
b = bn+3. Hence cn+2 must be matched to bn+3. But now we can argue that since cn+3 was
the most preferred woman of bn+3, cn+3 must be matched to some b
′ such that (b′, bn+3) ∈
Rcn+3 . Again from (4.8) we have that Abn+3 = {an+3} hence α(bn+3, cn+3) = an+2 and
therefore it follows from the preference list P ′(cn+3) that (b′, bn+3) ∈ Rcn+3 if and only
if b′ = bn+2. But this means that cn+3 must be matched to bn+2, which contradicts our
assumption that bn+2 is not matched to neither cn+2 nor cn+3.
Lemma 4.3.4. In any solution to J bn+1 is matched to cn+1.
Proof. LetN be a solution to J . Suppose by contradiction that bn+1 is not matched to cn+1.
Then since cn+1 was the most preferred woman of bn+1 it follows that cn+1 must be matched
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to some b′ such that (b′, bn+1) ∈ Rcn+1 . Now from (4.8) we have that Abn+1 = {an+2} which
implies that α(bn+1, cn+1) = an+2. Therefore it follows from the preference list P
′(cn+1)
that (b′, bn+1) ∈ Rcn+1 if and only if b′ = bn+2. But from lemma 4.3.3 we know that bn+2 is
always matched to either cn+2 or cn+3. Therefore by contradiction, bn+1 must be matched
to cn+1.
Lemma 4.3.5. In any solution to J every man b ∈ B is matched to a woman from the
set P (b).
Proof. Consider a man b ∈ B and suppose by contradiction that b is not matched to
someone in P (b). It follows from lemma 4.3.4 that b cannot be matched to cn+1, since cn+1
is matched to bn+1. From the way we defined the preferences of b in J we can conclude that
b prefers cn+1 to its match in N . Furthermore we have an+2 ∈ Ab from (4.8). Now since
cn+1 ranks an+2 at the top of its list it follows that α(b, cn+1) = an+2 and thus (b
′, b) ∈ Rcn+1
if and only if b = bn+2. But then the pair (b, cn+1) is blocking, thus contradicting the fact
that N is a solution to J .
Lemma 4.3.6. I admits a complete weakly stable matching if and only if J admits a
stable extension.
Proof. Suppose that N is a complete stable matching for I. Then complete N to a perfect
matching on B′ ∪ C ′ by matching bi,j to ci,j for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [ti] and matching
bn+i to cn+i for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that every man in B′\B is matched to the woman
that it prefers the most hence no man in B′ can be part of a block. From lemma 4.3.5 we
have that every man in B is matched to a partner that is acceptable in I. Hence for any
b ∈ B, if c is a woman that b strictly prefers to N(b) according to the preferences in J ,
then it must be the case that c ∈ P (b) and b also strictly prefers c to N(b) in I. Since
N is a solution to I it follows that c prefers N(c) at least as much as b. We can now use
lemma 4.3.2 to conclude that (N(c), b) ∈ Rc. Therefore (b, c) cannot be a blocking pair in
J . Hence the perfect matching that we defined from N is solution to the instance J .
Conversely, suppose that J admits a stable extension, and let N be the part of this
stable extension obtained by restricting it to the sets B ∪ C. It follows from lemma 4.3.5
that N is a perfect matching and every agent is matched to an acceptable partner. To see
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that there are no blocking pairs consider any pair (b, c) /∈ N such that (b, c) is an acceptable
pair, that is b ∈ P (c) and c ∈ P (b). Assume now that in I man b strictly prefers c to N(b).
Since c ∈ P (b) it follows that b also strictly prefers c to N(b) in J . Since N is a solution
to J we must have (N(c), b) ∈ Rc. Again using lemma 4.3.2 we can conclude that N(c)
is a man in P (c) that c prefers at least as much as b in I. Therefore N does not have any
blocking pairs, and is a weakly stable matching in I.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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Chapter 5
The nucleolus of matching games
with empty core
Let (G,w) be a weighted graph and (N, v) the corresponding matching game. We assume
throughout this chapter that the edge weights are always non-negative. We denote by
ν(G,w) the maximum weight of matching of G with respect to the weights w. We recall
the primal dual linear programs defined in section 2.1.1
(PFM) max
∑
e∈E
w(e)xe (5.1)
x(δ(u)) ≤ 1 for all u ∈ V (G)
xe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E(G).
(DFM) min
∑
u∈V (G)
yu (5.2)
yu + yv ≥ w(e) for all e = (u, v) ∈ E(G)
yu ≥ 0 for all u ∈ V (G).
We let νf (G,w) denote the optimal value of PFM andDFM . We are interested in the case
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where core(N, v) = ∅, hence we assume throughout this chapter that νf (G,w) > ν(G,w)
(see Theorem 2.3.3).
Our approach for computing the nucleolus of (N, v) will be similar to the one used by
[53] and [68]. That is, we will focus on first obtaining a polynomial sized characterization
of the least core. We start by recalling the definition of the least core.
Definition 5.0.7. Given a weighted graph (G,w) we define the linear program P =
P (G,w):
(P (G,w)) max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ w(M) +  for all M ∈M(G)
x(V (G)) = ν(G,w)
x ≥ 0
where M(G) denotes the set of matchings of G. We denote by 1 = 1(G,w) the optimal
value of P and for any  we let P () be the set of vectors x such that (x, ) is feasible to
P . Then the least core of the matching game induced by (G,w) is defined as
leastcore(G,w) = P (1).
For node-weighted graphs Paulusma [68] obtained an equivalent characterization of the
least core that uses only a polynomial number of constraints. This characterization is based
on the odd components of the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of the graph. The following
lemma is shown in [68].
Lemma 5.0.8. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph and D(G) denote the set of odd components
in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G. If ν(G,w) < νf (G,w) then there exits D ∈
D(G) with |D| > 1.
Hence whenever the core of the matching game corresponding to (G,w) is empty, there
must exist at least one non-singleton odd component. The following theorem is the main
result in [68].
Theorem 5.0.9. Let (G, y) be a node-weighted graph with respect to the non-negative node
weights y ∈ R|V (G)|+ . Suppose that ν(G, y) < νf (G, y). Then leastcore(G, y) is the set of
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vectors x that are optimal solutions to the linear program
max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ y(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G)
E(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D,D ∈ D(G)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ν(G, y)
x ≥ 0
where D(G) denotes the set of odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G
and M1 is an arbitrary maximum cardinality matching contained in the union of these odd
components.
Theorem 5.0.9 essentially says that if G is node-weighted then the following are true
(i) In any least core allocation the edges belonging to the odd components of the
Edmonds-Gallai decomposition have non-positive excess while all other edges of the
graph have non-negative excess.
(ii) In any least core allocation the edges belonging to the same odd component of the
Edmonds-Gallai decomposition must have equal excess.
This implies that any maximum cardinality matching on the union of the odd components
has excess 1. Hence it suffices to include only one constraint of the type x(M) ≥ w(M)+
for the fixed matching M1. Then any other matching of G will have excess no worse then
M1.
Since this characterization no longer holds true for graphs that are not node-weighted,
a different approach is needed for general weights. Our main idea is to find a new set of
components that satisfy the two properties of Theorem 5.0.9. That is, the edges inside
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Figure 5.1: A matching game that is not node-weighted.
these components receive non-positive excess in any least core allocation, the edges outside
these components receive non-negative excess, and the excess is equal along each of these
components.
As an example consider the matching game shown in Figure 5.1. The red edges denote
a maximum weight matching of weight 14. This core is empty since the fractional matching
whose support consists of the two triangles and the middle edge has weight 20 > 14. Also,
this graph is not node-weighted, since there is no possible assignment of non-negative values
to each vertex such that the weight of each edge is equal to the sum of the values of its
endpoints.
2
2
2
2
A
B
C D
H
G
E F
1
10
10
10
1
0
0
0
1 14
4
4
Figure 5.2: A least core allocation with negative excess on both triangles.
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Figure 5.3: A least core allocation with negative excess only on the left triangle.
Note however that the graph in this example does have a perfect matching, meaning
that there are no odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of the graph.
Hence Theorem 5.0.9 does not hold in this case. In fact, the least core for this example
consists of all allocations of the form
xi = 5− α1 i ∈ {A,B,C}
xi = 1− α2 i ∈ {F,G,H}
xC + xD ≥ 1
xD + xE ≥ 2
xE + xF ≥ 1
α1 + α2 = 2
0 ≤ α1 ≤ 5
0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
The minimum excess achieved by any matching in this example is −4 and in any least
core allocation, all matchings that consists of one edge from each of the two triangles have
minimum excess. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show two different allocations in the least core. In
particular, note that the edges of the path receive non-negative excess in any least core allo-
cation, while the edges of the triangles receive non-positive excess. Furthermore, the edges
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of each triangle always receive equal excess. Hence in this example, the components that
satisfy the properties of Theorem 5.0.9 are not the odd components of the Edmonds-Gallai
decomposition but the two triangles A,B,C and D,E, F .
The key observation about this example is that the least core of G is a strict subset
of the least core of the subgraph of G consisting of only the two triangles and the middle
edge of the path. Moreover, this subgraph of G is actually node-weighted, hence its own
least core is characterized by Theorem 5.0.9.
In the next section we identify some conditions under which this will always be the
case. That is, given a graph that is not node-weighted, we can identify a node-weighted
subgraph and express the least core of the original graph as a subset of the least core of
this subgraph.
5.1 The least core: a special case
In this section we assume that (G,w) is not a node-weighted graph. We show that if G
satisfies certain conditions, then one can identify a node-weighted subgraph of G, that we
call G=, such that the least core of G can be characterized in terms of the least core G=.
We start by fixing an arbitrary optimal solution y to the linear program DFM . We will
later show that our results are independent of this original choice of dual solution. We
define G= be the subgraph of G induced by the edges e ∈ E(G) that are tight with respect
to y, meaning that y(e) = w(e). Then (G=, w) is node-weighted with respect to the vector
y. When referring to G= we will use y to denote the edges weights with the understanding
that y(e) = yi + yj = w(e) for all e = (i, j) ∈ E(G=).
Note that ν(G=, y) ≤ ν(G,w) since any matching M of G= with weight y(M) is also a
matching of G with weight w(M) = y(M). However, it is possible that ν(G=, y) < ν(G,w)
if there were some edges of G that were part of every maximum weight matching but
were not tight with respect to y. Since y is an optimal solution to DFM it follows from
complementary slackness that νf (G=, y) = νf (G,w). Hence from our assumption that
ν(G,w) < νf (G,w) we also obtain ν(G=, y) < νf (G=, y). Thus we can apply Theorem
5.0.9 to (G=, y) to obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 5.1.1. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y be an
optimal solution to DFM for (G,w) and let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the set of
edges {e ∈ E(G) : y(e) = w(e)}. Then leastcore(G=, y) is equal to the set of vectors x that
are optimal solutions to the linear program:
max  (5.3)
s.t. x(e) ≥ y(e) for all e ∈ E(G=)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G=)
E(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G=)) = ν(G=, y)
x ≥ 0
where D(G=) denotes the set of odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of
the subgraph G= and M1 is an arbitrary maximum cardinality matching on the union of
these odd components.
For any D ∈ D(G=) with |D| > 1 we let γ(D) denote the set of edges of G with both
endpoints in D. Note that there might be edges in γ(D) that are not in E(D) since they
were not tight with respect to the dual solution y. We give these type of edges a special
name.
Definition 5.1.2. An edge e is a chord if e ∈ γ(D)\E(D) for some D ∈ D(G=).
We also define the concept of an extendable allocation that will be crucial for our main
theorem. Recall that allocations in leastcore(G=, y) are defined over the set of vertices
V (G=). Essentially an allocation in leastcore(G=, y) is extendable if we can lift it to an
allocation over V (G) by just assigning value zero to vertices in V (G)\V (G=) without
inducing negative excess on any edges in E(G)\E(G=) that were not chords. We will show
later that this implies that the minimum excess of a matching does not decrease when
performing this lift.
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Definition 5.1.3. An allocation x ∈ leastcore(G=, y) is extendable if for every edge e ∈
E(G)\E(G=) that is not a chord we have∑
i∈V (G=)
δ(i)3e
xi ≥ w(e)
We can now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1.4. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y be an
optimal solution to DFM for (G,w) and let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the set of
edges {e ∈ E(G) : y(e) = w(e)}. Suppose the following conditions hold
1. ν(G=, y) = ν(G,w)
2. There exists an extendable allocation in leastcore(G=, y).
Then
leastcore(G,w) = P˜ (˜1)
where P˜ is the linear program
(P˜ ) max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G=)
γ(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ν(G,w)
x ≥ 0
e˜1 is its optimum value and M1 is a maximum cardinality matching on D(G=).
We note that P˜ has a polynomial number of constraints. We can also see that our
definition of P˜ is very similar to linear program describing the least core of (G=, y) in
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corollary 5.1.1. However there are two main differences. The first difference is that
allocations in the least core of (G=, y) are vectors x over the set V (G=) that satisfy
x(V (G=)) = ν(G=, y), while solutions to the linear program P˜ are vectors over V (G)
that satisfy x(V (G)) = ν(G,w). The first condition of the theorem ensures that the total
value of these allocations is always the same. The second difference is that for the least
core of (G=, y) we only required the constraints x(e) ≥ w(e) for edges in E(G=) that are
outside the odd components, while in our definition of P˜ we also impose these constraints
for edges in E(G)\E(G=) that are not chords. This is where the second condition of the
theorem will come in since it ensures that there exists at least one allocation in least core
of (G=, y) that satisfies these additional constraints.
We now present the proof of Theorem 5.1.4
Proof. Recall from definition 5.0.7 that leastcore(G,w) = P (1). It then suffices to show
that 1 = ˜1 and P (1) = P˜ (1). We start by showing that P˜ () ⊆ P () for any . Hence
let x ∈ P˜ () for some  and take any matching M ∈ M(G). It follows from the definition
of P˜ that the only edges of G that can have negative excess with respect to x are the ones
in γ(D) for odd components D ∈ D. Thus we can lower bound the excess of the matching
M by considering only these edges. We obtain
x(M)− w(M) ≥
∑
D∈D
∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− w(e)
Using the fact that y is a feasible solution to DFM we have∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− w(e) ≥
∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− y(e) =
∑
i∈D∩N(M)
xi − yi
where N(M) denotes the vertices in D that are covered by M .
Now for a given D ∈ D it follows again from the definition of P˜ that xi − yi is the
same for all i ∈ D. Moreover, any matching contained in γ(D) can cover at most |D| − 1
vertices of D, since |D| is odd. Hence we can lower bound the excess of M by the excess
of M1 and obtain
x(M)− w(M) ≥ x(M1)− y(M1) ≥ .
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This shows that x ∈ P (), and therefore we have shown that
P˜ () ⊆ P () ∀ (5.4)
as well as
˜1 ≤ 1. (5.5)
For the reverse direction, we first define the following relaxation of P
(Pˆ ) max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M(G=)
x(V (G)) = ν(G,w)
x ≥ 0,
with optimum value ˆ1 and where M(G=) denotes the set of matchings of G=. Instead
of having a constraint for every matching of G as in the linear program P , in Pˆ we only
have constraints for matchings of G=. Since for any matching M ∈ M(G=) we have
w(M) = y(M) the constraints of Pˆ are a subset of the constraints of P . In particular this
implies that
1 ≤ ˆ1. (5.6)
Note that for any vertex i ∈ V (G)\V (G=), there is no matching appearing in the con-
straints of Pˆ that covers i. It is then easy to see that for any optimal solution x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1)
we must have xi = 0 for all i ∈ V (G)\V (G=). Otherwise we could slightly modify x
by decreasing on i and increasing uniformly across all other vertices in V (G)\ {i} so that
x(V (G)) stays the same. The resulting allocation will still be in Pˆ (ˆ1) but now x(M)
strictly increased for each matching M that appears in the constraints of Pˆ . Hence there
are no x-tight matchings for the new allocation contradicting the optimality of ˆ1.
Using the first condition of Theorem 5.1.4 we therefore obtain
x(V (G=)) = ν(G=, y) for all x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1)
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Hence Pˆ (ˆ1) is the set of vectors x ∈ R|V (G)| that are optimal solutions to the linear program
max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M(G=)
x(V (G=)) = ν(G=, y)
x ≥ 0
Now recall from definition 5.0.7 that the least core of (G=, y) is the set of vectors x ∈
R|V (G=)| that are optimal solutions to the linear program
max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M(G=)
x(V (G=)) = ν(G=, y)
x ≥ 0
Hence it follows that
Pˆ (ˆ1) =
{
x ∈ R|V (G)| : xV (G=) ∈ leastcore(G=, y) and xi = 0 for all i ∈ V (G)\V (G=)
}
where xV (G=) is the projection of x onto the set V (G=).
Now let x′ be an extendable allocation in leastcore(G=, y) (guaranteed to exist by the
second condition) and define the vector x as follows
xi =
x′i i ∈ V (G=)0 i ∈ V (G)\V (G=)
Then using corollary 5.1.1 and the fact that x′ is extendable we obtain that x must satisfy
all of the constraints of P˜ and therefore x ∈ P˜ (ˆ1). This shows that
ˆ1 ≤ ˜1. (5.7)
From equations (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7) we obtain 1 = ˆ1 = ˜1. This together with (5.4)
implies that P˜ (˜1) ⊆ P (1).
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Hence the proof is complete if we show that P (1) ⊆ P˜ (1). Let x ∈ P (1). Then
x ∈ Pˆ (1) and letting x′ denote the restriction of x to the vertices in V (G=) we have
x′ ∈ leastcore(G=, y). Hence using corollary 5.1.1 again we obtain that x′ (and therefore
x) satisfies all of the constraints of P˜ except possibly the constraints x(e) ≥ w(e) for edges
e ∈ E(G)\E(G=) that are not chords. Let e be such an edge. Since e is not a chord it does
not have both endpoints in the same odd component in D. Since each component in D
is factor critical there must exist a matching M that is a maximum cardinality matching
on the union of the odd components D and such that M ∪ {e} is a valid matching of G.
From corollary 5.1.1 we know that M must have minimum excess with respect to x′ and
therefore also with respect to x. Hence
x(M ∪ e)− w(M ∪ e) = (x(M)− y(M)) + (x(e)− w(e)) = 1 + (x(e)− w(e))
and since x ∈ P (1) this implies that x(e) ≥ w(e). Thus x ∈ P˜ (1) and the proof is
complete.
As an example of a graph whose least core is captured by Theorem 5.1.4 recall our
graph from Figure 5.1. This instance has a unique optimal solution y to DFM shown in
Figure 5.4. The red edges denote all the tight edges with respect to this solution. Hence
A
B
C D
H
G
E F
1
1
1
1 15
5
5
Figure 5.4: Optimal dual solution and equality subgraph.
the graph G= consists of the two triangles plus the middle edge of the path. Since G=
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still contains a matching of weight 14 we have ν(G,w) = ν(G=, y), so the first condition of
Theorem 5.1.4 is satisfied. The least core of (G=, y) is given by all allocations of the form
xi = 5− α1 i ∈ {A,B,C}
xi = 1− α2 i ∈ {F,G,H}
xD + xE ≥ 2
α1 + α2 = 2
0 ≤ α1 ≤ 5
0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
To satisfy the second condition of Theorem 5.1.4 we would need an allocation in the least
core of (G=, y) that additionally satisfies xC +xD ≥ 1 and xE+xF ≥ 1. It easy to see that
such allocations exists, and both allocations shown in figures 5.2 and 5.3 fit this criteria.
5.1.1 When the first condition of Theorem 5.1.4 fails
While Theorem 5.1.4 describes the least core of certain graphs that are not node-weighted,
it still imposes fairly strong conditions. The natural question to ask is what happens with
graphs that do not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.1.4? Can their least core still be
captured using a node-weighted subgraph? We will first look at what happens when the
first condition of Theorem 5.1.4 fails. That is, ν(G=, y) < ν(G,w).
An example of this can be seen in figure 5.5 below. The red edges denote the unique
maximum weight matching of weight 12. The core is empty since the fractional matching
whose support consists of the two triangles has weight 33/2 > 12. The unique optimal
dual solution y to DFM is shown in figure 5.6. The tight edges are the ones belonging to
the triangles, hence G= in this case consists of two disjoint triangles. Note that
11 = ν(G=, y) < ν(G,w) = 12.
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Figure 5.5: An matching game where ν(G=, y) < ν(G,w)
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Figure 5.6: Optimal dual solution and equality subgraph.
The least core in this example consists of all allocations x satisfying
xi = 5− α1 i ∈ {A,B,C}
xi = 1− α2 i ∈ {D,E, F}
α1 + α2 =
3
2
0 ≤ α1 ≤ 5
0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
2
Figure 5.7 and 5.8 show two different least core allocations. In particular, we can see that
the edge (C,D) receives non-negative excess in any least core allocation while the triangle
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edges receive non-positive excess, and the excess is equal along the edges of each triangle.
In some sense we see the same behaviour as before: the least core of (G,w) corresponds
to the allocations in the least core of (G=, y) that satisfy xC + xD ≥ 1. However, the
correspondence in this case no longer means that least core of (G,w) is a subset of the
least core of (G=, y) since allocations in the least core of (G=, y) have total value ν(G, y)
while allocations in the least core of (G,w) have total value ν(G,w).
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Figure 5.7: A least core allocation with negative excess on both triangles.
10
10
10
1
1
1
1
A
B
C D
E
F
1
2
1
2
1
2
7
2
7
2
7
2
Figure 5.8: A least core allocation with negative excess only on the left triangle.
One way of characterizing the least core of graphs such as the one in figure 5.5 is to
prove a more general version Theorem 5.0.9. Instead of the least core, we consider the
set of allocations that maximize the minimum excess but assign a total value that can be
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larger than the maximum weight of matching, but is still strictly less then the maximum
weight of a fractional matching. We present this generalised result in the next section.
5.2 A generalisation of the node-weighted result
Recall the linear program P (G,w) that defines the least core of (G,w). For a given ∆ ≥ 0
suppose we change the program slightly by replacing the constraint x(V (G)) = ν(G,w) by
x(V (G)) = ∆. We then obtain the following definition of the generalised least core.
Definition 5.2.1. Given a weighted graph (G,w) define the linear program P (G,w,∆):
(P (G,w,∆)) max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ w(M) +  for all M ∈M(G)
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0.
Let 1 = 1(G,w,∆) denote the optimal value of P (G,w,∆) and P (G,w,∆)() the set of
vectors x such that (x, ) is feasible for P (G,w,∆). Then we define
leastcore(G,w,∆) := P (G,w,∆)(1).
Note that for ∆ = ν(G,w) the set P (G,w,∆)(1) is just the least core of the matching
game (G,w). For a general ∆, we can think P (G,w,∆)(1) as just a generalisation of the
least core, where instead of having a total value of ν(G,w) to distribute among the vertices,
we now have a total value of ∆. Our objective is the same: maximize the minimum excess
x(M)− w(M) of a matching. Note that as long as ∆ < νf (G,w) we will still have 1 < 0,
since νf (G,w) represents the minimum total value required in order to be able to satisfy
every edge.
In this section we assume that (G,w) is a node-weighted graph with respect to the
node weights y ∈ R|V (G)|+ . Hence we can replace w by y for the remainder of the section.
We review some notation used throughout this section:
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- M is set of matchings of G
- M∗ is the set of maximum cardinality matchings of G
- (D, A, C) is the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G
- MD is the set of matchings of G contained in
⋃
D∈D E(D)
- M∗D is set of maximum cardinality matchings in MD
- M1 is a fixed arbitrary matching in M∗D.
We also assume as throughout this chapter that ν(G, y) < νf (G, y), meaning that the
core of the corresponding matching game is empty. Recall from lemma 5.0.8 that this
implies that there exists at least one D ∈ D with |D| > 1. We now define a generalisation
of the linear program of Theorem 5.0.9 that captures the least core of node-weighted graphs
by similarly replacing the constraint x(V (G)) = ν(G, y) by x(V (G)) = ∆.
Definition 5.2.2. Given a weighted graph (G,w) that is node-weighted with respect to the
vector y ∈ R|V (G)|+ define the linear program P˜ (G, y,∆) as
(P˜ (G, y,∆)) max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G)
E(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D(G)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0
and let ˜ = ˜1(G, y,∆) denotes its optimum value. As before, D(G) denotes the set of
odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G and M1 is a fixed maximum
cardinality matching on the union of these odd components.
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Our main result is the following.
Theorem 5.2.3. Let (G, y) be a node-weighted graph with respect to the node weights
y ∈ R|V (G)|+ and such that ν(G, y) < νf (G, y). Suppose that ν(G, y) ≤ ∆ < νf (G, y). Then
(i) 1(G, y,∆) = ˜1(G, y,∆) and
(ii) P (G, y,∆)(1(G, y,∆))) = P˜ (G, y,∆)(˜1(G, y,∆))).
Note that for ∆ = ν(G, y) our statement is equivalent to Theorem 5.0.9, hence it
suffices to prove it for ν(G, y) < ∆ < νf (G, y). For the remainder of this section we drop
the notations (G, y,∆) when referring to the linear programs P and P˜ .
To prove Theorem 5.2.3 we follow the proof of Paulusma [68] step by step, pointing out
where differences arise due to the replacement of ν(G, y) by ∆. The proof of Paulusma
proceeds by a series of lemmas. Our proof will use the exact same lemmas, whose state-
ments remain unchanged. Most of the proofs will also be identical to the ones in [68],
and in most instances where there is a change the proof will actually become easier since
∆ > ν(G, y). The only lemma where this is not the case is lemma 5.2.9, where an entirely
different proof is needed to account for our use of ∆.
5.2.1 Proof outline
We first give a short outline of the main structure of the proof.
1. In the first and easier part we will show that P˜ () ⊆ P () for any . This will follow
mostly from the definition of P˜ and it will also imply that
˜1 ≤ 1.
2. In the second and more difficult part we will show that 1 ≤ ˜1. We will accomplish
this by introducing a relaxation Pˆ of P whose optimum value we will denote by ˆ1.
Since Pˆ is a relaxation we will automatically have
1 ≤ ˆ1.
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Moreover, Pˆ will be easier to analyze then P and will allow us to prove that optimum
solutions to Pˆ have similar structural properties to optimum solutions of P˜ . More
specifically we will show that there exists at least one special type of allocation
x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1), called a flexible allocation, that can be modified into an allocation x˜ such
that x˜ ∈ P˜ (ˆ1). This will imply that
ˆ1 ≤ ˜1.
And thus given our previous inequalities we will have established that
1 = ˆ1 = ˜1.
3. In the third and final part we show that P (1) ⊆ P˜ (1). Here we will use our
relaxation Pˆ again since any allocation in P (1) will also be in Pˆ (1) = Pˆ (ˆ1). Then
using the structural properties of optimum solutions to Pˆ we will show that the given
allocation also satisfies the constraints of P˜ .
5.2.2 Proof of the first part of Theorem 5.2.3
We start by showing the first part of Theorem 5.2.3.
Lemma 5.2.4. P˜ () ⊆ P () for any  and consequently ˜1 ≤ 1.
Proof. Let x ∈ P˜1() and let M be any matching of G. Then we can decompose the excess
of M as follows:
x(M)− y(M) = x(M ∩ E(D))− y(M ∩ E(D)) + x(M\E(D))− y(M\E(D)),
and since x(e) ≥ y(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\E(D) we have
x(M)− y(M) ≥ x(M ∩ E(D))− y(M ∩ E(D)).
Now since xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D and for any D ∈ D we can lower bound the excess of M by
the excess of the fixed maximum cardinality matching M1. Hence
x(M)− y(M) ≥ x(M1)− y(M1) ≥ .
Thus, x ∈ P1() as required.
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Hence, to prove Theorem 5.2.3 it remains to show that 1 ≤ ˜1 and P1(1) ⊆ P˜ (1). We
introduce a similar relaxation of P () as in the proof of Theorem 5.1.4.
(Pˆ ) max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈MD ∪M∗
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0,
with optimum value ˆ1. As before, the set Pˆ () contains the set of vectors x such that
(x, ) is feasible for Pˆ . Since Pˆ is a relaxation of P we automatically have P () ⊆ Pˆ () for
any  and therefore 1 ≤ ˆ1.
Instead of having a constraint for every matching of G, in Pˆ we only include the
constraints for maximum cardinality matchings and matchings completely contained in
the union of the odd components. The goal behind the definition of Pˆ is two-fold: on one
hand, Pˆ contains only a small subset of the constraints of P and thus it should hopefully
be easier to analyze. On the other hand, we want Pˆ to maintain the same optimal value as
P . That is, even though we have fewer matchings that we need to satisfy in Pˆ , we should
not be able to increase the minimum excess. This means that we expect the maximum
cardinality matchings together with the matchings in the odd components to be the ones
that limit the optimum value of P .
Our goal is to show that optimal allocations in Pˆ (ˆ1) satisfy most of the properties of
P˜ . Then given such an allocation x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) we will obtain from x a new allocation in
P˜ (ˆ1). This will then imply that ˆ1 ≤ ˜1 and thus we will obtain that the optimal values
of all the three linear programs are the same. Once this is established, the proof will be
completed by showing that any optimal allocation in P (1) also belongs to P˜ (1).
5.2.3 Existence of x-tight allocations on the odd components
For x ∈ Pˆ () and M ∈ M∗ ∪MD we say that M is x-tight if x(M) = y(M) + . The
following lemma is crucial toward eventually arguing that the odd components in D are
the ones accounting for any negative excess.
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Lemma 5.2.5. Let x ∈ Pˆ () for  < 0. If there are no x-tight matchings in MD then  is
not optimal.
Proof. Let x ∈ Pˆ () and suppose that there are no x-tight matchings in MD. We may
assume that some matching from the set M∗ must be x-tight since otherwise  cannot be
optimal. Let U be the set of all vertices i ∈ D with xi > 0. We claim that each x-tight
matching M ∈ M∗ must expose at least one vertex in U . If this was not the case, then
since M covers all vertices outside D (recall the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition) we would
have x(M) = x(V (G)). But then
x(M) = x(V (G)) = ∆ > ν(G, y) ≥ y(M)
Since  < 0, this implies that M cannot be x-tight. Let j be an arbitrary vertex in A ∪ C.
Note that every matching M ∈ M∗ must cover j. We can then define a new allocation x′
as follows:
x′i = xi − δ ∀ i ∈ U
x′j = xj + δ|U |
where δ is chosen small enough such that x′i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ U and no matching M ∈ MD
becomes x′-tight. Then since every x-tight matching exposes at least one vertex in U and
covers vertex j we have x′(M) > x(M) for all x-tight matchings. Thus x′ ∈ Pˆ1() and
there are no x′-tight matchings, meaning that  is not optimal.
5.2.4 Averaging over the odd components
In this subsection we will work toward showing that for any optimal allocation in x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1)
we must have xi− yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D. For this, we will need the following
definition.
Definition 5.2.6. Given a vector x ∈ R|V (G)|+ and D ∈ D we define the average of x and
y on D as
xD :=
x(D)
|D| yD :=
y(D)
|D|
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We then let x ∈ R|V (G)|+ be the vector obtained by averaging x on each odd component D ∈ D
with respect to the node weights y:
xi := xD − yD + yi for all i ∈ D,D ∈ D
and leaving x unchanged on A ∪ ⋃ C. Note that x satisfies xi − yi = xj − yj for all
i, j ∈ D,D ∈ D and x(D) = x(D) for all D ∈ D.
As an initial step we first have to show that whenever x is an optimal allocation so is
x. This seems intuitive since the average excess will be no worse then the minimum excess
of an edge. The next lemma proves that this intuition is correct.
Lemma 5.2.7. Let x ∈ Pˆ (). Then x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M∗ ∪MD.
Proof. Let x ∈ Pˆ (). It suffices to show that the constraints are satisfied after averaging x
on a single component D ∈ D. Thus let D ∈ D and let x′ be given by x′i = xD−yD+yi for
all i ∈ V (D) and x′i = xi for all i ∈ V (G)\V (D). We first consider the case of a matching
M ∈ M∗. By properties of the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition we know that M either
covers all vertices of D or exposes exactly one vertex of D. If M covers all vertices of D
then x′(M) = x(M) and we are done. Otherwise there is some vertex i ∈ D that is not
covered by M . Recall that D is factor critical. We may assume wlog that i maximizes
xi− yi over D since otherwise we can replace M inside D by a near perfect matching that
exposes i and the excess will only decrease. But then
xi − yi ≥ xD − yD = x′i − yi
and therefore x′(M)− y(M) ≥ x(M)− y(M) and are done.
It remains to consider the case of a matching M ∈ MD. Since we are lower bounding
the excess of M with respect to x′, we may assume wlog that M is a matching in MD
with minimum excess. If x(e) > y(e) for all e ∈ MD then all matchings in MD have
strictly positive excess with respect to both x and x′. Hence we may assume that there
exists at least one edge inMD such that x(e) < y(e). Then since M is a matching inMD
with minimum excess it follows that M only contains edges with negative excess. Hence
if xD − yD > 0, then M cannot contain any edge of D and therefore x(M) = x′(M) and
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we are done. On the other hand if xD − yD ≤ 0 then we may assume wlog that M is
near-perfect matching on D. Then the argument is the same as for matchings in M∗.
We are now able to show the full result.
Lemma 5.2.8. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). Then x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1).
Proof. It follows from the definition of x that x(V (G)) = x(V (G)). From lemma 5.2.7 we
also know that x satisfies x(M)− y(M) ≥ ˆ1 for all M ∈M∗ ∩MD. Hence the only thing
that remains to be checked is x ≥ 0. We let yDmin = min {yi : i ∈ D} for all D ∈ D. Then
using the definition of x it suffices to prove for all D ∈ D that
xD ≥ yD − yDmin.
Suppose by contradiction that xD′ < yD′−yD′min for some D′ ∈ D. Then using the definitions
of xD and yD this is equivalent to∑
i∈D′
xi <
∑
i∈D′
(
yi − yD′min
)
.
This implies that |D′| > 1 since otherwise the right hand side would be zero, and we know
that x ≥ 0. We may modify x if necessary on the vertices of D′ while keeping x(D′) the
same to ensure that xi ≤ yi − yD′min for all i ∈ D′. It is not too hard to check that x will
still belong to Pˆ (ˆ1) after this modification. But then there must exist at least one vertex
k ∈ D′ such that xk < yk − yD′min. It follows that k must be covered by x-tight matching
M ∈M∗ ∪MD.
We now show that we can modify x to obtain a new allocation x′ such that (x′, ˆ1) is
still feasible for Pˆ but there are no x′-tight matchings. This would then contradict the
optimality of ˆ1. We consider two cases. First, if there exists a vertex i ∈ V (G) that is
outside the odd components and xi > 0, then we can decrease x on i and increase x on
k by a sufficiently small amount so that the new allocation x′ remains feasible. But then
there are no x′-tight matchings in MD, hence by lemma 5.2.5 ˆ1 cannot be optimal. For
the second case suppose that xi = 0 for all vertices i ∈ V (G) that are outside the odd
components. Then⋃
D∈D
x(D) = x(V (G)) = ∆ > ν(G, y) ≥
∑
D∈D
y(D)− yDmin
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Since xD′ < yD′ − yD′min there must exist a component D˜ ∈ D such that xD˜ > yD˜− yD˜min. By
lemma 5.2.7 we may assume that x is averaged on D˜ and therefore xi > 0 for all i ∈ D˜.
We can then decrease x uniformly on the vertices of D˜ and increase x by the same amount
on xk, choosing a sufficiently small amount so that the new allocation x
′ remains feasible.
Since every x-tight matching in MD covers k but must expose at least one vertex of D˜
(odd component) the excess of all such matchings will increase and there will be no x′-tight
matchings in MD. We then arrive at the same contradiction as in the previous case.
Recall that one of the objectives behind the definition of Pˆ was to maintain the same
optimal value as P . The next lemma establishes a preliminary result towards showing that
the optimal values of P and Pˆ are the same.
Lemma 5.2.9. ˆ1 < 0.
Proof. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). By lemma 5.2.8 we may assume that x = x. If there exists an edge
in the odd components with negative excess then clearly ˆ1 < 0. Hence we may assume
that xD ≥ yD for all D ∈ D.
Now take any matching M ∈ M∗ and recall that for every odd component D ∈ D
either M covers all the vertices of D or M exposes exactly one vertex of D. Let D′ ⊆ D
denote the set of odd components that have a vertex exposed by M . Since M covers all
vertices outside the odd components we have
x(M)− y(M) = x(V (G))− y(V (G))−
∑
D∈D′
(xD − yD)
≤ x(V (G))− y(V (G))
= ∆− y(V (G))
< 0,
since ν(G, y) < ∆ < y(V (G)). Hence M has negative excess and therefore ˆ1 < 0.
For a given x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) we let Dmax ⊆ D be the set of odd components on which xD−yD
is maximum among all D ∈ D.
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Lemma 5.2.10. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). If there are x-tight matchings in M∗, then for each
D ∈ Dmax there is a x-tight M ∈M∗ that exposes a vertex of D. Furthermore, any x-tight
matching must expose a vertex of at least one D ∈ Dmax.
Proof. Suppose M ∈M∗ is x-tight and covers all vertices of D for some D ∈ Dmax. Recall
from the definition of the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition that for every odd component
there exists a maximum cardinality matching that exposes one of its vertices. Hence let
M ′ be any matching in M∗ that exposes a vertex of D. Let P ⊆ M ∪M ′ be the unique
maximal alternating path starting in D at a vertex i exposed by M ′ and ending in some
other odd component D′ at a vertex j exposed by M . Reversing M along P results in
another maximum cardinality matching M¯ , that covers the vertices (N(M)\i) ∪ j. Since
D ∈ Dmax it follows that xi − yi ≥ xj − yj. Therefore the new matching M¯ is also x-tight.
To prove the second claim note that if M would cover all the vertices of every D ∈ Dmax
then D′ /∈ Dmax meaning that M¯ has strictly lower excess then M . But this contradicts
the fact that M is x-tight.
5.2.5 Structural properties of optimal allocations
We are now able to prove some important properties about optimal allocations in Pˆ (ˆ1).
Recall that our overall goal is to show that optimal allocations in Pˆ (ˆ1) satisfy the con-
straints of P˜ . In particular the constraints of P˜ imply that the excess must be equal and
non-positive on each of the odd components. The next lemma shows that this is also the
case for Pˆ (ˆ1).
Lemma 5.2.11. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). Then
1. x = x
2. xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D
3. Each M ∈M∗D is x-tight
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Proof. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). We first show (2) and (3) for x and then prove that x = x.
(2) Suppose by contradiction that xD > yD for some D ∈ Dmax. Then xi > yi for all
i ∈ D,D ∈ Dmax. This implies that Dmax must be a strict subset of D since otherwise
there would be no x-tight matchings in MD contradicting lemma 5.2.5. Furthermore, any
x-tight matching in MD does not contain any edges from components in Dmax. Now if
A ∪ C = ∅ then we can define a new allocation x′ by decreasing x uniformly on Dmax by a
total value δ, where δ is chosen sufficiently small so that x′i ≥ yi for all i ∈ D,D ∈ Dmax;
and then increasing x uniformly on D\Dmax by a total value of δ. Then x′ will be a feasible
allocation that has no x′-tight matchings thus contradicting the optimality of ˆ1. Hence
we may assume that A ∪ C 6= ∅. Then let j ∈ A ∪ C and define a new allocation x′ by
decreasing x uniformly on Dmax by a total value δ, where δ is chosen sufficiently small so
that x′i ≥ yi for all i ∈ D,D ∈ Dmax; and then increasing x uniformly on {j} ∪D\Dmax by
a total value of δ. Then it is easy to see that x′ will again be a feasible allocation that has
no x′-tight matchings.
(3) From lemma 5.2.5 we know that there exists a x-tight matching M ∈ MD. Then
from (2) we may assume that M ∈ M∗D. Finally note that the excess of any matching
M ∈M∗D is equal since
x(M)− y(M) =
∑
D∈D
(|D| − 1)(xD − yD).
(1) Let M be a matching in M∗D with minimum excess with respect to x. Then
x(M)− y(M) ≤ x(M)− y(M) with equality if and only if x = x. But from (3) we have
x(M)− y(M) = ˆ1
and since x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) we must have x(M) ≥ y(M) + ˆ1. Thus x = x.
We point out here that while this result is crucial to establish the desired behaviour
of solutions in Pˆ (ˆ1) over the odd components D this lemma is not sufficient to show our
end goal that we can get an allocation in Pˆ (ˆ1) that satisfies all the constraints of P˜ . In
particular over the next sections we will prove the crucial property that edges outside the
odd components receive non-negative excess.
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We have established so far that maximum cardinality matchings on the odd components
are always x-tight. Our next step is to show that there are maximum cardinality matchings
of G that are also x-tight. The next lemma considers a special case where vertices outside
the odd components receive zero value.
Lemma 5.2.12. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). If x(A ∪ C) = 0 then every M ∈M∗ is x-tight.
Proof. If A∪C = ∅ thenM∗ =M∗D so the lemma is true by lemma 5.2.11. Hence suppose
that A ∪ C 6= ∅ and x(A ∪ C) = 0. Recall that every maximum cardinality matching
M ∈M∗ can be decomposed as
M = MC ∪MA,D ∪MD
where MC is a perfect matching in the union of all even components C; MD induces a
near-perfect matching in all odd components D ∈ D; andMA,D is a matching that matches
A completely into ∪D the union of odd components. By lemma 5.2.11 we know that MD
is x-tight, therefore
x (MC ∪MA,D) ≥ y (MC ∪MA,D) .
Now let B be the vertices in D that are connected to vertices in A by MA,D. Then
y (MC ∪MA,D) = y(C ∪ A) + y(B).
By lemma 5.2.11 we have xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ B and since we assume that x(A ∪ C) = 0 we
obtain
y(C ∪ A) + y(B) ≤ x(B) ≤ y(B)
meaning that yi = 0 for all i ∈ C ∪ A and xi = yi for all i ∈ B. This means that
x(M) = x(MC) + x(A) + x(B) + x(MD)
= y(B) + y(MD) + ˆ1
= y(M) + ˆ1
and therefore M is x-tight as required.
We finish this subsection with the following useful technical lemma.
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Lemma 5.2.13. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1). Then there exists some x-tight M ∈ M∗. Moreover, if
D ∈ Dmax or |D| > 1 then there is some x-tight M ∈M∗ exposing a vertex of D.
Proof. If A ∪ C = ∅ then M∗ = M∗D and all of these matchings are x-tight by lemma
5.2.11. On the other hand if x(A∪C) = 0 then again every matching inM∗ is x-tight from
lemma 5.2.12. Hence the proof follows since for every D, there exists an x-tight matching
in M∗ exposing a vertex of D.
Now assume that assume that A ∪ C 6= ∅ and x(A ∪ C) > 0. Suppose by contradiction
that there are no x-tight matchings in M∗. Then we can decrease x uniformly on A ∪ C
and increase x uniformly by the same amount on D where this amount is chose sufficiently
small so that the new allocation is feasible but has no x-tight matchings in M∗D thus
contradicting lemma 5.2.11.
Hence there must be some x-tight matching in M∗. Then by lemma 5.2.10 we know
that for every D ∈ Dmax there is an x-tight matching inM∗ exposing a vertex of D. We are
left to prove the same result for D ∈ D\Dmax with |D| > 1. Let D be such a component.
Then xi < yi for all i ∈ D by lemma 5.2.11. If D is covered by every x-tight M ∈ M∗
then since x(A ∪ C) > 0 we can decrease x on some j ∈ A ∪ C with xj > 0 and increase x
by the same amount uniformly on the vertices of D. Then again we obtain a new feasible
allocation with no x-tight matching in M∗D, contradicting lemma 5.2.11.
5.2.6 Flexible allocations
Our general strategy is to show that there exists a certain allocation x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) from which
we can obtain a new allocation x˜ that satisfies all of the constraints of P˜ with the same
ˆ1. Our choice of allocation in Pˆ (ˆ1) will therefore have to satisfy some useful properties.
The following definition makes these properties exact.
Recall that given any odd component D ∈ D and a maximum cardinality matching
M ∈M∗ then M either covers all vertices of D or exposes exactly one vertex of D. In the
latter case we say that M exposes D.
Definition 5.2.14. An allocation x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) is flexible if for each D ∈ D there is some
x-tight M ∈M∗ exposing D.
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Lemma 5.2.15. Flexible allocations exists.
Proof. Let x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) and suppose that x is not flexible. Then by lemma 5.2.13 there exists
a singleton component D ∈ D with D = {i} such that every x-tight matching inM∗ covers
i. This implies that A 6= ∅ and by lemma 5.2.12 we must also have x(A ∪ C) > 0, since
otherwise every maximum cardinality matching is x-tight contradicting our assumption
that x is not flexible. We now decrease x uniformly on vertices j ∈ A ∪ C with xj > 0
and increase xi by the same amount until some matching M ∈M∗ that exposes i becomes
tight. Note that this modification preserves all the x-tight matchings in M∗. Hence the
claim follows by induction.
Given a flexible allocation xˆ ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) we let α0 < · · · < αp denote the different values
that xˆD − yD takes on each D ∈ D, and let
D = D0 ∪ · · · ∪ Dp
be the corresponding partition of D. Then xˆi − yi = αi for all i ∈ D where D ∈ Di, and
Dp = Dmax.
Lemma 5.2.16. There exists a partition A = A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ap, with some of the Ai possibly
empty, such thatM ∈M∗ is xˆ-tight if and only ifM matches each non-empty Ai completely
into Di.
Proof. If A = ∅ the lemma is trivially true. Hence assume that A 6= ∅. Since xˆ equalizes
the excess on each odd component (by lemma 5.2.11) we can see that the excess of a
matching M ∈M∗ depends only on how many nodes of A are matched into each Di. The
lemma then follows from the following claim.
Claim 1. Let H be a bipartite graph with node classes A and B. Suppose that B =
B0 ∪ · · · ∪ Bp is a partition of B and edges incident with vertices of Bi have weight αi,
where α0 < · · · < αp. Let M∗ be the set of matchings that completely matches A into B,
and assume that M∗ 6= ∅. Let M∗min be the set of matchings in M∗ of minimum weights.
Finally suppose that each b ∈ B is left uncovered by some M ∈ M∗min. There exists a
partition A = A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ap, with some of the Ai possibly empty, such that M ∈ M∗min if
and only if M matches each non-empty Ai completely into Bi.
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We omit the proof of this claim since it identical to lemma 4.15 in [68] and the result
is independent of our use of ∆.
5.2.7 Completing the proof of Theorem 5.2.3
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 5.2.3. This is accomplished by the
following two final lemmas.
Lemma 5.2.17. 1 = ˆ1 = ˜1
Proof. In lemma 5.2.4 we already showed that ˜1 ≤ 1. Moreover we also have observed
that 1 ≤ ˆ1 since Pˆ was defined as a relaxation of P . Hence to prove the lemma it suffices
to show that ˆ1 ≤ ˜1. We do this by constructing an allocation x ∈ P˜ (ˆ1).
Let xˆ ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1) be a flexible allocation with corresponding partition D = D0 ∪ · · · ∪ Dp
and A = A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ap. We define a new allocation x˜ as follows
x˜i =

yi i ∈ C
xˆi i ∈ D
yi − αj i ∈ Aj, 0 ≤ j ≤ p
We now show that x˜ ∈ P˜ (ˆ1). Since αj ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ p (see lemma 5.2.11) we clearly
have x˜i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V (G). Then using lemma 5.2.11 the only constraints that remain
to be checked are
(1) x˜(V (G)) = ∆
(2) x(e) ≥ y(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
⋃
D∈D
E(D)
To prove the first item let M ∈M∗ be an xˆ-tight matching and decompose it as
M = MC ∪MA,D ∪MD
Since MD is also xˆ-tight by lemma 5.2.11 we conclude that
xˆ (MC ∪MA,D) = y (MC ∪MA,D) = x˜ (MC ∪MA,D)
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where the last equation follows by definition of x˜. But then we also x˜i = xˆi for all i ∈ D
thus we must have
x˜(V (G)) = xˆ(V (G)) = ∆
Finally to prove the second item let e ∈ E(G)\⋃D∈D E(D). If e has both endpoints in
A ∪ C then the claim follows from the fact that x˜i ≥ yi for all i ∈ A ∪ C. Hence assume
that e is an edge between D and A. If e joins Di to Ai then by definition x˜(e) = y(e).
Hence assume that e joins Di to Aj for some j 6= i. Suppose that x˜(e) < y(e). Then it
must be the case that αi < αj. Now since xˆ is flexible there exists an xˆ-tight matching
M ∈ M∗ exposing a vertex of D. Since D is factor critical and xˆ − y is constant on D
we may assume wlog that M exposes the endpoint of e. Since M is xˆ-tight lemma 5.2.16
implies that the endpoint of e in Aj is matched into Dj by some edge f ∈ M . But then
our assumption that αi < αj means that the matching M\f ∪ e has excess strictly less
then M , a contradiction. Hence x˜ ∈ P˜ (ˆ1) and the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.2.18. P (1) ⊆ P˜ (1)
Proof. Let x ∈ P (1). Then x ∈ Pˆ (1) and by lemma 5.2.17 this means that x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1).
Then by lemma 5.2.11 x satisfies all of the constraints of P˜ (1) except possible x(e) ≥ y(e)
for e ∈ E(G)\ ∪D∈D E(D). Thus let e ∈ E(G)\ ∪D∈D E(D). Then there exists a matching
M ∈M∗D such that M ∪ e is a valid matching of G. By lemma 5.2.11 M is x-tight. Since
x ∈ P (1) we must have x(M ∪ e) ≥ y(M ∪ e) + 1. Thus x(e) ≥ y(e).
5.3 The least core: a stronger result
In this section we use Theorem 5.2.3 to prove a stronger version of Theorem 5.1.4. Hence
we assume that (G,w) is not node-weighted and ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). As before, we fix
an arbitrary optimal solution y to the linear program DFM and let G= be the subgraph
of G induced by the edges that are tight with respect to y. For a given ∆, recall the
definition of leastcore(G=, y,∆) in 5.2.1 as the set P (G=, y,∆)(1(G=, y,∆)). We also
recall the definition of the linear program P˜ (G=, y,∆) in 5.2.2 together with its optimum
value ˜1(G=, y,∆).
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Since y is an optimal solution, once again we have νf (G=, y) = νf (G,w) = y(V (G=))
and therefore our assumption that ν(G,w) < νf (G,w) also implies that ν(G=, y) <
νf (G=, y). Hence we can apply Theorem 5.2.3 to (G=, y) to obtain the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 5.3.1. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y be an
optimal solution to DFM for (G,w) and let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the set of
edges {e ∈ E(G) : y(e) = w(e)}. Suppose that ν(G=, y) ≤ ∆ < νf (G=, y). Then
(i) 1(G=, y,∆) = ˜1(G=, y,∆) and
(ii) P (G=, y,∆)(1(G=, y,∆))) = P˜ (G=, y,∆)(˜1(G=, y,∆))).
We let D(G=) denote the set of odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
of G= and as before M1 is an arbitrary maximum cardinality matching on the union of the
odd components. Recall that a chord is an edge e ∈ E(G)\E(G=) such that e ∈ γ(D) for
some odd component D ∈ D(G=). We adapt the definition of an extendable allocation to
the generalised least core.
Definition 5.3.2. An allocation x ∈ leastcore(G=, y,∆) is extendable if for every edge
e ∈ E(G)\E(G=) that is not a chord we have∑
i∈V (G=):e∈δ(i)
xi ≥ w(e)
We can now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.3.3. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y be an
optimal solution to DFM for (G,w) and let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the set of
edges {e ∈ E(G) : y(e) = w(e)}. Suppose that leastcore(G=, y,∆) contains an extendable
allocation for some ν(G=, y) ≤ ∆ < y(V (G=)). Then
leastcore(G,w,∆) = P˜ (˜1)
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where P˜ is the linear program
(P˜ ) max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G=)
γ(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0
and ˜1 is its optimum value.
The proof of this theorem is essentially identical to the one of Theorem 5.1.4 except
that we replace ν(G,w) by ∆ and instead of using corollary 5.1.1 of Theorem 5.0.9 we now
use the more general corollary 5.3.1 of Theorem 5.2.3 that allows us to replace ν(G=, y) by
∆ as well.
Proof. Recall from definition 5.2.1 that leastcore(G,w,∆) = P (G,w,∆)(1(G,w,∆)). For
ease of notation we denote the linear program P (G,w,∆) by P and its optimum value
1(G,w,∆) by 1. We then have to show that 1 = ˜1 and P (1) = P˜ (1).
We start by showing that P˜ () ⊆ P () for any . Hence let x ∈ P˜ () for some . Then
the constraints x(V (G)) = ∆ and x ≥ 0 are clearly satisfied since they are present in
the description of P˜ , so remains to check that x(M) ≥ w(M) +  for any fixed matching
M ∈ M(G). It follows from the definition of P˜ that the only edges of G that can have
negative excess with respect to x are the ones in γ(D) for odd components D ∈ D. Thus
we can lower bound the excess of the matching M by considering only these edges. We
obtain
x(M)− w(M) ≥
∑
D∈D
∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− w(e)
Using the fact that y is a feasible solution to DFM we have∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− w(e) ≥
∑
e∈M∩γ(D)
x(e)− y(e) =
∑
i∈D∩N(M)
xi − yi
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where N(M) denotes the vertices in D that are covered by M .
Now for a given D ∈ D it follows again from the definition of P˜ that xi − yi is the
same for all i ∈ D. Moreover, any matching contained in γ(D) can cover at most |D| − 1
vertices of D, since |D| is odd. Hence we can lower bound the excess of M by the excess
of M1 and obtain
x(M)− w(M) ≥ x(M1)− y(M1) ≥ .
This shows that x ∈ P (), and therefore we have shown that
P˜ () ⊆ P (), (5.8)
as well as
˜1 ≤ 1. (5.9)
We will now show the reverse direction, that 1 ≤ ˜1. We first define the following
relaxation of P
(Pˆ ) max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M(G=)
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0,
with optimum value ˆ1. Since the constraints of Pˆ are a subset of the constraints of P we
immediately have
1 ≤ ˆ1. (5.10)
Note that for any vertex i ∈ V (G)\V (G=), there is no matching appearing in the con-
straints of Pˆ that covers i. It is then easy to see that for any optimal solution x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1)
we must have xi = 0 for all i ∈ V (G)\V (G=) and therefore
x(V (G)) = x(V (G=)) = ∆ for all x ∈ Pˆ (ˆ1).
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Hence Pˆ (ˆ1) is the set of vectors x ∈ R|V (G)| that are optimal solutions to the linear program
max 
s.t. x(M) ≥ y(M) +  for all M ∈M(G=)
x(V (G=)) = ∆
x ≥ 0
Hence it follows that
Pˆ (ˆ1) =
{
x ∈ R|V (G)| : xV (G=) ∈ leastcore(G=, y,∆) and xi = 0 for all i ∈ V (G)\V (G=)
}
where xV (G=) is the projection of x onto the set V (G=). Now let x
′ be an extendable
allocation in leastcore(G=, y,∆) (guaranteed to exist by the hypothesis of the theorem)
and define the vector x as follows
xi =
x′i i ∈ V (G=)0 i ∈ V (G)\V (G=)
Then using corollary 5.3.1 and the fact that x′ is extendable we obtain that x must satisfy
all of the constraints of P˜ and therefore x ∈ P˜ (ˆ1). This shows that
ˆ1 ≤ ˜1. (5.11)
From equations (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11) we obtain 1 = ˆ1 = ˜1. This together with (5.8)
implies that P˜ (˜1) ⊆ P (1).
Hence the proof is complete if we show that P (1) ⊆ P˜ (1). Let x ∈ P (1). Then
x ∈ Pˆ (1) and letting x′ denote the restriction of x to the vertices in V (G=) we have
x′ ∈ leastcore(G=, y,∆). Hence using corollary 5.3.1 again we obtain that x′ (and therefore
x) satisfies all of the constraints of P˜ except possibly the constraints x(e) ≥ w(e) for edges
e ∈ E(G)\E(G=) that are not chords. Let e be such an edge. Since e is not a chord it does
not have both endpoints in the same odd component in D. Since each component in D
is factor critical there must exist a matching M that is a maximum cardinality matching
on the union of the odd components D and such that M ∪ {e} is a valid matching of G.
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From corollary 5.3.1 we know that M must have minimum excess with respect to x′ and
therefore also with respect to x. Hence
x(M ∪ e)− w(M ∪ e) = (x(M)− y(M)) + (x(e)− w(e)) = 1 + (x(e)− w(e))
and since x ∈ P (1) this implies that x(e) ≥ w(e). Thus x ∈ P˜ (1) and the proof is
complete.
Applying Theorem 5.3.3 for ∆ = ν(G,w) we obtain a direct strengthening of Theo-
rem 5.1.4, where the first condition that ν(G=, y) = ν(G,w) is no longer needed. That
is, the least core of (G,w) is captured by the polynomial sized linear program P˜ as
long as leastcore(G=, y, ν(G,w)) contains an extendable allocation. To see that this is
a valid choice of ∆, note that ν(G=, y) ≤ ν(G,w) and from complementary slackness
νf (G,w) = νf (G=, y). Thus our original assumption that ν(G,w) < νf (G,w) also implies
that ν(G,w) < νf (G=, y). The result is listed below.
Corollary 5.3.4. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y be
an optimal solution to DFM for (G,w) and let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the
set of edges {e ∈ E(G) : y(e) = w(e)}. Suppose that leastcore(G=, y, ν(G,w)) contain an
extendable allocation. Then
leastcore(G,w) = P˜ (˜1)
where P˜ is the linear program
(P˜ ) max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
 ⋃
D∈D(G=)
γ(D)

xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D(G=)
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ∆
x ≥ 0
and e˜1 is its optimum value.
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5.4 Choice of optimal dual solution
The hypothesis of corollary 5.3.4 requires the existence of an extendable allocation in the
set leastcore(G=, y, ν(G,w)). Since this set is clearly dependent on our choice of optimal
dual solution y to DFM a natural question that arises is whether one has to check this
condition for every single possible choice of y. In this section we show that this is not the
case by proving that whether (G,w) satisfies the hypothesis is independent of our choice
of optimal dual vector y.
Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w) and y an optimal dual solution
to DFM . Let G= be the subgraph of G induced by the set of edges that are tight with
respect to y, and let D be the set of odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
of G=. We say that a maximum cardinality matching of G= exposes an odd component
D ∈ D if M covers exactly |D| − 1 vertices of D. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.1. For every D ∈ D with |D| > 1 there exists a maximum cardinality matching
M∗ of G= that exposes D, and in addition satisfies the following property:
- for all singleton components {j} ∈ D that are exposed by M∗ we have y′(j) = 0 in
any optimal dual solution y′ to DFM .
Proof. Let x be a basic fractional matching of G. Then it follows from complementary
slackness that the support of x belongs to E(G=). From Theorem 2.1.4 we have xe ∈{
0, 1
2
, 1
}
for all e ∈ E(G) and the edges {e ∈ E(G) : xe = 12} induce vertex disjoint odd
cycles. Let S ⊆ D be the set of singleton odd components that are covered by x. Then
by complementary slackness any singleton component {j} ∈ D\S must have y′(j) = 0 in
any optimal dual solution y′ to DFM . Since x is basic it must induce an integer matching
M on G=[S ∪ A] that covers all vertices of S. Let AS ⊆ A denote the set of vertices in A
covered by M .
Now let M∗ be any maximum cardinality matching of G= that exposes D. Suppose
that M∗ exposes some vertex i ∈ S and let f be the edge in M covering i. Let P be
the unique maximal alternating path in M ∪M∗ that starts with edge f . Note that P
cannot end with an edge ofM since this would imply the existence of a vertex in AS that is
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exposed by M∗, but since M∗ is a maximum cardinality matching it must cover all vertices
of A, and therefore AS. Hence P must end with an edge of M
∗. Then the endpoint of P
cannot be in S since all vertices in S are covered by M . Hence P ends in a vertex of an
odd component D′ ∈ D\S. Now reversing the edges of M∗ along P results in a maximum
cardinality matching of G= that covers i. Since this process did not expose any vertices
of S that were already covered by M∗ and kept D exposed, we can repeat the argument
until M∗ covers every vertex of S.
The following key lemma shows that the vertices belonging to non-singleton odd com-
ponents must receive the same value in any optimal dual solution.
Lemma 5.4.2. Let D ∈ D with |D| > 1. Then for all i ∈ D we have y′(i) = y(i) for any
other optimal solutions y′ to DFM .
Proof. Let D ∈ D with |D| > 1 and let M∗ be a maximum cardinality matching of G=
that exposes D and satisfies the property of lemma 5.4.1. We show that for any vertex
i ∈ D we can use this maximum cardinality matching M∗ to obtain a maximum weight
fractional matching x whose support contains an odd cycle passing through i. To do this,
we first need to recall a result of Cornue´jols and Pulleyblank 2.1.5 that says that if H is a
factor critical graph with |H| > 1 then for any vertex i of H there exits a perfect fractional
matching on H whose support consists of disjoint edges and a single odd cycle containing
vertex i.
We obtain a fractional matching x of G= fromM
∗ by making the following two changes:
- replace M∗ inside D by a perfect fractional matching whose support contains an odd
cycle passing through vertex i
- for any other odd component D′ 6= D with |D′| > 1 that is exposed by M∗ replace
M∗ inside D′ by any perfect fractional matching
Then it follows by choice of M∗ that x covers every vertex j ∈ V (G=) with yj > 0. Since
all edges of G= are tight we obtain∑
e∈E(G=)
xewe = y(V (G=)) = νf (G,w)
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Hence x is a maximum weight fractional matching of (G,w) meaning that it is an optimal
solution to PFM . Then by complementary slackness all edges in the support of x, in
particular all edges of the odd cycle containing vertex i, are tight with respect to any
optimal dual solution to DFM . This fixes the values of every vertex on the odd cycle
including vertex i. Repeating this argument for every vertex of D then completes the
proof of the lemma.
We now look at what happens when we have two distinct optimal solutions to DFM , y1
and y2. For i ∈ {1, 2} we defineGi to be the subgraph of G induced by the set of edges Ei :=
{e ∈ E(G) : yi(e) = w(e)} and let Di denote the odd components in the Edmonds-Gallai
decomposition of Gi. Our goal will be to show that leastcore(G1, y1, ν(G,w)) contains
an extendable allocation if and only if leastcore(G2, y2, ν(G,w)) contains an extendable
allocation. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.3. V (G1) = V (G2).
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ V (G1). To show that i ∈ V (G2) it suffices to find a basic solution
x to PFM whose support contains an edge incident with i since then by complementary
slackness this edge must be tight with respect to any optimal dual solution including y2.
Let x be any basic solution to PFM and assume that x does not cover i, since otherwise
there is nothing to show. Let M := {e ∈ E(G) : x(e) = 1}. By complementary slackness
we have M ⊆ E1. Let f be any edge in E1\M that covers i. Now let P be the unique
maximal M -alternating path in E1 that starts with edge f .
We first consider the case where P has odd length. Then P must end in a vertex j
exposed by M . Since x is basic, this means that either x does not cover j or the support
of x contains an odd cycle that includes vertex j. Suppose first that x does not cover j.
Then by complementary slackness we must have y1(j) = 0. Since all edges of P are in
E1, they are all tight with respect to y1, hence we can flip the edges of M along P to
obtain a fractional matching that covers i and has the same weight as x. Suppose now
that j belongs to an odd cycle C in the support of x. Let Mj be the maximum cardinality
matching on C that exposes j. We can then replace C byMj and flip the edges ofM along
P to obtain a fractional matching that covers i and has the same weight as x.
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It remains to consider the case where P has even length. Then P ends in a vertex j
that has degree one in G1. If y1(j) > 0 then we modify y1 slightly by decreasing y1 on j
and increasing y1 by the same amount on the unique neighbour of j in G1 until either y1(j)
becomes zero or some new edge becomes tight and joins G1, in which case we can extend
our path P . Note that this maintains the property that y1 is an optimal dual solution to
DFM . Hence we may assume wlog that if P has even length then it ends in a vertex j
with y1(j) = 0. Then we can once again flip the edges of M along P to obtain a fractional
matching that covers i and has the same weight as x. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Our next lemma establishes an important connection between the odd components of
G1 and G2.
Lemma 5.4.4. Two vertices i and j belong to the same odd component in D1 if and only
if they belong to the same odd component in D2.
Proof. Let D ∈ D1 with |D| > 1 and let i ∈ D. We first show how to construct a maximum
cardinality matching of G2 that exposes i, thus proving that i must also belong to an odd
component in D2. Let M2 be a maximum cardinality matching of G2 that exposes some
arbitrary non-singleton component of D2 and satisfies the property of lemma 5.4.1. If
M2 exposes i we are done, hence assume that M2 covers i. Now let M1 be a maximum
cardinality matching of G1 that exposes D and satisfies the property of lemma 5.4.1. Since
D is factor critical we may assume wlog that i is the vertex of D that is exposed by M1.
Let P ⊆ M1 ∪ M2 be the unique maximal alternating path starting at i. Then P
must end at some vertex j that is exposed by either M1 or M2. From lemma 5.4.1 we can
conclude that either y1(j) = y2(j) = 0 or j belongs to a non-singleton component of D1 or
D2 (depending on if it is exposed by M1 or M2). But then we can apply lemma 5.4.2 to
obtain that y1(j) = y2(j). Note that from the same lemma 5.4.2 we also have y1(i) = y2(i)
since i belongs to a non-singleton components of D1.
Hence we found an alternating path P whose endpoints have the same value in y1 and
y2. In addition for every odd edge e of P we have
y1(e) ≥ y2(e) = w(e)
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since e ∈M2 ⊆ E2 and y1 is feasible solution. Similarly for every even edge e of P we have
y2(e) ≥ y1(e) = w(e)
since e ∈M1 ⊆ E1 and y2 is feasible solution. Then a simple inductive argument shows that
we must have y1(k) = y2(k) for all vertices k of P , meaning that P ⊆ E1 ∩ E2. But then
we can reverse the edges of M2 along P to obtain another maximum cardinality matching
of G2 that exposes i. This shows that all vertices of D belong to odd components in D2.
Now by lemma 5.4.2 we know that y1(i) = y2(i) for all i ∈ D. Hence E(D) ∈ E1 ∩E2 and
thus all vertices of D must belong to the same odd component in D2.
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.5. An edge e is a chord of G1 if and only if e is a chord of G2.
Proof. Let e = (i, j) be a chord of G1. Then since e /∈ E(G1) we must have y1(e) > w(e).
From lemma 5.4.2 we have y1(e) = y2(e) and therefore we must have y2(e) > w(e) and
e /∈ E(G2). Moreover, from lemma 5.4.4 we know that i and j must belong to the same
odd component in D2 as well. Hence e is a chord of G2.
We can now prove our main result.
Theorem 5.4.6. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph with ν(G,w) < νf (G,w). Let y1 and y2 be
two distinct optimal solutions to DFM for (G,w) and for each i ∈ {1, 2} let Gi be the sub-
graph of G induced by the edges {e ∈ E(G) : yi(e) = w(e)}. Then leastcore(G1, y1, ν(G,w))
contains an extendable allocation if and only if leastcore(G2, y2, ν(G,w)) contains an ex-
tendable allocation.
Proof. For i ∈ {1, 2} let i be the minimum excess of an allocation in leastcore(Gi, yi, ν(G,w)).
Suppose that x is an extendable allocation in leastcore(G1, y1, ν(G,w)). Recall from lemma
5.4.3 that V (G1) = V (G2). Now take any matching M ⊆ E2 of G2. We can decompose
the excess of M as follows
x(M)− w(M) = x(M ∩ E1)− w(M ∩ E1) + x(M\E1)− w(M\E1)
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Consider an edge e ∈ M\E1. Since M ⊆ E2 we have e ∈ E2 and therefore e cannot be a
chord of G2. Then by lemma 5.4.5 e cannot be a chord of G1 either. Since x is extendable
with respect to G1 and V (G1) = V (G2) from lemma 5.4.3 we have∑
i∈V (G2):e∈δ(i)
x(i) ≥ w(e)
from which we obtain
x(M\E1) ≥ w(M\E1)
and therefore
x(M)− w(M) ≥ x(M ∩ E1)− w(M ∩ E1) ≥ 1.
Hence (x, 1) is feasible for the linear program defining leastcore(G2, y2, ν(G,w)). Thus
2 ≤ 1, and by a symmetric argument we can show that 1 ≤ 2. Hence we must have
1 = 2 and therefore x ∈ leastcore(G2, y2, ν(G,w)).
It remains to show that x is extendable with respect to G2. Hence let e be an edge in
E(G)\E2 that is not a chord of G2. Then by lemma 5.4.5 e is not a chord of G1 either.
Hence the fact that x is extendable with respect to G1 and V (G1) = V (G2) implies that∑
i∈V (G2):e∈δ(i)
x(i) ≥ w(e)
so x is extendable with respect to G2.
5.5 Computing the nucleolus
In this section we show how the polynomial sized characterization of the least core given in
Theorem 5.2.3 leads to a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus. Hence
let (G,w) be a weighted graph satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 5.2.3 so that the least
core of (G,w) is given by
leastcore(G,w) = P˜1(˜1)
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where P˜1 is the linear program
(P˜1) max 
s.t. x(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)\
(⋃
D∈D
γ(D)
)
xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D
xi − yi = xj − yj for all i, j ∈ D, D ∈ D
x(M1) ≥ y(M1) + 
x(V (G)) = ν(G,w)
x ≥ 0
and e˜1 is its optimum value.
Recall that y is an optimal solution to DFM and D is the set of odd components in the
Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of G=, the subgraph of G induced by the tight edges with
respect to y. Also M1 is a fixed maximum cardinality matching on the union of the odd
components in D. Hence
y(e) = w(e) for all e ∈ E(D), D ∈ D
y(e) ≥ w(e) for all e ∈ E(G)
For the remainder of this section we use the notation N = V (G) and ν = ν(G,w).
The contents of this section are very similar to [68] where it is shown that the polynomial
characterization of the least core of node-weighted matching games given in Theorem 5.0.9
can be used to obtain a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus. The idea
is to prove by induction that each subsequent linear program in Maschler’s scheme can
also be expressed with a polynomial number of constraints.
Recall from section 2.3.3 that the nucleolus can be obtained as the solution to the
following sequence of linear programs:
(P1) max 
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) +  for all S 6∈ {∅, N}
x(N) = ν(N)
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with optimum value 1. If P1(1) does not consist of a single point we proceed by defining
Fix P1(1) to be the set of coalitions that are fixed by P1(1)
Fix P1(1) := {S ⊆ N : x(S) = x′(S) for all x, x′ ∈ P1(1)}
And we solve the second linear program
(P2) max 
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) +  for all S 6∈ Fix P1(1)
x ∈ P1(1)
defining in a similar way 2 and
Fix P2(2) := {S ⊆ N : x(S) = x′(S) for all x, x′ ∈ P2(2)}
We continue in this way until we reach
(Pr) max 
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) for all S 6∈ Fix Pr−1(r−1)
x ∈ Pr−1(r−1)
such that Pr(r) consists of a single point η(N, v), the nucleolus of the game.
The problem with this scheme is that each linear program Pi contains an exponential
number of constraints. By Theorem 5.2.3 we can replace P1 by the equivalent P˜1 containing
only a polynomial number of constraints, since they define the same set of optimal solution.
We now show that each Pk for k ≥ 2 can be replaced by an equivalent formulation that
contains only a polynomial number of constraints.
For k ≥ 2 we define the linear program
(P˜k) max 
s.t. x ∈ P˜k−1(˜k−1)
x(e) ≤ w(e) + 1 −  for all e ∈
⋃
D∈D
E(D), e 6∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1)
x(e) ≥ w(e)− 1 +  for all e ∈ E(G)\
(⋃
D∈D
γ(D)
)
, e 6∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1)
xi ≥ −1 +  for all i ∈ N, i /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1)
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with optimal value ˜k and let
Fix P˜k(˜k) :=
{
S ⊆ N : x(S) = x′(S) for all x, x′ ∈ P˜k(˜k)
}
.
The following theorem shows that we can replace Pk by P˜k.
Theorem 5.5.1. We have k = ˜k and Pk(k) = P˜k(˜k) for all k = 1, · · · , r.
Proof. For k = 1 the claim follows from Theorem 5.2.3. We proceed by induction on k.
Assume that k−1 = ˜k−1 and Pk−1(k−1) = P˜k−1(˜k−1). We prove the induction step using
two lemmas.
Lemma 5.5.2. Pk() ⊆ P˜k() and therefore k ≤ ˜k.
Proof. Let x ∈ Pk(). Then x ∈ P1(1) = P˜ (˜1).
Let f ∈ E(G)\ (∪D∈Dγ(D)) such that f /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1). Choose a maximum cardi-
nality matching on the odd components M ∈M∗D such that M ∪ f is also matching. Such
anM always exists since each component D ∈ D is factor critical and e does not have both
endpoints in the same component of D. It follows from the definition of P˜1(˜1) that N(M),
the set of vertices covered by M , is fixed since all matchings inM∗D have minimum excess.
Thus N(M) must also by fixed by P˜k−1(˜k−1). Since we assumed that f /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1)
we must have N(M ∪ f) /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1) as well. Thus, by the constraints in Pk we have
x(N(M ∪ f)) ≥ w(M ∪ f) + 
and since M is fixed
x(N(M)) = w(M) + ˜1
and hence x(f)− w(f) ≥ − ˜1, satisfying the constraint in P˜k.
Next, let i ∈ N such that i /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1). The argument is similar. We choose a
maximum cardinality matching on the odd componentsM ∈M∗D. Then, by the constraints
in Pk we have
x(N(M)) + xi ≥ w(M) + 
and since M is fixed
x(N(M)) = w(M) + ˜1
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and hence xi ≥ − ˜1 as required.
Finally, consider any edge f ∈ ∪D∈DE(D) such that f /∈ Fix P˜k−1(˜k−1). Choose a
maximum cardinality matching on the odd components M ∈ M∗D such that M covers
both endpoints of f . Then since f is not fixed, neither is N(M)\N(f). Hence, by the
constraints of Pk we have
x(N(M))− x(N(f)) ≥ w(M)− w(f) + 
and using the fact that M is fixed we obtain x(f)− w(f) ≤ ˜1 −  as required.
Lemma 5.5.3. P˜k() ⊆ Pk() and therefore ˜k ≤ k.
Proof. Let x ∈ P˜k(). Again this implies that x ∈ P1(1) = P˜ (˜1). We want to show that
x(S) ≥ ν(S) + 
for all S ⊂ N not yet fixed by Pk−1(k−1) = P˜k−1(˜k−1). Hence let S be such a set. Since
x ≥ 0 it is sufficient to show the above inequality for S = N(M) where M is a matching
of G. Further, since x(e)−w(e) ≥ 0 for all e 6∈ ∪D∈Dγ(D) for D ∈ D, we can assume that
M ∈ ∪D∈Dγ(D). Since y is a feasible solution to DFM we have
x(M)− w(M) ≥ x(M)− y(M)
And since xi − yi = xD − yD for all i ∈ D, D ∈ D by the constraints of P˜1 we obtain
x(M)− y(M) ≥
∑
D∈D
|M ∩ γ(D)|(xD − yD)
Letting kD = |M ∩ γ(D)| for all D ∈ D, it then suffices to show that∑
D∈D
kD(xD − yD) ≥ 
Choose a matching M ′ ⊆ ∪D∈DE(D) such that |M ′ ∩ E(D)| = kD for all D ∈ D and
M ′ ⊆M∗ for some M∗ ∈M∗D. Then
x(M ′)− w(M ′) =
∑
D∈D
kD(xD − yD)
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Note that we can always choose such an M ′ such that M ′ is also not fixed. Now since M∗
is fixed, M ′ is not fixed, and M ′ ⊆M∗ we must have at least one edge f ∈M∗\M ′ that is
not fixed. Hence by the constraints of P˜ we have
x(f)− w(f) ≤ 1 − 
Further, for each edge e ∈M∗\(M ′ ∪ f) we have x(e) ≤ w(e) by the constraints in P˜1.
x(M ′)− w(M ′) = (x(M∗)− w(M∗))− (x(f)− w(f))−
∑
e∈M∗\(M ′∪f)
(x(e)− w(e))
≥ (x(M∗)− w(M∗))− (x(f)− w(f))
= 1 − (1 − )
= 
as required.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 5.5.1 shows that we can replace each linear program in Maschler’s scheme by
an equivalent one containing only a polynomial number of constraints. We thus obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.5.4. Let (G,w) be a weighted graph and (N, v) the corresponding matching
game. If (G,w) satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 5.2.3 then the nucleolus of (N, v) can
be computed in polynomial time.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The results presented in this thesis open many avenues for future work, some of which we
present below.
• Bridging the gap between network bargaining games with general capacities and their
cooperative games counterpart, c-matching games.
We have shown that the equivalences observed in the case of unit capacities do
not extend to general capacities. In particular, our results imply that the set of
allocations corresponding to balanced solutions form a strict subset of the intersection
of the core and prekernel. A natural question is to investigate further properties of
this subset. We believe that this subset characterizes allocations with important
structural properties, and the study of these allocations can be of interest to the
cooperative games community. Since the intersection of the core and prekernel is not
always convex, it would be particularly interesting to investigate whether this subset
is better behaved. As a further point, the nucleolus is known to lie in the intersection
of the core and prekernel, provided that the core is non-empty. However, it is not
known whether the nucleolus always corresponds to a balanced outcome. Since both
the notion of the nucleolus and balanced outcomes aim to capture fair solutions,
showing that there is an equivalence is an important step that would further validate
both concepts.
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• Investigating further properties of c-matching games.
While matching games are fairly well studied, very little is known about the more
general c-matching variant. Several fundamental questions about c-matching games
are still open. As a first question one could investigate the question of whether the
nucleolus can be computed efficiently for c-matching games with non-empty core, for
example when the underlying graph is bipartite. This setting poses significantly more
challenges then that of matching games, and it is evident that there is a need for
the development of some new techniques and structural tools for solving these prob-
lems. Another interesting avenue would be the exploration of the connection between
c-matching games and many-to-many stable matchings. In the case of many-to-many
stable matchings, it is known that if the underlying graph is bipartite then stable
matchings can be computed efficiently. This indicates that a similar result should be
possible for c-matching games on bipartite graphs.
• The existence of cyclic three dimensional stable matchings.
The problem of determining whether every instance of a cyclic three dimensional
matching possess a stable solution is still open. The results of this thesis seem
to suggest that the existence an efficient algorithm for computing such solutions is
unlikely. An interesting avenue would be to approach the existence question from a
non-algorithmic perspective.
• New extensions of network games.
One can also study the network games proposed in this thesis in a dynamic and
decentralized setting, where there is no central authority for enforcing a matching
protocol and the matching platform evolves over time. Such a setting can arise in
many electronic applications, for example matching markets on the internet that
involve a large number of agents interacting in real time. Scenarios such as these call
for the design of dynamic algorithms that allow for several externalities, such as peer
effects, incomplete information, or side payments. An important question would be
to develop such algorithm that converge towards stable outcomes efficiently.
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